



Title	Adam of Bocfeld or Roger Bacon? New remarks on a commentary on the Book of Causes
Authors(s)	Calma, Dragos
Publication date	2018
Publication information	Calma, Dragos. "Adam of Bocfeld or Roger Bacon? New Remarks on a Commentary on the Book of Causes" 85, no. 1 (2018).
Publisher	Peeters Press
Item record/more information	http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10129
Publisher's version (DOI)	10.2143/RTPM.85.1.3284826

Downloaded 2024-06-21 18:21:06

The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa)



© Some rights reserved. For more information

ADAM OF BOCFELD OR ROGER BACON? NEW REMARKS ON A COMMENTARY ON THE *BOOK OF CAUSES**

Dragos CALMA

1. Overview of the question

In 1928 Martin Grabmann identified a commentary on the *Book of Causes* (= *CDC*) preserved in MS Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale central, Conv. Sopp. G. 4. 355, f. 90rb-98vb and in MS Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. VI, 1 (2821), f. 1r-54v; they have been copied in the second half of the thirteenth century.¹ In both manuscripts, the commentary is anonymous and incomplete.

The Venetian manuscript belonged to the library of the famous John of Marcanova a physician and philosopher from Padoua and Bologna who purchased it in the second half of the fifteenth century (he died in 1467). Its contents, in order, are: f. 1ra-54va *Commentary on Liber de causis* (anonymous); f. 54va-130rb, *Commentary on the Physics*, with the explicit: “Explicit octavus liber *Physicorum* sentenciarum magistri Ade, et per consequens omnes alii libri”; f. 130va-161r, *Commentary on De anima*, with the colophon: “Expliciunt notulae libri *De anima*, edite a magistro Adam Bouchermerfort, amen”.² The attribution of the two texts to magister Adam (de Bouchermerfort) is probably the reason why the commentary on *De causis* is attributed to the same master. Indeed, a note, in humanist handwriting, on the verso of the guard-leaf attributes the commentary to a certain Adam: “Scriptum Adame super *Libro de causis*, super libro *Physicorum*, super libro *De anima*”; but on f. 161rb, another note, also from the fifteenth century, writes in reference to the content of the manuscript: “Albertus (!) super *Librum de causis*, *Physicorum*, *De anima*.” On the verso of the same folio, another hand writes in 1453: “[...] in quo continetur scriptum Ade super librum *Physicorum*, *Scriptum de causis* cum questionibus omnibus.” The attribution of the commentary *De causis* to Adam appears also in an old table of contents of the manuscript.³

The manuscript from Florence contains the prologue (absent in the manuscript from Venice) and part of the commentary on the first chapter. The commentary on *De causis* is copied after a commentary on twelve books of the *Metaphysics* attributed to Adam of Bocfeld (preserved also in the MS Oxford, Balliol College, 241). In the Florence manuscript, coming to the commentary on the *De causis*, the scribe wrote “XIII” on the top of page, as if to indicate that this is the subsequent part of the same commentary on the *Metaphysics* which finished with book XII.

* A preliminary version of this paper was presented during the conference *Reading Aristotle in Britain in the 13th Century. Annual meeting of the Societas Artistarum I* organised by Charles Burnett, Dragos Calma, and Olga Weijers at the Warburg Institute, London, 23 January 2015. I thank Guy Guldentops, Evan King, Iulia Székely and Olga Weijers for their helpful remarks. This study is part of a research project supported by the Newton International Fellowship of the British Academy and the Royal Society, hosted by the University of Cambridge.

¹ M. GRABMANN, “Handschriftliche Hinweise auf den *Meteorologicakommentar* des Alfred von Sarashel. Aristoteleskommentare des Adam von Bocfeld und Adam de Bouchermerfort,” in: *Mittelalterliche lateinische Aristotelesübersetzungen und Aristoteleskommentare in Hss. spanischer Bibliotheken* (BAdW), 1928, repr. in: ID., *Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen*, Paderborn / München / Wien / Zürich 1979, pp. 46-51.

² See also J. VALENTINELLI, *Bibliotheca Manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum*, vol. IV, Venezia 1871, pp. 46-47.

³ Cf. F. PELSTER, “Adam von Bocfeld (Bockingfold), ein Oxforder Erklärer des Aristoteles um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts. Sein Leben und seine Schriften,” in: *Scholastik* 11 (1936), p. 211.

All these elements persuaded Grabmann that: (1) *CDC*, like the other works in the two manuscripts, must be attributed to Adam of Bouchermeffort; and (2) that Adam of Bouchermeffort is distinct from Adam of Bocfeld.⁴ Thirteen years later, in 1939, Grabmann, most probably influenced by Pelster's arguments, accepted that the two names refer to the same person.⁵ Yet the discussion went on and today there is a scholarly consensus that Adam of Bouchermeffort and Adam of Bocfeld are one and the same master.⁶

The problem of the authorship of *CDC* has remained open. Some outdated hypotheses made their way up to recent publications without preliminary verification, whereas others have been put forth without solid arguments. F. Pelster argued that the author of the *CDC* may be Richard Rufus of Cornwall. The hypothesis was not accepted by Rega Wood,⁷ who seems to be persuaded that it is the same author as that of the *De intelligentiis*, more commonly known as *Memoriale rerum difficilium* first attributed to Witelo, then to Adam de Puteorumvilla. There is no solid argument for the attribution of *CDC* to the author of *Memoriale rerum difficilium*; at the origin of this misperception lays a benign remark made by Grabmann.⁸ It may also be assumed that the title *De intelligentiis* used for the *Liber de causis* in some manuscripts contributed to this confusion, but there is no reason to defend Wood's hypothesis.⁹

The most insightful references to *CDC* are from Cristina d'Ancona, who had envisaged its publication.¹⁰ In her works, she refers to its author as pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld, although she does not express her view on the authenticity of the text. A new, thorough examination between *CDC* and other authentic works by Adam of Bocfeld would certainly yield a more detailed picture than I intend to provide here. My aim is to bring forward some evidence that may be useful for a future discussion about its authenticity.

⁴ On the various attributions to and manuscripts of Adam of Bocfeld, see H. POWELL, *The Life and Writings of Adam of Buckfield, with Special Reference to his Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*, Diss. for the Degree of Bachelor of Letters in the University of Oxford, 1964, pp. 1-51. It seems to me that Powell did not consult directly all the manuscripts; she mentions and compiles secondary sources, repeating some errors made by previous scholars.

⁵ M. GRABMANN, "Die Aristoteleskommentatoren Adam von Bocfeld und Adam von Bouchermeffort," in: *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 2 (1936), pp. 138-182; ID., "Mitteilungen über Werke des Adam v. Bocfeld aus Ms. Lat. Quart. 906 der Preussischen Staatsbibliothek in Berlin. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der vorthomistischen Aristoteleserklärung im 13. Jahrhundert," in: *Divus Thomas* 17 (1939), p. 16; PELSTER, "Adam von Bocfeld (Bockingfold)," pp. 197-201. See also D. SALMAN, "Note sur la première influence d'Averroès," in: *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie* 40 (1937), pp. 203-212.

⁶ P. GLORIEUX, "Maître Adam," in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 34 (1967), pp. 262-270; D. A. CALLUS, "Two Early Oxford Masters on the Problem of Plurality of Forms: Adam of Buckfield – Richard Rufus of Cornwall," in: *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie* 42 (1939), pp. 414-415; S. H. THOMSON, "A Note on the Works of Magister Adam of Bocfeld (Bochermerfort)," in: *Mediaevalia et Humanistica* 2 (1944), pp. 56-60; ID., "A Further Note on Master Adam of Bocfeld," in: *Mediaevalia et Humanistica*, 12 (1958), pp. 23-32. L.-J. BATAILLON, "Adam of Bocfeld. Further Manuscripts," in: *Mediaevalia et Humanistica* 13 (1960), pp. 35-39; R. J. LONG, "The Reception of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De plantis* at Oxford in the 13th Century," in: S. KNUTTILA – R. TYÖRINOJA – S. EBBESEN (eds), *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy*, Helsinki 1990, p. 2; O. WEIJERS, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: Textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500). Vol. 1: A-B*, Turnhout, 1994, p. 24.

⁷ RICHARD RUFUS OF CORNWALL, *In Physicam Aristotelis*, ed. R. WOOD, Oxford 2003, p. 247.

⁸ GRABMANN, "Die Aristoteleskommentatoren," p. 160: "in unserem Kommentar zum *Liber de causis* zeigt sich nicht bloss eine Benützung des Traktates *De intelligentiis*, sondern auch eine starke Beeinflussung der Lehre von der Erkenntnisweise der Intelligenzen, der reinen Geistwesen, durch diese Schrift."

⁹ The author of the commentary on *De causis* cites *Memoriale rerum difficilium* as an authority, and not as one of his own works. Cf. C. D'ANCONA, *Recherches sur le Liber de causis*, Paris, 1995, p. 207, n. 70.

¹⁰ D'ANCONA, *Recherches*, p. 207, n. 69.

S. H. Thomson in his seminal article published during the war¹¹ claimed that there is a second redaction of the same commentary preserved in two manuscripts: Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 1180 (2344), f. 334ra-342rb and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 113, f. 85v-88v. Yet these two are nothing more than copies of the text of the *Book of Causes* itself. He equally claimed that this “second redaction” closely resembles a commentary preserved in MS Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, VI.99, f. 111va-119va, attributed to John Krosbein. I have recently edited and examined this commentary, written at the end of the fourteenth century or at the beginning of the fifteenth century.¹² Strangely enough, the same error is made by R. Thomson, who also assumes that a copy of text of the *Book of Causes* preserved in Oxford (Merton College, MS 276) is a “second redaction” of pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld.¹³ The hypothesis of a “second redaction” by pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld must be abandoned, at least in the present state of the research.

