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Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries
Author(s)
Date Issued
1995-08
Date Available
2010-01-15T16:42:49Z
Abstract
This paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.
External Notes
A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP95/11
Classification
D43
L13
O32
Subject – LCSH
Research, Industrial
Commercial policy
Research, Industrial--Government policy
Oligopolies
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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