Negotiated Transfer Prices
|Title:||Negotiated Transfer Prices||Authors:||Becker, Johannes
Davies, Ronald B.
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/7188||Date:||Nov-2015||Abstract:||The predominant model of tax induced transfer pricing is based on the assumption that profit shifting is due to insufficient enforcement. However, evidence shows that the firms responsible for most profit shifting are also among the most frequently audited. We present an alternative model based on negotiations that avoid costly, yet uncertain, formal proceedings (e.g. court procedures). This model predicts that profit shifting increases in the tax gap even though enforcement is perfect. Further, it suggests that current efforts to streamline international tax law may have the unintended effect of increasing profit shifting.||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Keywords:||Nash bargaining;Transfer pricing;Tax avoidance;Corporate taxation||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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