Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment

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Title: Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1950
Date: Mar-1994
Abstract: The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown (i) that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, with increasing marginal cost it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly, (ii) when firms choose R&D and quantities a small tariff will raise welfare. This result can be reversed under Bertrand competition.
Funding Details: Not applicable
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: ProtectionExport promotionR&DOligopolyPrecommitment
Subject LCSH: Commercial policy--Mathematical models
Oligopolies
Exports--Mathematical models
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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