Minimum wages for Ronald McDonald monopsonies : a theory of monopsonistic competition by V Bhaskar and Ted To - a comment

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Title: Minimum wages for Ronald McDonald monopsonies : a theory of monopsonistic competition by V Bhaskar and Ted To - a comment
Authors: Walsh, Frank
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/930
Date: Sep-2001
Abstract: Bhaskar and To (1999) develop a model of monopsonistic competition and solve explicitly for equilibrium. While a minimum wage set just above the unconstrained optimum leads firms to increase employment it also causes firm exit as profits fall. In this note I show that the employment and welfare effects of the minimum wage which Bhaskar and To had thought to be ambiguous when firm exit was accounted for are in fact unambiguously positive.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Copyright (published version): UCD School of Economics 2001
Keywords: Monopsony;Minimum wage;Employment
Subject LCSH: Monopsonies
Minimum wage
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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