White Elephants and the Limits to Efficient Investment

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Title: White Elephants and the Limits to Efficient Investment
Authors: Bohn, Frank
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/6369
Date: May-2004
Abstract: This paper studies a policymaker’s optimal choice between redistribution and efficient public investment. Under political instability, there is myopic government behavior which results in underinvestment. Above some critical value of political instability, it is optimal not to invest at all. This finding also suggests that it may be rational for governments to refrain from anti-corruption investment, even if they are not rent-seeking themselves.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Political instability;Myopic behavior;Public investment;Corruption;Political economy;Transition and developing countries
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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