Being subject to the rule to do what the rules tell you to do
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|Title:||Being subject to the rule to do what the rules tell you to do||Authors:||Stout, Rowland||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4974||Date:||Apr-2010||Abstract:||One way to start thinking about agency is to try to distinguish the special way that reasons are involved in action from the way that reasons are involved in inanimate nature. Consider the following pair of explanations: Explanation A. The reason the soufflé collapsed is that the oven door was opened at the wrong time. Explanation B. The reason John collapsed onto the sofa was that he was exhausted after a hard day at work.||Type of material:||Book Chapter||Publisher:||Routledge||Copyright (published version):||2010, individual contributors for their contributions||Keywords:||Agency;Normativity;Causality||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed||Is part of:||Weiss, B. and Wanderer, J. (eds.). Reading Brandom : on making it explicit|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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