A missing step in Kant's refutation of idealism
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|Title:||A missing step in Kant's refutation of idealism||Authors:||O'Connor, Brian||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5365||Date:||2006||Abstract:||This paper contends that Kant’s argument in the Refutation of Idealism section of the Critique of Pure Reason misses a step which allows Kant to move illicitly from inner experience to outer objects. The argument for persistent outer objects does not comprehensively address the sceptic’s doubts as it leaves room for the question about the necessary connection between representations and outer objects. A second fundamental issue is the ability of transcendental idealism to deliver the account of outer objects, as required by the Refutation of Idealism itself.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Philosophy Documentation Centre||Copyright (published version):||2006 Idealistic Studies||Keywords:||Kant;Idealism||DOI:||10.5840/idstudies200636214||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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