Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland after the Crisis
Files in This Item:
|Dommett_Hardiman_MacCarthaigh_-_FINAL.pdf||559.96 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland after the Crisis||Authors:||Dommett, Kate
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8224||Date:||15-Jul-2016||Abstract:||Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top-down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post-New Public Management emphasis on re-centralizing administrative capacity. This paper, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command-and-control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European-type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Wiley||Copyright (published version):||2016 the Authors||Keywords:||Ministerial reponsibility; Accountability; Agency; Bureaucracies; Quangos; Reform||DOI:||10.1111/gove.12227||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Politics and International Relations Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.