Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLeahy, Dermot-
dc.contributor.authorNeary, J. Peter-
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-15T16:42:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-15T16:42:49Z-
dc.date.issued1995-08-
dc.identifier.other199511en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/1779-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the free-market and socially-optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other, but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.en
dc.description.externalNotesA hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNIen
dc.format.extent827679 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP95/11en
dc.subjectResearch & Developmenten
dc.subjectR&D spilloversen
dc.subjectR&D cooperationen
dc.subjectResearch joint venturesen
dc.subjectSubgame perfect equilibriumen
dc.subjectStrategic aspects of public policyen
dc.subject.classificationD43en
dc.subject.classificationL13en
dc.subject.classificationO32en
dc.subject.lcshResearch, Industrialen
dc.subject.lcshCommercial policyen
dc.subject.lcshResearch, Industrial--Government policyen
dc.subject.lcshOligopoliesen
dc.titlePublic policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industriesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.authorurlDermot Leahy (web page)en
dc.internal.authorurlhttp://www.ucd.ie/research/people/economics/drdermotleahy/en
dc.internal.authoridUCD0042en
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.type.capturetechniquePDFimageen
dc.neeo.contributorLeahy|Dermot|aut|-
dc.neeo.contributorNeary|J. Peter|aut|-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
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