Ownership structure, managerial turnover and takeovers: Further UK evidence on the market for corporate control
Files in This Item:
|Dahya_Powell_Ownership_structure,_managerial_turnover.pdf||215.79 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||Ownership structure, managerial turnover and takeovers: Further UK evidence on the market for corporate control||Authors:||Dahya, Jay
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/7511||Date:||Mar-1998||Online since:||2016-02-16T10:45:17Z||Abstract:||This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared to that of friendly takeovers. Furthermore, prior to takeover, hostile targets have lower abnormal returns, lower profitability, higher debt, lower managerial ownership and a high ownership stake held by external block holders relative to friendly targets. The results give further support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Global Business Publications||Journal:||Multinational Finance Journal||Volume:||2||Issue:||1||Start page:||62||End page:||83||Copyright (published version):||1998 Multinational Finance Society||Keywords:||Managerial control; Hostile takeover; Top management turnover; Friendly takeover; Ownership structure||Other versions:||http://www.mfsociety.org/modules/modDashboard/uploadFiles/journals/googleScholar/647.html||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Business Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.