A missing step in Kant's refutation of idealism

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Title: A missing step in Kant's refutation of idealism
Authors: O'Connor, Brian
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5365
Date: 2006
Abstract: This paper contends that Kant’s argument in the Refutation of Idealism section of the Critique of Pure Reason misses a step which allows Kant to move illicitly from inner experience to outer objects. The argument for persistent outer objects does not comprehensively address the sceptic’s doubts as it leaves room for the question about the necessary connection between representations and outer objects. A second fundamental issue is the ability of transcendental idealism to deliver the account of outer objects, as required by the Refutation of Idealism itself.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Centre
Copyright (published version): 2006 Idealistic Studies
Keywords: Kant;Idealism
DOI: 10.5840/idstudies200636214
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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