Realism and the absence of rivals
Files in This Item:
|Realism-and-the-Absence-of-Rivals-Synthese-Penultimate_Draft.pdf||414.76 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||Realism and the absence of rivals||Authors:||Dellsén, Finnur||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8172||Date:||2016||Abstract:||Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence'. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific communities and the time that has passed since the theory first became accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford’s New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Springer||Copyright (published version):||2016 Springer||Keywords:||Scientific realism;The new induction;The problem of unconceived alternatives;Evidence of absence;Absence of evidence||DOI:||10.1007/s11229-016-1059-3||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.