A Comparison of Malicious Interdiction Strategies Against Electrical Networks

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Title: A Comparison of Malicious Interdiction Strategies Against Electrical Networks
Authors: Cuffe, Paul
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8774
Date: Jun-2017
Abstract: How well can a typical electrical power system withstand a sophisticated malicious attack undertaken against its exposed branches? The present work seeks to articulate a comprehensive answer to this fundamental question of wide societal importance. New and established techniques that an attacker might use to select promising attack targets are considered, spanning complex network analysis, metaheuristics and classical optimization. By simulating this wide gamut of attack strategies on several test power systems, each modelled under many representative operating states, this work comprehensively articulates the expected robustness of electrical power grids against coordinated branch interdictions.
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: IEEE
Journal: IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems
Volume: 7
Issue: 2
Start page: 205
End page: 217
Copyright (published version): 2017 IEEE
Keywords: Cascading failureDirected attacksBranch interdictionCentralityOptimizationMetaheuristics
DOI: 10.1109/JETCAS.2017.2704879
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
metadata.dc.date.available: 2017-09-29T09:36:34Z
Appears in Collections:Electrical and Electronic Engineering Research Collection

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