There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)
|Title:||There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)||Authors:||Dellsén, Finnur||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8169||Date:||Sep-2016||Abstract:||There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Springer||Journal:||Journal for General Philosophy of Science||Volume:||47||Issue:||2||Start page:||377||End page:||384||Copyright (published version):||2016 Springer||Keywords:||Causal explanation; Partial explanation; The barometer; Causal histories||DOI:||10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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