Three Pragmatisms: Putnam, Rorty and Brandom
|Title:||Three Pragmatisms: Putnam, Rorty and Brandom||Authors:||Baghramian, Maria||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5610||Date:||2008||Abstract:||Over the last several decades an increasing number of philosophers have announced their sympathies for or have become affiliated with what has become known as neo-pragmatism. The connection between the various strands of pragmatism, new and old, however, remains quite unclear. This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by focusing on a debate between Hilary Putnam and Robert Brandom on classical and contemporary pragmatisms. Using the Brandom-Putnam debate as my starting point, I examine the relationship between the pragmatisms of Putnam and Rorty, two of the most influential neopragmatists, and argue that differing conceptions of the normative are at the heart of their disagreement. I further argue that this disagreement has similarities to, and can be illuminated by, two differing conceptions of norms in Wittgenstein’s work. I conclude that Brandom does not delineate the differences between various strands of pragmatism convincingly.||Type of material:||Book Chapter||Publisher:||Rodopi||Copyright (published version):||2008 Editions Rodopi B. V.||Keywords:||Pragmatism;Hilary Putnam;Robert Brandom||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed||Is part of:||Monroy, María Uxía Rivas et al. (eds.). Following Putnam's Trail: On Realism and Other Issues|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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