Seeing ourselves as others see us: The place of reason in Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments
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|Title:||Seeing ourselves as others see us: The place of reason in Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments||Authors:||Casey, Gerard||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5406||Date:||Dec-2012||Abstract:||In making a feeling or sentiment such as sympathy foundational to his ethical analysis Adam Smith appears to set himself on a collision course with those ethical theories in which reason plays a central role. I shall claim, contrary to appearances, that reason has an important part to play in Smith’s final account of ethics; that what Smith rejects when he appears to reject reason, is a kind of austere ultrarationalism (a la Cudworth, Plato or the Stoics) that would make reason the original independent source of our ethical judgements; and that, in the end, Smith does not reject reason but rather develops a complex theory of morality which permits reason to play a significant role in man’s moral life.||Type of material:||Book Chapter||Publisher:||Rowman and Littlefield (Lexington Books)||Copyright (published version):||2012, Lexington Books||Keywords:||Ethics;Ethical analysis;Judgement;Morality;Philosophy||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed||Is part of:||Ricca Edmondson, Karlheinz Huelser (eds.). Politics of Practical Reasoning: Integrating Action, Discourse and Argument|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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