The sources of value destruction in acquisitions by entrenched managers
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|Title:||The sources of value destruction in acquisitions by entrenched managers||Authors:||Harford, Jarrad
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/7478||Date:||Nov-2012||Abstract:||Prior work has established that entrenched managers make value-decreasing acquisitions. In this study, we determine how they destroy that value. Overall, we find that value destruction by entrenched managers comes from a combination of factors. First, they disproportionately avoid private targets, which have been shown to be generally associated with value creation. Second, when they do buy private targets or public targets with blockholders, they tend not to use all-equity offers, which has the effect of avoiding the transfer of a valuable blockholder to the bidder. We further test whether entrenched managers simply overpay for good targets or choose targets with lower synergies. We find that while they overpay, they also choose low synergy targets in the first place, as shown by combined announcement returns and post-merger operating performance.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Elsevier||Copyright (published version):||2012 Elsevier||Keywords:||Corporate governance; Mergers; Entrenchment; Blockholders; Overpayment;Corporate governance;Mergers;Entrenchment;Blockholders;Overpayment||DOI:||10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.016||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Business Research Collection|
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