Player type distributions as state variables and information revelation in zero sum repeated games with discounting

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
berginj_article_pub_006.pdf529.37 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Title: Player type distributions as state variables and information revelation in zero sum repeated games with discounting
Authors: Bergin, James
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/603
Date: Aug-1992
Abstract: This paper examines the role of the player type distributions in repeated zero sum games of incomplete information with discounting of payoffs. In particular the strategic "sufficiency" of the posterior distributions for histories and the Limiting properties of the posterior sequence are discussed. It is shown that differentiability of the value function is sufficient to allow the posteriors to serve as "state" variables for histories. The limiting properties of the posterior distributions are considered and a characterization given of the set of possible limit points of the posterior distribution. This characterization is given in terms of the "value" of information in the one-stage game.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Copyright (published version): Copyright 1992 Institute of Management Sciences/or Operations Research of America
Keywords: Discounted payoffs;Incomplete information;Zero-sum games
Subject LCSH: Distribution (Probability theory)
Game theory
Probabilities
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Geary Institute Research Collection
Economics Research Collection

Show full item record

Page view(s) 50

82
checked on May 25, 2018

Download(s) 50

126
checked on May 25, 2018

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.