Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages
|Title:||Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages||Authors:||Strobl, Eric
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8055||Date:||Jan-2007||Abstract:||We show in a monopsony model that accounting for changes in hours a minimum wage has ambiguous effects on employment and welfare. When all workers have the same preference ordering over leisure and consumption employment subsidies unambiguously improve welfare. Many countries have minimum wages and also tax minimum wage workers.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Elsevier||Journal:||Economics Letters||Volume:||94||Issue:||1||Start page:||83||End page:||89||Copyright (published version):||2007 Elsevier||Keywords:||Monopsony; Minimum wages; Hours worked; Productivity||DOI:||10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.005||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed||metadata.dc.date.available:||2016-10-13T12:48:16Z|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Research Collection|
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