When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus

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Title: When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus
Authors: Dellsén, Finnur
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8409
Date: 2017
Abstract: It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning, viz. Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.
Funding Details: Irish Research Council
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume: 96
Issue: 1
Start page: 142
End page: 156
Keywords: Scientific consensusExpert disagreementTrust in scienceEpistemic diversity
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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