White Elephants and the Limits to Efficient Investment
|Title:||White Elephants and the Limits to Efficient Investment||Authors:||Bohn, Frank||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/6369||Date:||May-2004||Abstract:||This paper studies a policymaker’s optimal choice between redistribution and efficient public investment. Under political instability, there is myopic government behavior which results in underinvestment. Above some critical value of political instability, it is optimal not to invest at all. This finding also suggests that it may be rational for governments to refrain from anti-corruption investment, even if they are not rent-seeking themselves.||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Start page:||1||End page:||14||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP04/13||Keywords:||Political instability; Myopic behavior; Public investment; Corruption; Political economy; Transition and developing countries||Other versions:||http://www.ucd.ie/economics/research/papers/2004/WP04.13.pdf||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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