Ownership structure, managerial turnover and takeovers: Further UK evidence on the market for corporate control

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Title: Ownership structure, managerial turnover and takeovers: Further UK evidence on the market for corporate control
Authors: Dahya, Jay
Powell, Ronan
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/7511
Date: Mar-1998
Online since: 2016-02-16T10:45:17Z
Abstract: This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared to that of friendly takeovers. Furthermore, prior to takeover, hostile targets have lower abnormal returns, lower profitability, higher debt, lower managerial ownership and a high ownership stake held by external block holders relative to friendly targets. The results give further support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Global Business Publications
Journal: Multinational Finance Journal
Volume: 2
Issue: 1
Start page: 62
End page: 83
Copyright (published version): 1998 Multinational Finance Society
Keywords: Managerial controlHostile takeoverTop management turnoverFriendly takeoverOwnership structure
Other versions: http://www.mfsociety.org/modules/modDashboard/uploadFiles/journals/googleScholar/647.html
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Business Research Collection

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