Now showing 1 - 9 of 9
  • Publication
    Philosophy, psychiatry and avoiding 'real mischief': Review of Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, intersections, and new perspectives. Edited by Daniel D. Moseley and Gary J. Gala, Routledge 2015
    (Mental Health Net (MHN), 2016-09-06)
    What can philosophy offer psychiatry? What can psychiatry offer philosophy? Simply, there is nothing as harmful as a bad theory put into practice and conversely the constraints of practice and the recalcitrance of the realities of anomalous experiences offer instructive challenges to theory. We know well that the history of medicine and psychiatry have many examples of bad theory having been put into practice often with tragic consequences. Equally the extremes of armchair philosophy and far-fetched thought experiments, while keeping some philosophers busy chasing zombies or possible worlds in which minds can be uploaded into a computer hard-drives, leave philosophy open to accusations of irrelevance and obfuscation.
      178
  • Publication
    Homelessness and the limits of hospitality
    (Philosophy Now, 2017-12)
    This article explores the issue of homelessness from the perspective of someone who has experienced homelessness, as someone who has worked with the homeless and heard the stories of ‘our friends on the street’, as a mother distressed to see other mothers’ children, no matter their age, in such dire circumstances, and as a philosopher driven to interrogate the hidden assumptions and beliefs motivating our choices, judgments, and behavior.
      251
  • Publication
    A Phenomenological Grounding of Feminist Ethics
    (Taylor & Francis, 2018-06-27)
    The central hypothesis of this paper is that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty offers significant philosophical groundwork for an ethics that honours key feminist commitments – embodiment, situatedness, diversity and the intrinsic sociality of subjectivity. Part 1 evaluates feminist criticisms of Merleau-Ponty. Part 2 defends the claim that Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist ontology underwrites leading approaches in feminist ethics, notably Care Ethics and the Ethics of Vulnerability. Part 3 examines Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of embodied percipience, arguing that these offer a powerful critique of the view from nowhere, a totalizing God’s-eye-view with pretensions to objectivity. By revealing the normative structure of perceptual gestalts in the intersubjective domain, he establishes the view from everywhere. Normativity is no longer deferred to higher authorities such as duty, utility or the valorised virtue, but through the perceptual gestalt it is returned to the perceiving embodied subject. This subject, defined by inherent intersubjectivity, is thereby vulnerable to others and has the capacity for care.
      579Scopus© Citations 7
  • Publication
    Primary Intersubjectivity: Empathy, Affective Reversibility, 'Self-affection' and the Primordial 'We'
    (Springer, 2014-04)
    The arguments advanced in this paper are the following. Firstly, that just as Trevarthen's three subjective/intersubjective levels, primary, secondary, and tertiary, mapped out different modes of access, so too response is similarly structured, from direct primordial responsiveness, to that informed by shared pragmatic concerns and narrative contexts, to that which demands the distantiation afforded by representation. Secondly, I propose that empathy is an essential mode of intentionality, integral to the primary level of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, which is crucial to our survival as individuals and as a species. Further to this last point, I argue that empathy is not derived on the basis of intersubjectivity, nor does it merely disclose intersubjectivity, rather it is constitutive of intersubjectivity at the primary level. Empathy is a direct, irreducible intentionality separable in thought from the other primary intentional modes of perception, rationality, memory and imagination, but co-arising with these. In regard to the inter-personal level, the concrete relations with others, primary empathy is both the ground for the possibility of the secondary manifestations—pity, sympathy, perspective taking, etc., and motivates them. Thirdly, it is the movement in the core of subjectivity initially generated by shifting attention between the 'I' and 'we' perspectives and later 'solidified' through affect to become shifting identification, which opens up the intersubjective domain. So we can affirm that we are not only born into sociality but our sociality goes to the roots of our being as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have claimed.
