Why Do Some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires While Others Do Not? A Within-Case Analysis of Burma/Myanmar, 1948-2011
Files in This Item:
|Dukalskis_Studies_in_Conflict_&_Terrorism.pdf||603.05 kB||Adobe PDF||Download|
|Title:||Why Do Some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires While Others Do Not? A Within-Case Analysis of Burma/Myanmar, 1948-2011||Authors:||Dukalskis, Alexander||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8472||Date:||25-Jun-2015||Abstract:||This article uses Burma/Myanmar from 1948 to 2011 as a within-case context to explore why some armed insurgent groups agree to cease-fires while others do not. Analyzing 33 armed groups it finds that longer-lived groups were less likely to agree to cease-fires with the military government between 1989 and 2011. The article uses this within-case variation to understand what characteristics would make an insurgent group more or less likely to agree to a cease-fire. The article identifies four armed groups for more in-depth qualitative analysis to understand the roles of the administration of territory, ideology, and legacies of distrust with the state as drivers of the decision to agree to or reject a cease-fire.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Taylor and Francis||Copyright (published version):||2015 Taylor and Francis||Keywords:||Civil wars;Armed conflicts;Ceasefires||DOI:||10.1080/1057610X.2015.1056631||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Politics and International Relations Research Collection|
Show full item record
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.