- Monaghan, David S.

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# Monaghan, David S.

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Monaghan, David S.

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Monaghan, David S.

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- PublicationAn optical encryption scheme that uses polarization of coherent light(Optical Society of America, 2005-10-16)
; ; ; We demonstrate an optical system that encodes two dimensional data as different polarization states. The encrypted image is recorded using a digital holographic setup and the decryption is done numerically.279 - PublicationCryptanalysis of optical security systems with significant output images(Optical Society of America, 2007-08-01)
; ; ; The security of the encryption and verification techniques with significant output images is examined by a known-plaintext attack. We introduce an iterative phase-retrieval algorithm based on multiple intensity measurements to heuristically estimate the phase key in the Fourier domain by several plaintext-cyphertext pairs. We obtain correlation output images with very low error by correlating the estimated key with corresponding random phase masks. Our studies show that the convergence behavior of this algorithm sensitively depends on the starting point. We also demonstrate that this algorithm can be used to attack the double random phase encoding technique.442Scopus© Citations 85 - PublicationStatistical investigation of the double random phase encoding technique(Optical Society of America, 2009-08-24)
; ; ; ; The amplitude-encoding case of the double random phase encoding technique is examined by deﬁning a cost function as a metric to compare an attempted decryption against the corresponding original input image. For the case when a cipher–text pair has been obtained and the correct decryption key is unknown, an iterative attack technique can be employed to ascertain the key. During such an attack the noise in the output ﬁeld for an attempted decryption can be used as a measure of a possible decryption key’s correctness. For relatively small systems, i.e., systems involving fewer than 5x5 pixels, the output decryption of every possible key can be examined to evaluate the distribution of the keys in key space in relation to their relative performance when carrying out decryption. However, in order to do this for large systems, checking every single key is currently impractical. One metric used to quantify the correctness of a decryption key is the normalized root mean squared (NRMS) error. The NRMS is a measure of the cumulative intensity difference between the input and decrypted images. We identify a core term in the NRMS, which we refer to as the difference parameter, d. Expressions for the expected value (or mean) and variance of d are derived in terms of the mean and variance of the output ﬁeld noise, which is shown to be circular Gaussian. These expressions assume a large sample set (number of pixels and keys). We show that as we increase the number of samples used, the decryption error obeys the statistically predicted characteristic values. Finally, we corroborate previously reported simulations in the literature by using the statistically derived expressions.943Scopus© Citations 18 - PublicationKey-space analysis of double random phase encryption technique(Optical Society of America, 2007-09-10)
; ; ; We perform a numerical analysis on the double random phase encryption/decryption technique. The key-space of an encryption technique is the set of possible keys that can be used to encode data using that technique. In the case of a strong encryption scheme, many keys must be tried in any brute-force attack on that technique. Traditionally, designers of optical image encryption systems demonstrate only how a small number of arbitrary keys cannot decrypt a chosen encrypted image in their system. However, this type of demonstration does not discuss the properties of the key-space nor refute the feasibility of an efficient brute-force attack. To clarify these issues we present a key-space analysis of the technique. For a range of problem instances we plot the distribution of decryption errors in the key-space indicating the lack of feasibility of a simple brute-force attack.1519Scopus© Citations 85 - PublicationRole of phase key in the double random phase encoding technique : an error analysis(Optical Society of America, 2008-07-20)
; ; ; ; We perform a numerical analysis of the double random phase encryption–decryption technique to determine how, in the case of both amplitude and phase encoding, the two decryption keys (the image- and Fourier-plane keys) affect the output gray-scale image when they are in error. We perform perfect encryption and imperfect decryption. We introduce errors into the decrypting keys that correspond to the use of random distributions of incorrect pixel values. We quantify the effects that increasing amounts of error in the image-plane key, the Fourier-plane key, and both keys simultaneously have on the decrypted image. Quantization effects are also examined1161Scopus© Citations 39 - PublicationA known-plaintext heuristic attack on the Fourier plane encryption algorithm(Optical Society of America, 2006-04-17)
; ; ; The Fourier plane encryption algorithm is subjected to a known-plaintext attack. The simulated annealing heuristic algorithm is used to estimate the key, using a known plaintext-ciphertext pair, which decrypts the ciphertext with arbitrarily low error. The strength of the algorithm is tested by using this estimated key to decrypt a different ciphertext which was also encrypted using the same original key. We assume that the plaintext is amplitude-encoded real-valued image, and analyze only the mathematical algorithm rather than a real optical system that can be more secure. The Fourier plane encryption algorithm is found to be susceptible to a known-plaintext heuristic attack.561Scopus© Citations 204