|Title:||Reconstructed Empiricism||Authors:||Dellsén, Finnur||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8174||Date:||2016||Abstract:||According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen's own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In addition, another set of philosophers have argued that van Fraassen’s empiricist position appeals to an unmotivated distinction between observable and unobservable aspects of the world. This paper aims to reconstruct a van Fraassen-style empiricism about scientific acceptance that avoids these two objections – reconstructed empiricism.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Springer||Copyright (published version):||2016 Springer||Keywords:||Epistemic attitude;Constructive empiricism;Scientific realism;Acceptance and belief;Manifestationalism;Empirical adequacy||DOI:||10.1007/s12136-016-0289-9||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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