Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

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Title: Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets
Authors: Neary, J. Peter
O'Sullivan, Paul
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/3045
Date: 11-May-1998
Abstract: This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
Funding Details: Not applicable
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Research and development;R&D spillovers;Cooperative agreements;Research Joint Ventures;Strategic trade policy;Export subsidies;Commitment;Dynamic consistency
Subject LCSH: Research, Industrial--Mathematical models
Commercial policy--Mathematical models
Export subsidies--Mathematical models
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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