Sovereign Default and the Euro

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWhelan, Karl-
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-30T11:26:05Z-
dc.date.available2013-07-30T11:26:05Z-
dc.date.issued2013-07-
dc.identifier.other201309en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/4474-
dc.description.abstractThe introduction of the euro meant that countries with sovereign debt problems could not use monetisation and devaluation as a way to prevent default. The institutional structures of the euro were also widely thought to prevent a country in difficulties being bailed out by other euro members or having its sovereign debt purchased by the ECB. Despite these restrictions, there was relatively little discussion about sovereign default in pre-EMU debates among economists and financial markets priced in almost no default risk in the pre-crisis years. The crisis has seen bailouts and bond purchases by the ECB but there has also been a sovereign default inside the euro and further defaults seem likely. The introduction of the euro was intended to bring greater stability by ending devaluations triggered by self-fulfilling runs on a currency. While this particular scenario can no longer happen, this paper discusses mechanisms whereby expectations that a country may leave the euro can lead to this outcome occurring.en
dc.description.sponsorshipNot applicableen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP13/09en
dc.relation.requiresEconomists Online Collection & RePEcen
dc.subjectEuro Crisisen
dc.subjectSovereign Defaulten
dc.titleSovereign Default and the Euroen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.internal.webversionshttp://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP13_09.pdf-
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.neeo.contributorWhelan|Karl|aut|-
dc.description.adminASen
dc.date.updated2013-07-26-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
WP13_09.pdf515.65 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Show simple item record

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.