International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLeahy, Dermot-
dc.contributor.authorNeary, J. Peter-
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-15T15:16:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-15T15:16:36Z-
dc.date.issued1995-05-09-
dc.identifier.other199509en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/1777-
dc.description.abstractWe examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D subsidy and welfare are higher in an equilibrium in which government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment yields gains but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all.en
dc.description.externalNotesA hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNIen
dc.format.extent536029 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP95/9en
dc.subjectResearch & Developmenten
dc.subjectR&D subsidiesen
dc.subjectStrategic trade policyen
dc.subjectExport subsidiesen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectDynamic consistencyen
dc.subject.classificationF12en
dc.subject.classificationL13en
dc.subject.lcshResearch, Industrialen
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial policyen
dc.subject.lcshCommercial policyen
dc.subject.lcshExport subsidiesen
dc.subject.lcshOligopoliesen
dc.titleInternational R&D rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitmenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.authorurlDermot Leahy (web page)en
dc.internal.authorurlhttp://www.ucd.ie/research/people/economics/drdermotleahy/en
dc.internal.authoridUCD0042en
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.type.capturetechniquePDFimageen
dc.neeo.contributorLeahy|Dermot|aut|-
dc.neeo.contributorNeary|J. Peter|aut|-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
wp95_09.pdf523.47 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Show simple item record

Page view(s) 50

1,519
Last Week
6
Last month
15
checked on Nov 28, 2020

Download(s) 50

285
checked on Nov 28, 2020

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.