XI-Internalising practical reasons
Files in This Item:
|Internalising_practical_reasons.pdf||50.3 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||XI-Internalising practical reasons||Authors:||Stout, Rowland||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4957||Date:||Jun-2004||Abstract:||Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent’s state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this means that in a causal process of acting the justifying reasons have done their work by the time the agent has the appropriate beliefs and desires. Transforming these into behaviour is not guided by reason. This conception of action in which there is no role for reason in the part of the process where anything actually gets done is not acceptable. So the original assumption that beliefs rather than the believed facts figure in the casual explanation of action should be challenged||Type of material:||Conference Publication||Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell||Copyright (published version):||2004, Wiley-Blackwell||Keywords:||Philosophy of action;Agency;Causal theory;Normative||DOI:||10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00090.x||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed||Conference Details:||Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday, 24th May, 2004 at 4.15 pm.|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.