A dynamic model of cross licensing
|Title:||A dynamic model of cross licensing||Authors:||Ménière, Yann
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/680||Date:||5-Nov-2004||Abstract:||In sectors with cumulative and complementry technologies, some rms build patent portfolios in order to block their competitors' access to the technology and/or to negociate cross licensing agreements. We propose a dynamic model that captures this behaviour in an integrated duopoly where the rms invest successively in upstream patentable technologies and downstream marketable products. We study the impact of legal patent strength on competition and investment. We then consider two alternative settings. One where the rms cross license or pool their patents and another where the patent strength is restricetd. We verify whether and when such alternatives are socially efficient.||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School Of Economics||Copyright (published version):||2004 School Of Economics, University College Dublin||Subject LCSH:||Technological innovations
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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