Auctioning horizontally differentiated items

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorParlane, Sarah-
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-24T17:19:12Z-
dc.date.available2008-11-24T17:19:12Z-
dc.date.copyright2005 School Of Economics, University College Dublinen
dc.date.issued2005-12-08-
dc.identifier.other200525en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/682-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auctioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and competitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are allocated according to the expected total surplus each generates. This market division is efficient if and only if the distribution of bidders' tastes is not skewed. If skewed, reserve prices distort participation towards the least preferred item. For greater degrees of product differentiation competition leads to multiple equilibria. Finally, competition with close substitutes sellers leave participation rents to their weakest bidder. They do not in other cases, whether they compete or cooperate.en
dc.format.extent300490 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School Of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP05/25en
dc.subjectCompetitionen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectReserve pricesen
dc.subjectEfficiencyen
dc.subject.classificationD43en
dc.subject.classificationD44en
dc.subject.classificationD82en
dc.subject.lcshAuctions--Mathematical modelsen
dc.subject.lcshCompetitionen
dc.subject.lcshPricingen
dc.titleAuctioning horizontally differentiated itemsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.authorurlSarah Parlane (web page)en
dc.internal.authorurlhttp://www.ucd.ie/economics/staff/sparlane/INDEX.HTMen
dc.internal.authorcontactotherEmail: Sarah.Parlane@ucd.ie; Tel: +353 1 716 86 77en
dc.internal.authoridUCD0019en
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.internal.webversionshttp://www.ucd.ie/economics/research/papers/2005/WP05.25.pdf-
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.neeo.contributorParlane|Sarah|aut|-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextopen-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
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