Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
wp95_11.pdf808.28 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Title: Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
Neary, J. Peter
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1779
Date: Aug-1995
Abstract: This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Research & Development;R&D spillovers;R&D cooperation;Research joint ventures;Subgame perfect equilibrium;Strategic aspects of public policy
Subject LCSH: Research, Industrial
Commercial policy
Research, Industrial--Government policy
Oligopolies
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

Show full item record

Page view(s) 20

156
checked on May 25, 2018

Download(s) 20

309
checked on May 25, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.