2. Composition of the text

Cristina d’Ancona, who devoted important pages to *CDC*, offers a short description: all chapters but one of the *Book of Causes* are commented upon; the first fifteen chapters (i.e., the first half) have a double commentary: a literal exposition of the text and a commentary *per questiones*.¹⁴ The last fifteen theorems have only a literal exposition. It seems that *CDC* is among the first commentaries on the *Book of Causes* presenting such a double structure. Two later commentaries on the *Book of Causes* share this literary genre: one written by William of Leus¹⁵ and one written by John of Mallinges.¹⁶ Albert the Great’s paraphrase is rather different since it does not present *questiones* in the proper sense of the term, although it contains both a literal explanation and doctrinal discussions. With the commentary of John of Mallinges, *CDC* shares another common feature: they are not copied in the successive order of the chapters of the *Book of Causes*.¹⁷

CDC very often cites Arabic sources: Averroes (various commentaries on Aristotelian works), Algazali (*Metaphysics*) and Avicenna (*Metaphysics*); he uses the sobriquet *Expositor* for both Alfarabi (whom he considers to be the author of the commentaries of the theorems of the *Book of Causes*) and Averroes.

Each of the two manuscript copies of *CDC* has numerous individual variants and omissions, which indicates that one is not the model for the other one. They both share common errors and in both codices one passage is missing at the end from the answer to the second argument from the first question on the first chapter: the two scribes leave a blank space. These indicate that the two codices belong to the same family of the manuscript

¹¹ THOMSON, “A Note on the Works,” pp. 56-60.

¹² D. CALMA, “A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein’s Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*,” in: D. CALMA (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350-1500)*, Turnhout, 2016, pp. 11-98.

¹³ R. THOMSON, *Catalogue of Medieval Manuscripts of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle in British Libraries, vol. I: Oxford*, Turnhout, 2011, p. 329.

¹⁴ D’ANCONA, *Recherches*, pp. 206-207.

¹⁵ D. CARRON, “A Theological Reading of the *Liber de causis* at the Turn of the Fourteenth Century: The Example of William of Leus,” in: D. CALMA (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)*, Turnhout, 2016, pp. 467-550.

¹⁶ D. CALMA – A. BANEU, “Le commentaire sur le *Liber de causis* de Jean de Mallinges,” in: CALMA (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages*, vol. I, pp. 153-286.

¹⁷ For the reasons explained above (cf. supra n. 1), it is possible to give a full description of the text only according to the Venetian manuscript. A detailed description is to be found in D’ANCONA, *Recherches*, p. 206, n. 67 and p. 228.

tradition and they depend upon an intermediary model. Due to numerous individual variants (some of them obvious errors) and the very abbreviated forms used in both cases, it is not an easy task to edit this commentary appropriately.

3. Chronology

The very problematic attribution to Adam of Bocfeld was a major reason why no chronology was ever established for the commentary.¹⁸ Yet two passages may provide additional indications about the date of composition.

The first is found in a question related to the chapter VIII[IX]: *Utrum causa prima cognoscit malum*. The author gives a short explanation about the contradictory feelings of hate and love, and finishes the argument with the following quotation:

[...] unde in V nove translationis *Ethicorum* scribitur: quoniam si **magna et fortia fuerunt desideria hebetabunt rationem**, et sic malum non cognoscit. (MS Venezia, Marc., lat. VI.1, f. 49ra)

Two remarks may be made here at the outset: (1) the thesis is borrowed from the third (not the fifth) book of the *Ethics* (III, 1119b10)¹⁹ and (2) the words “nova translatio *Ethicorum*” usually refer to Grosseteste’s translation. The quotation, however, does not match Grosseteste’s version which reads: “et si magne et vehementes sint, et cogitationem percuciant.”²⁰ These incongruities can be explained. Indeed, around 1150, Burgundio of Pisa translated from the *Ethics* the book II and the book III, until 1119a34. Medieval authors referred to it as *vetus translatio*. In a second phase, Burgundio translated book I and books IV to X: medieval authors called this the *nova translatio*.²¹ In both phases of translation, Burgundio omitted eighteen lines at the end of book III, from 1119b1 to 1119b18; these were, however, included in the complete translation of the *Ethics* from Arabic made by Hermann the German (Alemannus), almost a century later (1240-1243).²² The quotation given in *CDC* refers precisely to these eighteen lines, in Hermann’s translation:

actus autem desiderii suum simile augmentat, et **si magna et fortia sint (fuerint: MS QpYM) desideria, rationem hebetabunt.**²³

¹⁸ I could not find a discussion about the chronology of the pseudo-Adam’s commentary in C. d’Ancona’s works, although she seems concerned to compare it to Roger Bacon’s and pseudo-Henry of Ghent’s texts. D’ANCONA, *Recherches*, pp. 255-256.

¹⁹ I thank Irene Zavattero, who helped me clarify this reference to Aristotle’s *Ethics*.

²⁰ ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. R.A. GAUTHIER, *recensio pura, Aristoteles Latinus* vol. 26/1-3, fasc. 3, Leiden / Bruxelles 1972, p. 201, l. 3.

²¹ This translation is partially known to us: book I in its entirety and fragments of books VII and VIII (called: *Ethica Hoferiana* and *Ethica Borghesiana*). Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea, Aristoteles Latinus* 26/1-3, fasc. 2, p. 129, l. 7: “alia translatio de fine nove *Ethice*.”

²² See A. FIDORA – A. AKASOY, “Hermannus Alemannus und die *alia traslatio* der Nikomachischen Ethik,” in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 44 (2002), pp. 79-94. For a complete list of translations from Arabic into Latin, see Ch. BURNETT, “Arabic into Latin: the Reception of Arabic Philosophy into Western Europe,” in: P. ADAMSON – R.C. TAYLOR (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 370-404. Hermann the German seems to be cited in an authentic work of Adam of Bocfeld; cf. THOMSON, “Works of Adam de Bocfeld,” p. 74.

²³ ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea, Aristoteles Latinus* 26/1-3, fasc. 2, p. 130, l. 13-14.

When *CDC* refers to the *nova translatio*, it means both Burgundio's and Hermann's translations. The reference to the book III as book V is extremely rare (only one similar case is known, an unpublished commentary preserved in Avranches).²⁴ Two chapters from book III were considered and counted as two separate books: the chapter on courage was counted as book IV and the chapter on profligacy (the source for the quotation used in *CDC*) as book V. Therefore, according to this unusual (for us) division of the *Ethics*, the reference made in *CDC* to book V is attested by the tradition. He seems to ignore the translation completed by Robert Grosseteste in 1246-1247²⁵ or at least he prefers to use the older versions of the Latin text. If Adam of Bofeld were the authors of *CDC*, the ignorance of Grosseteste's work may seem rather astonishing since they both knew each other, as attested by two episodes. The first occurred in 1238, when Adam was arrested together with other students from Oxford, and the bishop of Lincoln obtained his liberation (together with three other students). Five years later, Adam, then a Master, was granted by Grosseteste the living of Iver in Buckinghamshire.²⁶ Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics* circulated shortly after its completion. Albert the Great discusses in his commentary on the *Ethics* from 1248-1252 the lines quoted by *CDC*, but the Dominican uses Grosseteste's translation.²⁷

The citation of this passage according to Hermann's translation is indeed uncommon,²⁸ yet it does not suffice to determine the chronology. Indeed, a more important element is an argument (present in the analysis of chapter IV(V) of the *Book of Causes*) against the views of Frederic the Emperor concerning the unity of the intellect:²⁹

Opinio vero Phederici quondam Imperatoris sicut ex relatione nobis constat circa dictam questionem est: quoniam ex eadem procedant (...) (MSVenezia, Marc., lat. VI.1, 17rb)

Frederick II Hohenstaufen, king of Germany, Italy and Burgundy, died December 13, 1250. The reference "once an Emperor" indicates that the commentary was written after his death,

²⁴ On the earliest Latin commentaries on the *Ethics* see the work of I. ZAVATERRO: "Éthique et politique à la Faculté des arts de Paris dans la première moitié du XIII^e siècle," in: J. VERGER – O. WEIJERS (eds.), *Les débuts de l'enseignement universitaire à Paris (1200-1245 environ)*, Turnhout, 2013, pp. 205-245; EAD., "Anonymus Magister Artium: le portrait intellectuel d'un maître ès arts anonyme de la première moitié du XIII^e siècle," in: C. ANGOTTI – M. BRÎNZEI – M. TEEUWEN (eds.), *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, Porto 2012, pp. 63-77; EAD., "I primi commentatori latini dell'*Ethica Nicomachea*: interpreti fedeli di Aristotele?," in: P. BERNARDINI (ed.), *I manoscritti e la filosofia*, Siena, 2010, pp. 67-84; EAD., "Le prologue de la *Lectura in Ethicam ueterem* du *Commentaire de Paris (1235-1240)*: introduction et texte critique," in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 77 (2010), pp. 1-33; EAD., "Le bonheur parfait dans les premiers commentaires latins à l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*," in: *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 139 (2007), pp. 311-327.

²⁵ Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea, Aristoteles Latinus* 26/1-3, fasc.1-2, p. CCI.

²⁶ Cf. R. J. LONG, "Introduction," in: *Adam of Bockenfeld, Glossae super De vegetabilibus et plantis*, Leiden 2012, p. 2.

