There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)

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Title: There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)
Authors: Dellsén, Finnur
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8169
Date: Sep-2016
Abstract: There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Springer
Copyright (published version): 2016 Springer
Keywords: Causal explanation;Partial explanation;The barometer;Causal histories
DOI: 10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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