When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus
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|Title:||When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus||Authors:||Dellsén, Finnur||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8409||Date:||2017||Abstract:||It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning, viz. Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.||Funding Details:||Irish Research Council||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Taylor and Francis||Journal:||Australasian Journal of Philosophy||Volume:||96||Issue:||1||Start page:||142||End page:||156||Keywords:||Scientific consensus; Expert disagreement; Trust in science; Epistemic diversity||DOI:||10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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