²⁷ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Super Ethica*, ed. W. KÜBEL, *Opera Omnia* XIV.1, Münster, 1968-1972, III, lec. 15, p. 219, l. 55-66, and p. VI for the date,

²⁸ Only six commentaries on the *Ethics* written before 1250 are known to date; yet only one commentary, by Robert Kilwardby (edition under completion by A. Celano) refers to these eighteen lines translated by Hermann the German. The commentary by Ps. Peckham (1245-1247), studied by Valeria Buffon, is concluded (in 1245-1247) before treating these eighteen lines. Cf. V. BUFFON, *L'idéal éthique des maîtres ès arts de Paris vers 1250, avec édition critique et traduction sélectives du Commentaire sur la Nouvelle et la Vieille Ethique*, Thèse de doctorat présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université Laval, pp. 9 and 209; it is on free access on her academia web-page: <https://uba.academia.edu/ValeriaBuffon>.

²⁹ The entire discussion on the unity of the intellect is edited in Appendix 2.

in 1251 or later.³⁰ In the present state of the research, the *terminus ante quem* is difficult to establish: the author of *CDC* does not seem to be familiar with the commentaries on the *Book of Causes* by Albert the Great (1264-1268) and Thomas Aquinas (1272). He considers the *Book of Causes* the fourteenth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,³¹ ignoring Aquinas' seminal discovery about the Proclean origins of the text. Indeed, *CDC* refers to the book XII of the *Metaphysics* as book XI. Therefore, it can be inferred that *CDC* was certainly composed after 1251 and before William of Moerberke's new and revised translation of the *Metaphysics*, completed by 1268 and in circulation by 1270. It is probable that it precedes Albert's *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*.

The doctrine of the unity of the intellect presented in *CDC* may offer other elements for considering the chronology as it does not appear to depend on, nor is it as elaborate as the discussion offered by Albert the Great in his *De unitate intellectus* (1263 or shortly after) and Siger of Brabant in his *In III De anima* (ca. 1265/1266). The latter is considered to be one of the very first and most seminal works of the Latin reception of Averroes' doctrine of the intellect. Had the commentary been written after 1265/1268, major works such as Albert the Great's commentary on the *Book of Causes*, his *De unitate intellectus* and Siger of Brabant's *In III De anima* would have left a trace, tacitly or explicitly, among the numerous other sources used in the commentary. Accordingly, a chronology of *CDC* with 1251 as *terminus post quem* and 1263-1265 as *terminus ante quem* appears as the most probable.

The question regarding the preference for Hermann the German's translation of the *Ethics* remains open, unless the reference is copied from a secondary source. My (limited) examination of his other quotations of the *Ethics* did not have any substantial results.

4. Authenticity of the text

4.1. Matching the dates

There is no scholarly consensus about the period of activity of Adam of Bocfeld: according to Ch. Burnett, "it is likely that his commentaries were written in the late 1230s and the 1240s in Oxford, before he progressed from arts to theology."³² Ch. Lohr proposes a more restricted timescale: between 1243 and 1249/1250.³³ O. Weijers chooses an approximate date: "vers 1250."³⁴ R. J. Long defends the possibility of a longer academic career, from 1243 to 1258, although his evidence for this is not clear.³⁵ H. Powell, who gives a detailed account of

³⁰ The reported views of Frederick II on the unity of intellect may be a second-hand reference of the *Sicilian Questions*, preserved only in Arabic. On this famous text, see A. A. AKASOY, "Ibn Sab'īn's *Sicilian Questions*: The Text, Its Sources, and Their Historical Context," in: *Al-Qanṭara* XXXIX.1 (2008), pp. 115-146; for a German translation: A. A. AKASOY, *Philosophie und Mystik in der späten Almohadenzeit Die Sizilianischen Fragen des Ibn Sab'īn*, Leiden 2005; EAD., *Ibn Sab'īn: Die Sizilianischen Fragen*, Arabisch-Deutsch, Freiburg 2005; an Italian translation: P. SPALLINO, *Ibn Sab'īn, Le Questioni siciliane. Federico II e l'universo filosofico*, Palermo 2002. Interestingly enough, yet without any direct consequence for the present discussion, the *Book of Causes*, in its Arabic version, is one of the sources of Ibn Sab'īn for *Sicilian Questions*.

³¹ *Scriptum super Librum de causis*, MS Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale central, Conv. Sopp. G. 4. 355, 96vb-ra: "[...] iste tractatus *De causis* esset quartus decimus *Metaphysice*. Sed considerandum est quoniam scientia differt ab alia duobus modis aut quoniam sunt de diversis aut quoniam sunt de eisdem penes diversos modos considerationis. Et hoc modo ista scientia separatur a superiori propter modum considerationis [...]."

³² Ch. BURNETT, "Aristotle's Natural Philosophy," p. 40.

³³ Ch. LOHR, "The new Aristotle and 'science' in the Paris arts faculty (1255)," in: O. WEIJERS – L. HOLTZ (eds.) *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIII^e – XIV^e siècles)*, Turnhout 1997, p. 255.

³⁴ O. WEIJERS, "La *Questio de augmento* d'Adam of Bocfeld," in: G. MARCHETTI – O. RIGNANI – V. SORGE (eds.), *Ratio et superstitio: Essays in Honor of Graziella Federici Vescovini*, Turnhout 2003, p. 243.

³⁵ LONG, *Adam of Bockenfield*, p. 2.

Adam's life and works, does not give a precise period for his career, but envisaged the possibility of a time spent abroad for teaching purposes (maybe in Paris) "between 1243 and 1249 or during the next decade."³⁶ If the author of *CDC* is indeed Adam of Bocfeld, the dating proposed above would be in contradiction with the hypotheses formulated by Burnett, Lohr and Weijers. On the other hand, accepting Long's and Powell's hypothesis of a longer academic career, i.e., after 1251, it would be difficult to explain where and in what context Adam commented upon the *Book of Causes*. It is known that he was named rector of Iver in Buckinghamshire in 1249 and shortly afterwards become canon of Lincoln (presumably charge preserved until 1278-1279) and in 1265 collector of the papal tenths for the diocese of Lincoln. He seemed to have been a rather tempestuous person, involved in various trials in Lincoln and Northumbria.³⁷ It seems improbable that Adam could have found in the regions where he occupied these ecclesiastical positions the proper institutional context and adequate audience to teach what was for him an authentic Aristotelian text. The hypothesis of a Parisian teaching after 1249, according to Powell's suggestion, requires (stronger) evidence.

4.2. The unity of the intellect

Arguments in favour of doctrinal coherence are often essential in a discussion on the authenticity of text, although the possibility of a doctrinal evolution should not to be excluded. Since *CDC* is still unedited, its doctrines remain hidden and the comparison with Adam's authentic text limited. Nevertheless, at least one doctrine – one the unity of the possible intellect – is worthy of interest as it is rather uncommon for a commentary on the *Book of Causes*. According to it, Averroes was right to maintain that there is one intellect, undivided, united to the individual bodies of human beings through its operation only and not through its substance. Individuation through operation is the result of the union of the unique intellect with the *phantasmata* of each individual. According to the author, this doctrine finds its confirmation in chapter III of the *Book of Causes*, where it is stated that intelligible forms are impressed into one soul, *anima nobilis*, by a higher intelligence. This noble soul, unique for the entire human species, corresponds to Averroes' possible intellect.

The author's overall position, however, is ambiguous. Later he argues that, in his own view (*tertia vero opinio in qua sumus*), the individuation of the intellect is twofold: in regard to its substance, as its creator made it, and in regard to its operation, through phantasms. No explanation is given for this double, and obviously inconsistent, solution. Still, one must note that this kind of opposition between Christian faith (i.e., individuation in regard to its substance) and philosophy (i.e., individuation in regard to its operation) becomes current after the interventions of Thomas Aquinas and Étienne Tempier in 1272-1277. Yet it is not presented as opposition in *CDC*. One might also consider the fact that, while he repeatedly argues for the individuation through operation and not through substance, *CDC* also disagrees with the opinion of Frederick II, but it is not clear whether he rejects the Emperor's opinion on the unity of the intellect (which would be in contradiction to his personal views) or his opinion that this possible intellect is also the intelligence united to the sphere of earth.³⁸

While there is no space in this article to analyse the details of the doctrine presented by the author of *CDC*, it is possible quickly to compare this position against the authentic commentary on *De anima* by Adam of Bocfeld. When commenting the relevant passages on

³⁶ POWELL, *The Life and Writings of Adam of Buckfield*, p. 8*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6*-8*.

³⁸ Cf. *infra* Appendix 2, p. 000.

the possible intellect,³⁹ Adam explicitly quotes Averroes' commentary on *De anima* but does not mention the theme of the unity. He explains that the possible intellect is a simple substance, always in potency, without any contact with a material form, part of the intellectual soul; and that it knows itself because it is intelligible by itself and not through an intelligible species. Elsewhere, Adam of Bocfeld explicitly asks whether the possible intellect is separated from the body; and very briefly answers that it is so only as to its operation, not as to its substance.⁴⁰ A commentary on *De anima* is obviously a more appropriate context than the commentary on *De causis* to discuss the unity of the intellect.

