German Idealism and Normativity
Files in This Item:
|Brian_O'Connor_-_German_Idealism_and_Normativity.pdf||81.37 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||German Idealism and Normativity||Authors:||O'Connor, Brian||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5192||Date:||Feb-2009||Online since:||2013-12-16T09:33:49Z||Abstract:||A defining commitment of that group of philosophers labelled the German Idealists is that experience is not explicable as natural stimulus and response. Rather, experience is infused with rules which are to be understood as determinations of reason. What this means, essentially, is that our experience of the world bears the characteristics of determinations that, precisely as the products of reason, are attributable to human beings. These determinations of reason act as constraints on behaviour and on knowledge, yet these are, in effect, constraints that we give to ourselves. It is this idea to which the famous thesis of the autonomy of reason refers: reason is not grounded in nature and nor is it part of the chain of material causality.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Taylor & Francis (Routledge)||Journal:||International Journal of Philosophical Studies||Volume:||17||Issue:||1||Start page:||3||End page:||7||Copyright (published version):||2009, Taylor & Francis||Keywords:||German idealists||DOI:||10.1080/09672550902727819||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.