Why Do Foreign Firms Pay More: The Role of On-the-Job-Training
|Title:||Why Do Foreign Firms Pay More: The Role of On-the-Job-Training||Authors:||Görg, Holger
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8053||Date:||Oct-2007||Online since:||2016-10-13T12:40:42Z||Abstract:||While foreign-owned firms have consistently been found to pay higher wages than domestic firms to what appear to be equally productive workers, the causes of this remain unresolved. In a two-period bargaining framework we show that if training is more productive and specific in foreign firms, foreign firm workers will have a steeper wage profile and thus acquire a premium over time. Using a rich employer-employee matched data set we verify that the foreign wage premium is only acquired by workers over time spent in the firm and only by those that receive on the job training, thus providing empirical support for a firm specific human capital acquisition explanation.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Springer||Journal:||Review of World Economics||Volume:||143||Issue:||3||Start page:||464||End page:||482||Copyright (published version):||2007 Kiel Institute||Keywords:||On-the-job training; Foreign firms; Wages||DOI:||10.1007/s10290-007-0117-9||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Research Collection|
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