4.3. Comparison with other commentaries on *De causis*

Cristina d'Ancona, who has a broader knowledge of *CDC*, compared it with pseudo-Henry of Ghent's (1245-1255) and Roger Bacon's (1241-1245), and concluded in favour of "obvious similarities."⁴¹ Indeed, a certain number of *questiones* share the same title; still, my (limited) evaluation of these three texts did not reveal any decisive parallels. A comparison between *CDC* with Roger Bacon has, however, proven to be more interesting than expected, though not with Bacon's commentary on the *Book of Causes*, but with another text ascribed to him: the *Questiones altere supra libros Prime Philosophie* (= *QA*), on books I to IV of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.⁴² Silvia Donati has convincingly challenged the authenticity of this work and two others: the *Questiones supra undecimum Prime Philosophie Aristotelis* and the *Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum Aristotelis*.⁴³

Appendix 4 presents several striking similarities between *QA*, lib. IV, q. 1 and *CDC*, I, q. 1. Indeed, using the same expressions or synonyms, the two texts analyse what is the science of being.⁴⁴ Although it is a standard topic for a medieval commentary on *Metaphysics* IV, it is less predictable for a commentary on the *Book of Causes*. Nevertheless several commentaries on the *Book of Causes* examine in the prologue or in the exegesis on the first chapter the specificities of metaphysics as a science, as if the *Book of Causes* were an

³⁹ Cf. POWELL, *The Life and Writings*, pp. 218-221.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁴¹ Cf. D'ANCONA, *Recherches*, pp. 207-208, namely n. 69-72. A new historical analysis of the commentary on the *Book of Causes* by Roger Bacon would be necessary since there is no scholarly consensus about the chronology and the place of composition; according to its editor, R. Steele, Bacon's commentary was written during his Parisian teaching, between 1241 and 1245; F. Van Steenberghen placed it "around 1250"; more recently, S. Donati has provided arguments for "after 1246/1247." While Steele, Van Steenberghen and d'Ancona believe that it was written in Paris, Porro considers that it was written in Oxford (although he preserves the "traditional" chronology: 1241-1246). Cf. R. STEELE, *Quaestiones supra Librum de causis, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, Oxford, 1936, p. 39; F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, Louvain/Paris, 1964, p. 144; S. DONATI, "Pseudoepigrapha in the *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi? The Commentaries on the Physics and on the Metaphysics*," in: VERGER – WEIJERS, *Les débuts de l'enseignement universitaire*, pp. 159-62; D'ANCONA, *Recherches*, p. 197; P. PORRO, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century. Proclus and the *Liber de causis*," in: S. GERSH (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Cambridge, 2014, p. 281.

⁴² ROGER BACON, *Questiones altere supra libros Prime Philosophie Aristotelis (Metaphysica I-IV)*, ed. R. STEELE, *Opera hactenus inedita* vol. XI, Oxford, 1932.

⁴³ ID., *Questiones supra undecimum Prime Philosophie Aristotelis (Metaphysica XII)*, ed. R. STEELE, coll. F.M. DELORME, *Opera hactenus inedita* vol. VII, Oxford, 1926; ID., *Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum Aristotelis*, ed. F.M. DELORME, coll. R. STEELE, *Opera hactenus inedita* vol. VIII, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928; DONATI, "Pseudoepigrapha in the *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi?*," pp. 153-203.

⁴⁴ See Appendix 3.

extension of a reflection on the books IV or I of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.⁴⁵ It is important to recall that according to the author of *CDC*, the *Book of Causes* is the fourteenth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The question whether there can be a science of the common being (*ens commune*) examined both in *CDC* and *QA* appears also in pseudo-Peter of Auvergne's commentary of the *Book of Causes*.⁴⁶ Yet, unlike the examples just quoted, *CDC* presents a very elaborated analysis of the topic, as if it was a meticulous commentary on *Metaphysics IV*, surpassing in length and details even *QA*. Indeed, *CDC* quotes more authorities namely Isaac Israeli's *De descriptionibus philosophie*, Algazel's *Metaphysics* (in reality: Aristotle, *Metaph.*, VII, 15, 1040a 20), and Boethius (in reality: Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, 1, 2). Although very similar in most aspects, the author of *CDC* provides arguments (such as the distinction between the universals abstracted by the logician and the metaphysician) which are absent in *QA*; they are meant to bring precision to his demonstration. He explicitly indicates his own views, either distinguishing them ("ex processu more nostro") from the opinion of the *Expositor* (i.e. the secondary propositions of the theorems of the *Book of Causes*) or clarifying his previous expressions ("et dico secundum acceptionem propter dialecticam").

How can be explained these similitudes? There are two main options: (1) the texts have been written by two different authors or (2) they have been written by the same author who recycles his expressions. In the first case, one has to examine the following possibilities: (i) *CDC* used *QA* or (ii) *QA* used *CDC* or (iii) they both share the same common source. It seems to me that in the present state of research it is difficult to provide a decisive and unquestionable answer to this question. Yet I consider the second hypothesis to be more probable: the same author wrote the two commentaries, recycling some of his arguments, citations, and phrases. In the *CDC* one can observe a detailed knowledge of *Metaphysics IV*, with arguments interconnected efficiently and naturally in a complex and long demonstration deployed in several points. Equally, the arguments intrinsically articulating the discussion in *QA*, at times with more detailed explanations (such as on the meaning of *secunda intentio*) offer the same impression of internal coherence that characterise a genuine unfolding thinking.

If my hypothesis is valid, then Silvia Donati's demonstration against the authenticity of the *QA* is reinforced. It could be corroborated by one more piece of evidence: Roger Bacon's authentic commentary on the *Book of Causes* does not share any significant features with *CDC*.⁴⁷ Therefore, if the author of *QA* is also the author of *CDC*, then he definitely is not Roger Bacon. Who was he? In the present state it is difficult to give an answer. Silvia Donati does not advance any hypothesis. He was, in any case, an important master whose influence can be traced until the beginning of the fifteenth century, as attested by its influence on Henry of Gheismar.

5. Reception of the text

In a *Questio de quolibet* disputed at the University of Erfurt in 1414 by Henry of Gheismar, several paragraphs are tacitly quoted from this anonymous commentary on the *Book of Causes*. Iulia Székely and I have recently edited the *Questio*; it is preserved in two manuscripts, one in Erfurt, the other in Uppsala. Henry of Gheismar is one of those authors that we would consider today only at the border of the highway of the history of philosophy.

⁴⁵ Cf. GILES OF ROME, *Super Librum de Causis*, Venezia, 1550, rep. Frankfurt a.M., 1968 1550, *Prohemium Y-Z*; JACQUES DE GOSTYNIN, *Super Librum de causis*, ed. W.P. GÓRA, in: *Materiały i Studia Zakładu Historii filozofii Starożytnej i Średniowiecznej* 11 (1969), p. 13.

⁴⁶ Cf. M. MAGA, "Remarques sur le commentaire au *Liber de causis* attribué à Pierre d'Auvergne," in: CALMA (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, vol. I*, pp. 53-136.

⁴⁷ See also D'ANCONA, *Recherches*, p. 208.

He was, however, an important master in his time: he studied at the Faculty of Arts in Prague around 1390 before moving to the newly founded university of Erfurt where, in 1411-1412, he was vice-rector and then rector of the University; in 1413 he begins his studies at the Faculty of theology at the same University and becomes dean of the Faculty of Arts. In 1419 he is co-founder of the University of Rostock. In 1414 he is elected to hold (while he was still in Erfurt) a *Questio de quolibet*. The *quodlibeta* of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Eastern and Central Europe differ markedly from the *quodlibeta* of thirteenth-century Paris and Oxford; they took place only once a year and lasted almost two weeks. It was a spectacle, in the proper sense of the word. The topic of the *quodlibet* discussed by Henry is whether the primary cause exerts a stronger influence than the secondary causes. It is the main theme of the first chapter of the *Book of Causes*, and Henry uses indirectly two authorities: Thomas Aquinas and the anonymous author studied here. From the latter, he copies several long passages⁴⁸ of the literal explanation of the first theorem, in particular the distinction between *causa prima* and *causa primaria* and the discussion about the meaning of *plus* from the famous theorem: “*causa prima plus est influens quam causa secundaria.*” The anonymous author distinguishes between “*plus influere,*” which describes the broadness of an action, and “*magis influere,*” which describes the intensity of an action; the first cause acts in a broader and more complete way (“*calor solis completius influit*”) than the secondary cause which acts intensely (“*calor ignis intensius*”). The definition is the following: “*plus et minus dicunt completionem et incompletionem, magis vero et minus intensionem et remissionem.*” Henry of Gheismar accepts this distinction and integrates it in a constant dialogue with Aquinas’ interpretation about essential and accidental orders of causes. He eventually argues against the anonymous’ interpretation and shows that the first theorem of the *Book of Causes* is valid only if it is applied to the same genus of causes. The example given is about formal causes: the heat of the sun heats in a broader and more complete way than the heat of fire. But if one compares different genera of causes, the first theorem of *De causis* is not valid: for example, if one compares a formal cause, such as the rational soul, and a material cause, such as the first matter, it is obvious that the formal cause, which is a secondary cause in order of composition of the human being, acts in a more complete way (*completius*) than the material cause, which is a primary cause.⁴⁹

The difference between “*plus influere*” and “*magis influere*” is not very elaborate from a philosophical perspective; nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the anonymous author explains the quality of the action of the first cause without any reference to the position of the cause in the hierarchy of substances: there is no discussion about the sun being superior or nobler than fire. The main advantage in this difference between “*plus influere*” and “*magis influere*” is that it can be applied to the Aristotelian system of causality in which there is no ontological hierarchy between causes. And this is a natural application, inasmuch as the anonymous author believed that the *Book of causes* was an authentic work of Aristotle, and therefore he tried to give a faithful Aristotelian understanding of this Neoplatonic doctrine of causality. This is also what attracted the interest of Henry of Gheismar: the possibility to explain or apply the metaphysics of causality from the *Book of Causes* to an Aristotelian vocabulary and model of causality.

