Social Choice in Sensor Networks

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Title: Social Choice in Sensor Networks
Authors: Muldoon, Conor
O'Hare, G. M. P. (Greg M. P.)
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4407
Date: Aug-2012
Abstract: In this position statement, we argue for the use of online algorithms for social choice and group decision making in sensor networks whereby self-interested agents socially maximize their utility and preferences, which are based on variable network state. Specifically, we consider the nondictatorship principle of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and discuss this in the context of the Schulze voting method.
Type of material: Conference Publication
Publisher: WAITS 2012 Workshop
Keywords: Networks;Sensor;Telecommunications
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Conference Details: ECAI 2012 Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Telecommunications & Sensor Networks (WAITS 2012), Montpellier, France, August, 2012
Appears in Collections:Computer Science Research Collection

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