Symmetric research joint ventures : cooperative substitutes and complements

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Title: Symmetric research joint ventures : cooperative substitutes and complements
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
Neary, J. Peter
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1789
Date: May-2004
Abstract: We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we explore the implications of our results for the comparison between research joint ventures and a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Bertrand and Cournot competition;Cooperative substitutes and comp;R&D;Research joint ventures;Strategic trade and industrial policy
Subject LCSH: Competition
Joint ventures
Industrial policy
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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