⁴⁸ A table with relevant passages is published in D. CALMA – I. SZÉKELY, “Cause and Causality in Henry of Gheismar’s *Questio de quolibet*,” in: CALMA (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages*, vol. II, pp. 196-199. For the reader’s convenience, I have copied this table of parallel passages in Appendix 4.

⁴⁹ CALMA – SZÉKELY, “Cause and Causality in Henry of Gheismar’s *Questio de quolibet*,” pp. 201-210.

6. Conclusion

This commentary, long attributed to pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld, displays more similarities with the *Questiones altere supra libros Prime Philosophie Aristotelis*, attributed until recently to Roger Bacon, than with other authentic works by Adam of Bocfeld (e.g. his commentary on *De anima*) and Roger Bacon (e.g. his commentary on *De causis*). The text seemed to have been written after December 1250 and probably even before Albert the Great's commentary on *De causis* 1264-1268. Thus, it is most probably posterior to the commentaries on *De causis* by pseudo-Henry of Ghent and Roger Bacon. It is, in many respects, an interesting and original commentary, defending Averroes' theory of the unity of the intellect. If its author had a teaching career at the Faculty of arts at the University of Paris, he most probably taught Siger of Brabant. His influence extends to the fifteenth century, when he is used as an authority in the reading of the *Book of Causes*.

This commentary should be of interest for historians of philosophy not only for its original doctrines developed mainly in the *questiones*, but also for the literal explanation of the *Book of Causes* that provides invaluable insights for our understanding of the state of this text as it is known to its early commentators.

Appendix 1

<Super *Librum de causis*>

[MS Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, Conv. Sopp. G. 4. 355 = *F*]

[MS Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. VI, 1 (2821) = *V*]

[F 96rb; V 1ra] OMNIS CAUSA PRIMARIA PLUS INFLUIT SUPER CAUSATUM SUUM QUAM SECUNDARIA CAUSA UNIVERSALIS.

Quoniam intelligere et scire contingit circa omnes scientias quarum¹ sunt principia, cause et² elementa, ex horum cognitione, tunc enim opinamur cognoscere unumquodque, cum causas primas cognoscamus, sicut scribitur in Phisicis¹, et Posterioribus Analeticisⁱⁱ: scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter et non sophistico modo³, quod est secundum accidens⁴, cum causam⁵ arbitramur cognoscere etc., ideo quia⁶ in sublimioribus philosophie⁷ dogmatibus de causis speculatur philosophus, quarum essentia separata est per naturam, quoniam, ut habetur in Posterioribusⁱⁱⁱ, magis novit intelligens ex superioribus causis, esse⁸ vero istarum causarum est esse superius, sicut in II theoremate^{iv} proponitur distinguendo omne esse superius etc.

Dividitur autem tractatus iste in duas⁹ distinctiones. In prima enim intendit certificare generaliter¹⁰ comparisonem et distinctionem istarum causarum, quarum esse superius est et essentia separata, usque ibi^v: *Intelligentia est substantia que non dividitur*. In secunda vero intendit specialiter certificare substantiam¹¹ et comparisonem¹² earum secundum seriem et ordinem nature. Et¹³ intendit ibi de ipsis ista considerare, scilicet simplicem cognitionem, virtutem, influentiam, regimen et durationem. Huiusmodi omnia patebunt suo loco. Prima pars dividitur in duas. In parte prima certificat comparisonem causarum, quarum esse superius est, usque ibi^{vi}: *omne esse superius* etc. In secunda certificat earum distinctionem secundum illud¹⁴ esse superius.

In primo igitur¹⁵ theoremate^{vii} comparat plures causas ad effectum unum concurrentes secundum influentiam maiorem vel minorem, et per ordinem se habentes, sicut sunt causa primaria et secundaria, ut in isto ordine et hac comparatione ostendit Philosophus de operatione ad virtutem, de virtute vero ad simplicitatem essentie separate in eis in¹⁶ quibus

¹ quarum] quorum *F*

² et] ad *V*

³ modo *om. V*

⁴ est secundum accidens] secundum accidens est *V*

⁵ cum causam] tantum *V*

⁶ quia] quod *V*

⁷ philosophie *post corr. ex philosophice V*

⁸ esse] *coni. cause FV*

⁹ duas *om. V*

¹⁰ generaliter] qualiter et distinctionem *F*

¹¹ substantiam] substantia *F*

¹² comparisonem] ceromparationem (?) *V*

¹³ et *om. V*

¹⁴ illud] id *V*

¹⁵ igitur] theoromate *add. sed exp. F*

¹⁶ in] ut *F*

una influit¹⁷ super aliam in ratione¹⁸ cause vel causati se habendo. Et incepit a causa propter quam fuit sua consideratio in cognitione substantiarum spiritalium.

Et dicit: *omnis causa* etc. Et notandum¹⁹ quod universaliter²⁰ theorema proposuit cum sit de causis universaliter influentibus super omne genus causati; et etiam dictum theorema super omnem artem et disciplinam erigitur generaliter et discernitur. Sequitur *causa*, a qua sumpsit exordium: est autem *causa per quam aliquid habet esse*, quod dicit causatum, ut dicitur in libro *De articulis fidei*^{viii}; secundum Boetium^{ix}: causa est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud. Ideoque²¹ necessitatem cause expressit quatenus tangat principium approximatum ad opus.

Sequitur *primaria*. Et considerandum est quod causa prima et primaria diversantur in hoc quod causa prima est unica, sicut scribitur in XI *Metaphysice*^x: unica est causa prima et unicus est motor²² primus, sicut unum est celum primum tantum, ut in libro *Celi et mundi*^{xi}: causa prima movet causatum primum; [F 96va] et in libro *De articulis fidei*^{xii}: *causam simplicissimam esse oportet. Unde manifestum est omnium causatorum esse unam causam*²³ *supremam*. Est igitur causa unica, primo et suprema²⁴. Causa vero primaria²⁵ nec unica est, sed plures, nec prima²⁶ est simpliciter, sed prima in genere. Quatenus ergo plures causas, quarum esse superius est, in dicto theoremate ad invicem posset comparare et conferre proposuit: *omnis causa primaria*²⁷ etc.

Sequitur *plus influit* etc. Sed tunc verisimilis videtur afferri²⁸ instantia: quia calor solis est causa primaria, calor²⁹ ignis secundaria; tamen plus influit calor ignis quam calor solis. Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quoniam plus vel minus influere dupliciter est: vel secundum completionem³⁰ et incompletionem aut secundum intensionem³¹ et remissionem. Calor vero solis completius influit quia, sicut dixit Expositor super II *Physicorum*^{xiii}: generans particulare relinquit generatum antequam compleatur sua generatio; generans vero universale, sicut sol et relique stelle, complet³², supplet et perficit generationem. Unde in II *Physicorum*^{xiv}: sol et homo generant hominem; et in *Libro vegetaliu*^{xv}: per virtutem stellarum fit³³ forma in materia. Calor vero ignis³⁴ intensius³⁵ influit, sicut patet in combustionem³⁶. Sed³⁷ plus et minus dicunt completionem et incompletionem, magis vero et minus intensionem et remissionem. Unde dixit: *plus influit* etc. nec expressit magis.

¹⁷ una influit] influit una F

¹⁸ in ratione] intentione F

¹⁹ notandum] quod causa *add. sed exp.* F

²⁰ universaliter] et universaliter *add.* V

²¹ ideoque] ideo est V

²² motor] motus V

²³ unam causam] causam unam V

²⁴ est igitur... suprema *om.* F

²⁵ primaria] in(?) *add.* V

²⁶ prima] suprema V

²⁷ omnis causa primaria] causa primaria omnis V

²⁸ videtur afferri] afferri videtur V

²⁹ calor] solis *add. sed exp.* F

³⁰ completionem] completivam V

³¹ intensionem] intensionem V

³² complet] plet (?), *scr. sed del.* F

³³ fit] sit V

³⁴ ignis] ignis *post corr. ex igniss* F

³⁵ intensius] intensicius V

³⁶ combustionem] abustione V

Preterea, calor solis non tantum ad esse naturale, sed etiam ad influentiam eius quod est vivere³⁸, esse³⁹ disponit; calor vero ignis ad esse naturale tantum, et ideo causa primaria, que est calor solis, plus influit sive completius, et sic⁴⁰ ‘plus’ significavit.

Sequitur *supra causatum suum*⁴¹. Dicit autem ‘suum’ propter duo: primum est quatenus significantur due cause ad unum et ad eundem effectum; secundum est quatenus significetur⁴² appropriatum et ut ascribitur⁴³ idem effectus cause primarie magis universaliter, que magis influit super idem causatum. Unde ita debet regi *supra causatum suum* et proprium. Et notandum est quod⁴⁴ influentia est diffusio⁴⁵ virtutis cause super causatum per modum spiritualem. Et hoc modo plus influit causa primaria super causatum suum⁴⁶ quam secundaria quia, sicut proponitur in *De articulis fidei*^{xvi}, quidquid est causa cause est causa causati. Verumtamen, sicut scribitur in commento isto⁴⁷: effectus utriusque cause per modum altiore et sublimiorem cause⁴⁸ superiori et primarie ascribitur et ei⁴⁹ attribuitur.

Et quia ‘plus’ denotat⁵⁰ excessum, sequitur respectu cuius denotatur excessus, cum dicit *quam*⁵¹ *causa secundaria*; et dicit secunda ad primariam sicut secunda⁵² ad primam vel supremam.

