What you know when you know an answer to a question
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|Title:||What you know when you know an answer to a question||Authors:||Stout, Rowland||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4969||Date:||Jun-2010||Abstract:||A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, which is implicit in much of the literature on this, is spelt out and its significance explored. The argument includes an assumption that knowing-wh involves a subject being in a relation with an answer to a question and an assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. The paper considers a series of counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions, developing refinements until the best one is achieved. The neatest response to the existence of this counterexample is to deny that answers must be facts.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Wiley||Copyright (published version):||2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.||Keywords:||Knowledge;Knowing;Assumption||DOI:||10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00745.x||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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