Realism and the absence of rivals

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Title: Realism and the absence of rivals
Authors: Dellsén, Finnur
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Date: 2016
Online since: 2017-03-01T02:00:35Z
Abstract: Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence'. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific communities and the time that has passed since the theory first became accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford’s New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Springer
Journal: Synthese
Volume: 194
Issue: 7
Start page: 2427
End page: 2446
Copyright (published version): 2016 Springer
Keywords: Scientific realismThe new inductionThe problem of unconceived alternativesEvidence of absenceAbsence of evidence
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1059-3
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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