'Let's Look at it Objectively': Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized

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Title: 'Let's Look at it Objectively': Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized
Authors: Moran, Dermot
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4318
Date: Jul-2013
Online since: 2014-07-31T03:00:09Z
Abstract: In recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into the naturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is constituted through the intentional activity of cooperating subjects. Understanding the role of cooperating subjects in producing the experience of the one, shared, objective world keeps phenomenology committed to a resolutely anti-naturalist (or ‘transcendental’) philosophy.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Journal: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Volume: 72
Issue: July 2013
Start page: 89
End page: 115
Copyright (published version): 2013 The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors
Keywords: PhenomenologyNaturalism
DOI: 10.1017/S1358246113000064
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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