Fertilizer and Votes: Does Strategic Economic Policy Explain the 2009 Malawi Election?
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|Title:||Fertilizer and Votes: Does Strategic Economic Policy Explain the 2009 Malawi Election?||Authors:||Brazys, Samuel
Walsh, Patrick P.
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/6504||Date:||Sep-2015||Abstract:||Ethno-regional voting cleavages have featured in a number of sub-Saharan African states during the third wave of democratization. While these voting patterns are well studied, there have been few attempts to understand if pan-ethno-regional coalition building based on targeted economic policies can be employed to secure national electoral coalitions. We examine the 2009 Malawian parliamentary elections where a newly-formed national party used its incumbent position to promote an economic policy based on food security in order to overcome traditional ethno-regional voting patterns. After presenting a formal model of an optimal allocation of an economic resource to induce vote-switching, we use district-level data in a system of equations approach finding that this strategic allocation did indeed contribute to the nation-wide electoral victory.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Elsevier||Journal:||Electoral Studies||Volume:||39||Start page:||39||End page:||55||Keywords:||Elections; Africa; Identity politics; Ethno-regional; Clientelism; Prebendalism||DOI:||10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.007||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Politics and International Relations Research Collection|
Geary Institute Research Collection
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