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The Heuristic Conception of Inference to the Best Explanation
Author(s)
Date Issued
2017-05-24
Date Available
2018-05-24T01:00:11Z
Abstract
An influential suggestion about the relationship between Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation (IBE) holds that IBE functions as a heuristic to approximate Bayesian reasoning. While this view promises to unify Bayesianism and IBE in a very attractive manner, important elements of the view have not yet been spelled out in detail. I present and argue for a heuristic conception of IBE on which IBE serves primarily to locate the most probable available explanatory hypothesis to serve as a working hypothesis in an agent’s further investigations. Along the way, I criticize what I consider to be an overly ambitious conception of the heuristic role of IBE, according to which IBE serves as a guide to absolute probability values. My own conception, by contrast, requires only that IBE can function as a guide to the comparative probability values of available hypotheses. This is shown to be a much more realistic role for IBE given the nature and limitations of the explanatory considerations with which IBE operates.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Springer
Journal
Philosophical Studies
End Page
12
1
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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