Efficiency wages and bargaining

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Title: Efficiency wages and bargaining
Authors: Walsh, Frank
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/192
Date: Nov-2005
Abstract: I argue that in contrast to the literature to date efficiency wage and bargaining solutions will typically be independent. If the bargained wage satisfies the efficiency wage constraint efficiency wages are irrelevant. If it does not, typically we have the efficiency wage solution and bargaining is irrelevant.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin; School of Economics
Copyright (published version): 2005 UCD, School of Economics
Subject LCSH: Wage bargaining
Efficiency wage theory
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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