'Let's Look at it Objectively': Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized
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|Title:||'Let's Look at it Objectively': Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized||Authors:||Moran, Dermot||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4318||Date:||Jul-2013||Abstract:||In recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into the naturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is constituted through the intentional activity of cooperating subjects. Understanding the role of cooperating subjects in producing the experience of the one, shared, objective world keeps phenomenology committed to a resolutely anti-naturalist (or ‘transcendental’) philosophy.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Cambridge University Press||Copyright (published version):||2013 The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors||Keywords:||Phenomenology;Naturalism||DOI:||10.1017/S1358246113000064||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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