A multisector model of efficiency wages
|Title:||A multisector model of efficiency wages||Authors:||Walsh, Frank||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/188||Date:||Apr-1999||Online since:||2008-06-03T15:35:25Z||Abstract:||The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low-turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on-the-job offers. If sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes, the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||University of Chicago Press||Journal:||Journal of Labor Economics||Volume:||17||Issue:||2||Start page:||351||End page:||376||Copyright (published version):||Copyright 1999 by The University of Chicago||Subject LCSH:||Efficiency wage theory
|DOI:||10.1086/209924||Other versions:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/209924||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Research Collection|
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