Minds and machines
|Title:||Minds and machines||Authors:||Casey, Gerard||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5469||Date:||Jun-1992||Abstract:||The emergence of electronic computers in the last thirty years has given rise to many interesting questions. Many of these questions are technical, relating to a machine’s ability to perform complex operations in a variety of circumstances. While some of these questions are not without philosophical interest, the one question which above all others has stimulated philosophical interest is explicitly non-technical and it can be expressed crudely as follows: Can a machine be said to think and, if so, in what sense? The issue has received much attention in the scholarly journals with articles and arguments appearing in great profusion, some resolutely answering this question in the affirmative, some, equally resolutely, answering this question in the negative, and others manifesting modified rapture. While the ramifications of the question are enormous I believe that the issue at the heart of the matter has gradually emerged from the forest of complications||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||American Catholic Philosophical Association||Journal:||American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly||Volume:||66||Issue:||1||Start page:||57||End page:||80||Copyright (published version):||1992 American Catholic Philosophical Association||Keywords:||Philosophy; Computers; Artificial intelligence||DOI:||10.5840/acpq199266143||Other versions:||www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/gerardcasey/casey/MndMchnes.pdf||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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