In fine vero theorematis complementum comparationis⁵³ appositum Philosophus cum dixit: *quam secunda*⁵⁴ *universalis*, propter duo. Primum est: quoniam sola unica, comparabilia sunt; in VII *Phisicorum*^{xvii}: causa prima vero⁵⁵ universalis et secunda particularis non sunt univoce [V 1rb] cause, sed cum utraque causa est universalis <tunc sunt equivoce>. Secundum est: quia dicta earum collatio et comparatio non⁵⁶ tenet in particulariter agentibus, iuxta quod⁵⁷ instantia, que in superficie pretendit⁵⁸ fantasiam, dissolvitur, videlicet in calore ignis, qui est causa primaria et minus influit in causatum suum, quod est combustibile vel adustum⁵⁹, quam calor⁶⁰ ferri igniti in corpora materie solide et compacte. Unde virtus amplius est unita et aggregata magis⁶¹. Unde vehementiores inducit impressiones, sicut illud theorema

³⁷ sed] et V

³⁸ quod est vivere] vivere quod est V

³⁹ esse] cause FV

⁴⁰ sic] hoc per V

⁴¹ suum om. V

⁴² significetur] due cause ad unum add. sed exp. F

⁴³ ascribitur] inscribentur post corr. sup. lin. ex scribentur F

⁴⁴ quod] quoniam V

⁴⁵ diffusio] disepersio (?) add. sup. lin. post corr. ex diso (?) F

⁴⁶ super causatum suum] suum causatum V

⁴⁷ in commento isto] in isto commento V

⁴⁸ cause] rerum(?) F

⁴⁹ ei om. F

⁵⁰ denotat] denominat F

⁵¹ quam om. F

⁵² et dicit ... secunda] om. V

⁵³ comparationis] operationis F

⁵⁴ secunda] causa secundaria V

⁵⁵ prima vero] vero prima post corr. ex vero prima et V

⁵⁶ non] tamen add. sed exp. F

⁵⁷ quod] in add. sed exp. F

⁵⁸ pretendit] repretendit a. corr. F

⁵⁹ adustum] adustⁱ V

⁶⁰ calor] frador(?) innati add. sed exp. F

⁶¹ unde virtus... magis om. F

proposuit⁶²: *omnis virtus unita* etc. Ignis vero calor est⁶³ in materia⁶⁴ rara habente⁶⁵ partes segregatas. Ideo in istis causis particularibus, causa primaria minus influit. Ad quod excludendum, subiungitur *universalis*.

Et in hoc terminata est⁶⁶ intentio Auctoris. Post hoc vero⁶⁷ sequitur intentio Expositoris Alfarabii et serie<s> sue considerationis.

Est dictum⁶⁸ theorema declarare, immo verificare per viam triplicis rationis, quarum due prime cause sumuntur ex comparatione duarum causarum ad⁶⁹ effectum unum concurrentium per influentiam sue virtutis; tertia vero, que ibi incipit⁷⁰: *et non*⁷¹ *figitur causatum secunde* etc., sumitur ex comparatione duarum causarum ad eundem effectum ratione fixationis et continuationis consequentis influentiam sue virtutis.

Prima vero et secunda ratio diversantur per hoc quod prima sumitur ex comparatione et collatione dictarum causarum ad effectum tantum; secunda vero⁷², que ibi incipit: *et causa prima adiuvat secundam* etc., sumitur ex comparatione earum et collatione ad[F 96vb]invicem primo, deinde vero ad effectum⁷³. Pars vero prima⁷⁴ processum continens prime rationis in duas multiplicatur partes. In prima siquidem⁷⁵ tradit ipsam rationem; in secunda dat eius declarationem per viam similitudinis et exempli, que⁷⁶ ibi incipit: *et nos quidem exemplificamus* etc. Virtute vero prime rationis elicitur talis demonstratio. Componitur sillogismus⁷⁷ in hunc modum: *omnis causa*, que ad remotionem virtutis alterius cause a re causata *non aufert virtutem suam ab ea, plus influit super illud causatum*; sed cum removet⁷⁸ secunda universalis virtutem suam a re causata, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam a re causata; ergo causa universalis prima plus influit super causatum suum quam secunda universalis. Et ita patet propositum.

Processus autem Philosophi circa dictam demonstrationem talis est. Primo tangit minorem cum dicit: *cum ergo removet* etc. Secundo tangit modum per quem verificatur⁷⁹, scilicet *quod est*⁸⁰ *quia causa* etc. Ex quo elicitur demonstratio talis: nulla causa, que⁸¹ prius agit in causatum alterius aufert virtutem suam ad remotionem virtutis alterius cause, que sequitur⁸²

⁶² proposuit] proponit V

⁶³ calor est] calorem V

⁶⁴ in materia] ra add. sed exp. F

⁶⁵ habente] post corr. ex habentes F

⁶⁶ est om. V

⁶⁷ vero om. V

⁶⁸ dictum] deinde V

⁶⁹ ad] eundem add. V

⁷⁰ ibi incipit] incipit ibi F

⁷¹ et non om. F

⁷² vero om. F

⁷³ effectum] vero add. sed exp. F

⁷⁴ pars vero prima] prima vero pars V

⁷⁵ siquidem] vero supra V

⁷⁶ que] qui V

⁷⁷ sillogismus] similis V

⁷⁸ removet] secunda add. sed exp. F

⁷⁹ verificatur] ibi add. V

⁸⁰ quod est iter. V

⁸¹ que] per add. V

⁸² sequitur] sensibilis F

ipsam a re causata. Sed causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam⁸³, cum⁸⁴ agit in causatum cause secunde antequam agat in ipsum⁸⁵ causa⁸⁶ universalis secunda, que sequitur ipsam causam universalem⁸⁷ primam. Ergo cum secunda causa universalis⁸⁸ removet virtutem suam a re causata, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea. Per istam ergo minorem pro simili verificatur minor principalis sillogismi, qui precessit.

Tertio ibi⁸⁹: *cum ergo causa secunda* etc.⁹⁰ concludit, videlicet: *cum causa secunda agit⁹¹ in causatum non excusatur vel excluditur nec absolvitur actio⁹² ipsius⁹³ a causa prima, que est supra⁹⁴ ipsam causam⁹⁵*. Et sequitur ex hoc quod dictum est: *quod causa universalis prima prius agit in causatum secunde antequam agat in ipsum causa secunda*; et ideo⁹⁶ non absolvitur actio cause secunde a causa prima, quia ponendo⁹⁷ posteriora ponitur quod est prius in genere illo, nec absolvitur posterius a priori.

Quarto vero tangit rationem illationis cum dicit: *quoniam est causa*; et supplendum est: *quoniam⁹⁸ causa prima, que est, absolvitur actio cause secunde [id est causa, id est cause, secundum quod non⁹⁹ absolvitur prima]*.

Post hoc autem sequitur explanatio et declaratio dicte rationis per viam similitudinis et exempli. Et continet quatuor particulas.

In prima exemplificat in genere cause¹⁰⁰ formalis per esse, vivum et hominem. Quare¹⁰¹ res in primis habet esse quod est vivere, quia vivere viventibus est esse; postea vero vivere, quod est intelligere, et hoc quia vivere multipliciter dicitur, ut intellectus, sensus, motus et status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum et detrimentum et augmentum. Et extrahit Alfarabius hoc exemplum ex XVIII theoremate^{xviii}, quod proponit: *omne ens propter ens¹⁰² primum*, et¹⁰³ in hoc tetigit esse; *et res vive¹⁰⁴ mote sunt per essentiam suam propter vitam primam*, et in hoc tetigit vivere; *et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter¹⁰⁵ intelligentiam primam*, et in hoc tetigit intelligere. Exemplificavit autem in genere cause¹⁰⁶

⁸³ non... suam om. V

⁸⁴ cum] sup. lin. F

⁸⁵ ipsum] ipsam FV

⁸⁶ causa] autem V; autem add. sed exp. F

⁸⁷ universalem] secundam vel add. sed exp. F

⁸⁸ universalis] sed add. V

⁸⁹ ibi] scilicet add. V

⁹⁰ etc. om. F

⁹¹ agit] agat F

⁹² actio] ab actione F

⁹³ illius] ipsius V

⁹⁴ supra] suba (!) F

⁹⁵ ipsam] causam add. V

⁹⁶ et ideo] non V

⁹⁷ ponendo] proponendo(?) V

⁹⁸ quoniam] est add. sed del. F

⁹⁹ non iter. F

¹⁰⁰ cause] esse V

¹⁰¹ quare] quatenus(?) F

¹⁰² propter ens] preter vis F

¹⁰³ et om. V

¹⁰⁴ vive] vivere V

¹⁰⁵ propter] preter F

¹⁰⁶ cause] esse V

formalis Expositor vero¹⁰⁷, quia <non> intelligit¹⁰⁸ [ac] de causis formalibus principaliter¹⁰⁹ ut cause sunt, sed prout sunt effectus derelicti ex influenza virtutis causarum agentium, quarum essentia separata est per naturam.

In secunda vero applicat exemplum ad propositum hoc modo: vivum¹¹⁰ est causa hominis propinqua et esse est causa remota. Unde *esse* est *vehementius*¹¹¹ *causa* formalis *homini* in eodem genere¹¹², quia quicquid est *causa cause* est causa causati. Similiter ponit in¹¹³ vivere et intelligere: et hoc est *vivum enim*¹¹⁴ etc.

