The Illusionary Comfort of a Warm Normative Theory

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Title: The Illusionary Comfort of a Warm Normative Theory
Authors: Keane, Mark T.
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/9189
Date: 24-Nov-2017
Abstract: One of the most common tactics in Cognitive Science is the wholesale adoption of anexisting normative account as a theoretical basis for understanding some aspect ofhuman cognition or, indeed, as a yardstick for correct behaviour (see e.g., Eysenck & Keane, 1995, 2015). Research on the psychology of deduction (Johnson-Laird, 1999;Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; Oaksford & Chater,1998, 2007) has some of the most well-known examples of this tactic, where logicismhas argued that human thinking (1) reflects some internalized form of extensional,classical logic and (2) should be measured against classical logic as a normativesystem (Elquyam & Evans, 2011, pp. 234). Similarly, Oaksford & Chater (2007)advance Bayesian probability theory as a normative account of human rationality,though many disagree (Jones & Love, 2011; Bowers & Davis, 2012).
Funding Details: Science Foundation Ireland
Type of material: Conference Publication
Publisher: Cognition, Language and Perception Research Group
Keywords: CognitionNormativity
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Conference Details: Workshop on the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (WPCS 2017), Buenos Aires, Argentina, 22-24 November 2017
Appears in Collections:Computer Science Research Collection
Insight Research Collection

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