Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment
|Title:||Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment||Authors:||Leahy, Dermot||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1950||Date:||Mar-1994||Online since:||2010-05-10T16:23:28Z||Abstract:||The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown (i) that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, with increasing marginal cost it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly, (ii) when firms choose R&D and quantities a small tariff will raise welfare. This result can be reversed under Bertrand competition.||Item notes:||A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI||Funding Details:||Not applicable||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP94/1||Keywords:||Protection; Export promotion; R&D; Oligopoly; Precommitment||JEL Codes:||F12; L13||Subject LCSH:||Commercial policy--Mathematical models
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed||This item is made available under a Creative Commons License:||https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/1.0/|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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