Understanding without Justification or Belief
|Title:||Understanding without Justification or Belief||Authors:||Dellsén, Finnur||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8171||Date:||2016||Abstract:||In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest among epistemologists in the nature of understanding, with some authors arguing that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology. But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view, understanding is a species of knowledge. Although this view has recently been challenged in various ways, even the critics of the standard view have assumed that understanding requires justification and belief. I argue that it requires neither. If sound, these arguments have important upshots not only for the nature of understanding, but also for its distinctive epistemic value and its role in contemporary epistemology.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Wiley||Journal:||Ratio||Volume:||30||Issue:||3
|Start page:||239||End page:||254||Keywords:||Understanding; Knowledge; Belief; Epistemology||DOI:||10.1111/rati.12134||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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