Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeary, J. Peter-
dc.contributor.authorO'Sullivan, Paul-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-25T14:22:23Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-25T14:22:23Z-
dc.date.issued1998-05-11-
dc.identifier.other199810en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/3045-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.en
dc.description.sponsorshipNot applicableen
dc.format.extent5028840 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP98/10en
dc.subjectResearch and developmenten
dc.subjectR&D spilloversen
dc.subjectCooperative agreementsen
dc.subjectResearch Joint Venturesen
dc.subjectStrategic trade policyen
dc.subjectExport subsidiesen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subjectDynamic consistencyen
dc.subject.lcshResearch, Industrial--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshCommercial policy--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshExport subsidies--Mathematical modelsen
dc.titleBeat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic marketsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.neeo.contributorNeary|J. Peter|aut|-
dc.neeo.contributorO'Sullivan|Paul|aut|-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
WP 98-10b.pdf2.6 MBAdobe PDFDownload
Show simple item record

Page view(s) 50

1,551
Last Week
5
Last month
12
checked on Nov 28, 2020

Download(s) 50

234
checked on Nov 28, 2020

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.