Estimating the shirking model with variable effort
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|Title:||Estimating the shirking model with variable effort||Authors:||Strobl, Eric
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8056||Date:||Jun-2007||Abstract:||We show in a theoretical efficiency wage model where firms differ in monitoring intensity that the impact of monitoring intensity on wages is ambiguous, a result that mirrors evidence from the empirical literature. We argue that to correctly specify the impact of monitoring on wages, the interaction between monitoring and effort needs to be modelled. Results using a worker, firm panel from Ghana which contains reasonable effort and monitoring proxies show that the return to effort is higher in poorly monitored sectors as the theory suggests.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Elsevier||Copyright (published version):||2006 Elsevier||Keywords:||Efficiency wages;Effort;Monitoring intensity;Efficiency wages;Supervision;Size||DOI:||10.1016/j.labeco.2006.02.009||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Research Collection|
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