Hegel's phenomenology and the question of semantic pragmatism
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|Title:||Hegel's phenomenology and the question of semantic pragmatism||Authors:||O'Connor, Brian||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5509||Date:||Sep-2007||Abstract:||This paper criticizes the assumptions behind Robert Brandom's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, contending that Hegel's concern with the rational structure of experience, his valorization of reflection over ordinary experience and his idea of the necessity of progress in knowledge cannot be accommodated within the framework of semantic pragmatism. The central contentions are that Brandom's pragmatism never comes to terms with Hegel's idea of truth as a result, leading to a historicist distortion, and also that Brandom's failure to deal with Hegel's distinction between natural consciousness and the phenomenological observer collapses Hegel's phenomenology into a philosophy restricted to the level of natural consciousness.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Philosophy Documentation Centre||Copyright (published version):||2007 The Owl of Minerva (Journal of the Hegel Society of America)||Keywords:||Phenomenology; Semantic pragmatism||DOI:||10.5840/owl2006/2007381/210||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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