In tertia vero exemplum assignatum verificat sic: *si removeas virtutem rationalem*¹¹⁵ *ab homine non remanet homo, remanet tantum*¹¹⁶ *vivum, spirans, sensibile*; quod licet¹¹⁷ primo aspectu ratione dissonante superficie tenuis videatur, hoc tamen¹¹⁸ per certitudinem quando declarabitur: et ita cum causa¹¹⁹ secunda, que est rationale, aufert¹²⁰ virtutem suam formalem¹²¹ vel rationem, <id est> vivere, que est causa primaria super rationale, non propter hoc aufert virtutem vel rationem ab homine formalem¹²². Similiter se habent vivere et esse ad hominem. Et tangit rationem¹²³ huius quia causa non removetur per remotionem sui causati, et ita remoto vivere non propter hoc removetur esse; similiter remoto intelligere non propter hoc removetur vivere ab homine; et hoc intendit ibi: *illius quidem significatio* etc.

Quarto vero concludit et¹²⁴ recapitulat; et planum est quod dicit ibi: *Iam ergo manifestum est et planum* etc. Et supplendum est: *iam manifestum est* per viam rationis *et planum* per viam similitudinis et exempli ex precedentibus. Deinde vero tangit [F 97ra] rationem illationis ibi: et *quod non fit*¹²⁵ *secundum hoc* etc. Et notandum est [V 1va] quoniam per causam propinquam intendit causam secundariam, per remotam vero primariam, ut patebit postmodum quod ante dicit quod remota *vehementioris est adherentie cum re* significat quod¹²⁶ plus influit.

Secunda vero ratio in sillogismum transformatur sic: *omnis causa que adiuvat reliqua super operationem suam*, plus influit super causatum ad quod¹²⁷ adiuvat causa¹²⁸; sed *causa*

¹⁰⁷ vero] nisi V

¹⁰⁸ intelligit] intelligeret FV

¹⁰⁹ principaliter] principale F

¹¹⁰ vivum] vivere V

¹¹¹ vehementius] esse est *add. sed exp. F*; esse est *add. V*

¹¹² genere] cause *add. V*

¹¹³ in *om. V*

¹¹⁴ vivum enim] vivus F

¹¹⁵ rationalem] rationaliter V

¹¹⁶ tantum] tamen F

¹¹⁷ licet] hoc V

¹¹⁸ hoc tamen] sed tantum V

¹¹⁹ causa *om. V*

¹²⁰ aufert *in marg. F*; aufertur V

¹²¹ formalem] formaliter FV

¹²² formalem] formaliter FV

¹²³ rationem] ad *add. F*

¹²⁴ et] exemplificat *scr. sed exp. F*

¹²⁵ sit] et *add. V*

¹²⁶ quod] cum F

¹²⁷ ad quod *om. F*

¹²⁸ causam] esse F

*prima*¹²⁹ *adiuvat secundam super operationem suam*; ergo plus influit super causatum suum quam causa secunda etc.

In hac ratione procedit sic. Primo tangit minorem et hoc est: *et causa prima adiuvat* etc. Secundo verificat eam sic: *omnem autem*¹³⁰ *operationem quam causa secunda efficit, efficit causa prima verumptamen per modum sublimiorem et altiorem*, et hoc est: *quoniam omnem operationem* etc. Tertio aggregat istam rationem precedenti propter convenientiam utriusque prehabitam et patet quod dicit¹³¹; et hoc est: *et quando removetur causa* etc.

Tertia ratio in formam sillogisticam reciditur in hunc modum: omnis causa sine qua causatum non habet fixationem et continuationem plus influit super ipsum quam causa remota sine qua figitur et continuatur. Sed causatum cause secunde non figitur nec continuatur nisi per virtutem cause prime; figitur tamen et continuatur sine virtute cause secundarie. Ex hiis ergo convincitur quoniam *omnis causa primaria plus influat* etc.

In hac ratione sic procedit. Primo¹³² tangit minorem, ut cedat¹³³ pro medio dicte rationis et hoc: *et non figitur causatum cause secunde* etc. Secundo verificat illud medium sic: quando causa¹³⁴ secunda nec efficit rem nec sufficit ad faciendum eam vel servandam, causa prima influit super¹³⁵ eam et intensius adheret virtus eius rei¹³⁶, quod servat eam, id est conservat. Et in hoc *figitur*, id est conservatur, et continuatur causatum cause secunde per virtutem cause¹³⁷ prime; et hec ratio ex IX¹³⁸ theoremate^{xix} robur assumpsit, scilicet quod *omnis intelligentie fixio et essentia est*¹³⁹ *per bonitatem puram que est causa*¹⁴⁰ *prima*. Et hoc intendit ibi: *quod est quia causa*¹⁴¹ *secunda* etc. Tertio vero concludit et recapitulat media trium rationum et aggregat ipsa quatenus finem dictis imponendo dictum theorema sufficienter roboretur, et hoc est¹⁴²: *igitur manifestum est*, et ita¹⁴³ medium secunde rationis per hoc quod dicit: *quod*¹⁴⁴ *causa longinqua vehementius est causa rei quam propinqua*, licet secundaria, quia *influit virtutem suam super eam et servat*¹⁴⁵ *eam*; per hoc enim quod¹⁴⁶ causa prima servat rem causatam, figitur causatum per virtutem cause prime; per hoc autem quod sequitur, quod non separatur virtus cause prime a re causata, propter separationem secundarie et propinque, immo adheret ei vehementius, tetigit medium tertie¹⁴⁷ rationis, et ultimo tetigit ipsum, quia prius recapitulat ipsum specialiter, et etiam quatenus aggreget secundam et¹⁴⁸ tertiam ipsi.

¹²⁹ prima] primaria V

¹³⁰ autem] enim F

¹³¹ patet quod dicit] quod dicit patet V, quod add. sup. lin. V

¹³² primo] dicit add. sed exp. F

¹³³ cedat] sedet F

¹³⁴ causa] non add. sed exp. F

¹³⁵ su- add. sup. lin. F

¹³⁶ rei] re F

¹³⁷ cause om. V; secunde add. sed exp. F

¹³⁸ nono] nocto V

¹³⁹ essentia] est add. sup. lin. post corr. ex et F

¹⁴⁰ causa om. V

¹⁴¹ causa] prima add. F

¹⁴² est] aliquid add. F; aliquid ut(?) add. V

¹⁴³ ita] intendit V

¹⁴⁴ quod] quia V

¹⁴⁵ servat] post. corr. ex conservat F

¹⁴⁶ quod] cum add. sed exp. F

¹⁴⁷ tertie] cause F

¹⁴⁸ et add. sup. lin. F

Per hoc autem quod sequitur, *quod ostendimus et exposimus*, imponit finem dictis, et in hoc terminatur intentio Expositoris ordinata in serie, que precessit. Ordo patet ex processu more nostro.

Ad evidentiam eorum que proposita fuerunt¹⁴⁹ in initio, de consideratione Philosophi occurrunt generaliter sex dubitanda. Primum est utrum de ente possit esse scientia in sua¹⁵⁰ communitate. Secundum est utrum de ente separato¹⁵¹. Tertium est utrum de ente separato increato. Quartum est utrum de causis possit esse¹⁵² philosophia prima. Et etiam de consideratione causarum: utrum possit considerare omnes causas vel quasdam tantum [vel quasdam¹⁵³] si non omnes. Similiter de consideratione causarum oportet dialecticum, mathematicum et moralem, et etiam: qualiter de causis et principiis consideretur in diversis scientiis et secundum quas vias tam de complexis quam incomplexis. Sexto et ultimo de unitate istius scientie et separatione¹⁵⁴.

<Q. 1: Utrum de ente possit esse scientia in sua communitate>

Circa primum sic proceditur¹⁵⁵: videtur quod de ente in sua communitate non possit esse una scientia, nec mathematica nec alia, multiplici ratione.

Prima est: nihil quod est commune obiectum¹⁵⁶ virtutum genere et specie¹⁵⁷ differentium¹⁵⁸ ad aliquam appropriatur illarum. Sed ens commune est obiectum trium virtutum anime, scilicet substantie et ei quod quid est¹⁵⁹, quod est obiectum partis intellective, et quantitati, quod est obiectum sensus¹⁶⁰ communis. Sed quinque differentie¹⁶¹, que sunt numerus, motus, magnitudo, quies et figura, communes sunt¹⁶² etiam qualitati¹⁶³, quod est obiectum sensus¹⁶⁴ particularis, precipue in tertia specie, scilicet passioni et passibili¹⁶⁵ qualitati, que sensui inferunt passionem particulari, ut odor, color, sapor, calor, frigus et sonus et sic de aliis. Igitur ens non appropriatur ad intellectionem cause. Sed scientia tantum est de hiis, que sunt in intellectu, non in sensu. Ergo de [F 97rb] ente in sua communitate non potest esse scientia, cum in sua communitate non sit in intellectu.

Secunda ratio est: quia maior requiritur unitas ad genus predicabile quam ad genus subiectum, quia unitas que exigitur ad genus predicabile, est unitas secundum scientiam, unitas vero que exigitur ad genus subiectum, est unitas secundum esse. Sed ad unitatem generis predicabilis

¹⁴⁹ fuerunt] fuerit *V*; *om. F*

¹⁵⁰ sua] suo *V*

¹⁵¹ separato] increato *add. sed exp. F*

¹⁵² esse] scientia *add. sed exp. F*

¹⁵³ quasdam] quas *V*

¹⁵⁴ sexto et ultimo de unitate istius scientie et separatione] sexto vero et ultimo de unitate et separatione istius scientie *V*

¹⁵⁵ sic proceditur] proceditur sic et *V*

¹⁵⁶ obiectum] obiectis *V*

¹⁵⁷ genere et specie] specie et genere *FV*

¹⁵⁸ differentium] et differentie *F*

¹⁵⁹ est] ita *add. V*

¹⁶⁰ sensus] sensitive *FV*

¹⁶¹ differentie] differentias *FV*

¹⁶² communes sunt] commune est *FV*

¹⁶³ etiam qualitati] in qualitate *V*

¹⁶⁴ sensus] sensitive *FV*

¹⁶⁵ passibili] qil(?) *add. sed exp. F*

non sufficit unitas entis in sua communitate. Ergo¹⁶⁶ non sufficit unitas entis in sua communitate accepti ad unitatem generis subiecti. Igitur quemadmodum ipsum in sua communitate sumptum non potest esse genus predicabile, unius ordinatoris non poterit esse genus subiectum unius scientie in dicta communitate.

