Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries
|Title:||Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries||Authors:||Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J. Peter||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1779||Date:||Aug-1995||Online since:||2010-01-15T16:42:49Z||Abstract:||This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.||Item notes:||A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP95/11||Keywords:||Research & Development; R&D spillovers; R&D cooperation; Research joint ventures; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Strategic aspects of public policy||metadata.dc.subject.classification:||D43; L13; O32||Subject LCSH:||Research, Industrial
Research, Industrial--Government policy
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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