The trade-off between monetary and fiscal solidity : international lenders and political instability
|Title:||The trade-off between monetary and fiscal solidity : international lenders and political instability||Authors:||Bohn, Frank||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1788||Date:||May-2004||Online since:||2010-01-19T14:35:58Z||Abstract:||This paper analysis the intertemporal public finance decision under political instability. The government’s choice between inflationary finance and foreign debt is constrained by an interest rate, which is affected both by market conditions and debt conditionality. The main result is that there is typically a trade-off between seigniorage taxation and foreign debt. There are two implications. First, monetary and fiscal solidity can typically not be achieved at the same time. Second, myopic behaviour produced by political instability leads to a reduction of seigniorage, not to an increase as argued, for instance, by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (AER, 1992).||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP04/08||Keywords:||Debt conditionality; Myopic behaviour; Political economy; Seigniorage; Government deficit; Public finance||Subject LCSH:||Finance, Public
|Other versions:||http://www.ucd.ie/economics/research/papers/2004/WP04.08.pdf||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
Show full item record
Page view(s) 5080
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.