      542Scopus© Citations 15
  • Publication
    Introduction
    (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016)
    This book draws on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, psychology, neuroscience and Buddhist philosophy to explicate Merleau-Ponty's unwritten ethics. Daly contends that though Merleau-Ponty never developed an ethics per se, there is significant textual evidence that clearly indicates he had the intention to do so. This book highlights the explicit references to ethics that he offers and proposes that these, allied to his ontological commitments, provide the basis for the development of an ethics. In this work Daly shows how Merleau-Ponty's relational ontology, in which the interdependence of self, other and world is affirmed, offers an entirely new approach to ethics. In contrast to the 'top-down' ethics of norms, obligations and prescriptions, Daly maintains that Merleau-Ponty’s ethics is a 'bottom-up' ethics which depends on direct insight into our own intersubjective natures, the 'I' within the 'we' and the 'we' within the 'I'; insight into the real nature of our relation to others and the particularities of the given situation. Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of Intersubjectivity is an important contribution to the scholarship on the later Merleau-Ponty which will be of interest to graduate students and scholars. Daly offers informed readings of Merleau-Ponty’s texts and the overall approach is both scholarly and innovative.
      42
  • Publication
    Not suffering, not melancholy: Review of On Happiness: New Ideas for the Twenty-First Century, Edited by Camilla Nelson, Deborah Pike and Georgina Ledvinka, UWA Publishing
    (Writing and Society Research centre at the University of Western Sydney, 2016-06-24)
    What is happiness? The word conjures sunshine, pleasure, expansiveness and possibility – and we all claim some knowledge and experience of happiness. Nonetheless, happiness, perhaps more than any other experience, is defined and delineated in the negative. Happiness is not suffering, not anguish, not absence or lack, not loneliness, not depression, not melancholy. That we do not in fact have grasp of a pure state, such as happiness, in isolation from its contraries illuminates something important about how our selves and our realities are structured. We are able to recognise it not only because it is already a part of our experiential repertoire but also because we are already familiar with its converse. This insight has direct implications for our experiences in general and for the experience of happiness in particular.
      228
  • Publication
    Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture: Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World, Christoph Durt, Thomas Fuchs, Christian Tewes
    (Phenomenological Reviews, 2017-12)
    This current collection of essays presents a rich offering of interdisciplinary scholarship from some of the leading thinkers alongside emerging scholars connected to the enactivist tradition and its progenitor phenomenology; their remit – to investigate how the various dimensions and domains of our shared world are crucially informed by cultural modes of embodiment and enactively galvanized cultural contexts. Many of the chapters were presented as papers at the conference Enacting Culture: Embodiment, Interaction and the Development of Culture, October 15-17, 2014, University of Heidelberg, Germany. This was the final conference marking the end of the European Commission funded Innovative Training Network, Towards an Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity.
      477
  • Publication
    Meleau-Ponty's Aesthetic Interworld: From Primordial Percipience to Wild Logos
    (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2016)
    The overall aim of this paper is to defend the value of the arts as uniquely instructive regarding philosophical questions. Specifically, I aim to achieve two things: firstly, to show that through the phenomenological challenge to dualist and monist ontologies the key debate in aesthetics regarding subjective response and objective judgment is reconfigured and resolved. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s analyses complement and complete Kant’s project. Secondly, I propose that through his phenomenological interrogations of the creative process the issue of the viability of his relational non-dualist ontology is defended against accusations that it has not gone beyond dualism or that it has collapsed into a monism.
      376
  • Publication
    Does the Reversibility Thesis Deliver All That Merleau-Ponty Claims It Can?
    (Wiley, 2014-03-25)
    Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis argues that self, other and world are inherently relational, interdependent at the level of ontology. What is at stake in the reversibility thesis is whether it overcomes skeptical objections in both assuring real communication and avoiding solipsism in assuring real difference; the Other must be a genuine, irreducible Other. It is objected that across the domains of reversibility, symmetry and reciprocity are not guaranteed. I argue that this is a non-problem; rather the potentialities for asymmetry and non reciprocity in fact guarantee the irreducibility of the Other; reversibility needs to be appreciated as dialectical or aesthetic, not as a literal or 'mechanistic' reversal. A further criticism targets the viability of ontology itself, whether alterity is ever compatible with ontology. This paper considers these objections from two of Merleau-Ponty's contemporaries—Claude Lefort and Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas developed a philosophy which while intersecting with Merleau-Ponty's at important junctures, nonetheless arrived at an entirely different destination. I argue alongside Martin Dillon against the objections of Lefort, and alongside Dan Zahavi against the objections of Levinas. Both of these interpreters, I propose remain faithful to the core directions and spirit of Merleau-Ponty's endeavours without becoming diverted by the less significant inconsistencies.
      289Scopus© Citations 9