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Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment
Author(s)
Date Issued
1994-03
Date Available
2010-05-10T16:23:28Z
Abstract
The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown (i) that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, with increasing marginal cost it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly, (ii) when firms choose R&D and quantities a small tariff will raise welfare. This result can be reversed under Bertrand competition.
External Notes
A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Sponsorship
Not applicable
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP94/1
Classification
F12
L13
Subject – LCSH
Commercial policy--Mathematical models
Oligopolies
Exports--Mathematical models
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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