Tertia ratio sumitur ex II *Phisicorum*^{xx}: triplex est negotium: primum est de ente mobili corruptibili, scilicet phisicum; secundum est de ente mobili incorruptibili, scilicet mathematicum, ut astrologum¹⁶⁷, ad quem alie finaliter tendunt; tertia¹⁶⁸ est de ente immobili incorruptibili, scilicet methaphisicum. Ergo cum non possit una scientia integrari ex istis tribus, nec ens ad ista tria cedat in unam scientiam, et ita de ente in sua communitate non potest esse [V 1vb] una scientia.

Quarta ratio sumpta est ex auctoritate Aristotelis in libro *De vegetabilibus*^{xxi} et Ysac in libro *De descriptionibus philosophie*^{xxii}: genera et species dant se et sua nomina¹⁶⁹ hiis quorum sunt. Ex hoc sequitur id quod scribitur in *Metaphysica*^{xxiii} Algazelis scilicet quod *genus*¹⁷⁰ nihil¹⁷¹ est preter suas species. Ergo ens nihil¹⁷² est preter suas species. Ergo de ente communiter sumpto non est scientia una, sed contracto.

Contrarium duplici convincitur ratione.

Prima est: scientia fit per ymaginationem scibilis vel intelligibilis, ergo de primo ymaginabili in sua communitate erit scientia prima, que omnibus communis est; sed ens, sicut dicit Algazel¹⁷³ in sua *Metaphysica*^{xxiv}, [et etiam] est primum ymaginabile ab natura; ergo dispositio in sua communitate debet esse philosophia prima, que omnibus¹⁷⁴ est communis¹⁷⁵. Unde, Algazel^{xxv} et Avicenna^{xxvi}: ens in sua communitate diffinitione non cognoscitur, sed sola ymaginatione.

Secunda ratio est complicata ex pluribus mediis et est: quia¹⁷⁶ de eo contingit esse scientiam sub quo subiecta aliarum continentur et in quo principia radicanter et cuius cognitio rectificat omnem scientiam. Sed sub ente continentur subiecta¹⁷⁷ aliarum scientiarum, que sunt de aliqua parte entis et in quo principia earum radicanter, et maxime veritas principii primi ‘de quolibet esse vel non esse’ radicanter super ens. Et hoc dicit¹⁷⁸: li quodlibet, quod claudit in se materiam sue distinctionis, que est ens, et etiam li esse, quod est actus entis, quod¹⁷⁹ rectificat etiam¹⁸⁰ omnem scientiam [quia per ymaginationem eius contrahendo substantiam¹⁸¹ aliarum ymaginatarum, et de ipsis per principia in ente¹⁸² radicata approbari passiones]. Igitur de ente

¹⁶⁶ ergo] igitur V

¹⁶⁷ astrologum] astrologia FV

¹⁶⁸ tertia] unde(?) V

¹⁶⁹ sua nomina] nomina sua V

¹⁷⁰ genus] genera V

¹⁷¹ nihil] vel FV

¹⁷² nihil] vel FV

¹⁷³ Algazel] Algazelis V

¹⁷⁴ omnibus] omnis V

¹⁷⁵ sed ens ... comunis om. F

¹⁷⁶ quia] quidem F

¹⁷⁷ subiecta] subiecte V

¹⁷⁸ et hoc dicit] sed dicat F

¹⁷⁹ entis quod] om. V

¹⁸⁰ etiam] et V

¹⁸¹ substantiam] ymaginationem add. sed exp. F

¹⁸² in ente] inter V

in illa communitate erit scientia omnibus communis, que rectificat omnes alias et dirigit¹⁸³ eas in cognitione causarum, principiorum et subiectorum, et hec est philosophia prima, quod arbitror esse¹⁸⁴ astruendum.

<Solutio>

Ad intelligentiam huius questionis considerandum est quod de ente convenit esse scientia dupliciter. Primo modo est scientia de ente non contracto secundum rem vel secundum¹⁸⁵ acceptionem, separationem vel¹⁸⁶ abstractionem. Et hoc modo *Philosophia Prima*¹⁸⁷ de ente in sua communitate speculatur quantum ad primam sui partem usque ad sextum tractatum, et quantum ad subiectum¹⁸⁸ primum¹⁸⁹, quod est commune per participationem essentie¹⁹⁰ formalis¹⁹¹, sicut rationes due declarabant¹⁹². Alio modo est scientia de ente contracto secundum rem vel secundum¹⁹³ acceptionem. Et dico secundum acceptionem propter dialecticam, que licet sit de omnibus entibus, tamen contrahit ens secundum suam acceptionem. Sed de ente contracto¹⁹⁴ dupliciter est scientia: aut enim est scientia de ente contracto per separationem, et hoc est philosophia prima quoad tertium subiectum et tertiam partem. Secundo modo est scientia de ente per abstractionem¹⁹⁵. Differentia vero separationis et abstractionis patuit superius. Hec vero abstractio¹⁹⁶ rei tripliciter est: aut enim est¹⁹⁷ abstractio rei a re, et hec est in mathematicis forme quantitatis a materia naturali, quorum utrumque est res. Secunda est intentionis a re, et hec est in phisicis: abstrahit enim phisicus¹⁹⁸ universalem intentionem a particulari. Tertia est intentionis ab intentione, et hec est in dialecticis¹⁹⁹. Differt tamen²⁰⁰ hec intentio ab ea que est in phisicis: universale enim quod abstrahit²⁰¹ phisicus est²⁰² communis intentio nature, quod est esse divinum ad cuius continuationem sunt omnes operationes nature, ut patet in II *De anima*^{xxvii}; universale vero quod abstrahit logicus, est communis intentio rationis ad quam ascendit intellectus per abstractionem, que fit ab universali quod est communis intentio nature. Sic igitur abstrahit logicus intentionem ab intentione; unde logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis, sicut dicit Boetius^{xxviii}, sic ergo secundum dictum modum contingit esse scientiam de ente communiter sumpto et contracto, et per hoc patet solutio ad [F 97va] primam²⁰³ questionem.

¹⁸³ dirigit] digerit V

¹⁸⁴ esse add. V

¹⁸⁵ secundum om. V

¹⁸⁶ vel om. V

¹⁸⁷ prima] est add. F

¹⁸⁸ subiectum] commune add. sed exp. V

¹⁸⁹ primum om. V

¹⁹⁰ essentie] essentialem F

¹⁹¹ formalis] coni. formaliter FV

¹⁹² declarabant] determinabant V

¹⁹³ secundum om. V

¹⁹⁴ contracto] contracta V

¹⁹⁵ de ente per abstractionem post corr. F

¹⁹⁶ abstractio] rei add. V

¹⁹⁷ est add. sup. lin. F

¹⁹⁸ phisicus] natura add. sed exp. F

¹⁹⁹ dialecticis] dialogis FV

²⁰⁰ tamen] tantum V

²⁰¹ abstrahit] corpus add. sed exp. F

²⁰² est om. V

²⁰³ primam] ipsam V

<Ad rationes>

Ad rationem primam in oppositum dicendum est quod substantia, quantitas et²⁰⁴ qualitas dupliciter possunt considerari: aut secundum essentiam, et sic sunt obiecta unius virtutis, scilicet intellective, et hoc modo ens commune est obiectum²⁰⁵ unius virtutis et potest esse una scientia de ente. Alio modo considerantur ista tria genera, sed ens²⁰⁶ est res illorum generum, et sic est obiectum²⁰⁷ trium virtutum, et hoc modo ens alicui non appropriatur illarum, ut ratio procedebat.

Ad secundam dicitur per interemptionem maioris²⁰⁸, non maior requiritur unitas²⁰⁹ ad genus subiectum²¹⁰ quam ad genus predicabile, sed maior quia unitas <...>²¹¹

Ad tertium patet via per diffinitionem questionis, quia triplex negotium predictum distinguitur per ens contractum: nihil tamen prohibet esse scientiam superiorem de ente communiter sumpto.

Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia generis dupliciter consideratur, ut abstracta vel ut participata. Unde licet genus nihil sit preter suas species, non debet esse²¹² genus et²¹³ suum nomen suis speciebus per essentiam²¹⁴ participatam, verumtamen aliquid est genus preter species secundum intentionem nature abstracte. Unde natura quandoque intendit assimilare²¹⁵ individuo²¹⁶ in genere, non tamen²¹⁷ in specie, quandoque vero in utroque; et ita per essentiam absolutam ens est aliquid preter suas²¹⁸ differentias. Et hoc modo est scientia de ipso separato preter ens vel est preter suas differentias²¹⁹ secundum eundem modum considerationis, et sic cedunt in eandem scientiam; tamen secundum diversos²²⁰ modos considerationis, aliquid est preter ens et cedunt in scientias disparatas. Per hoc patet solutio quesitorum²²¹.

²⁰⁴ et om. V

²⁰⁵ obiectum] obiectis F

²⁰⁶ ens] esse V

²⁰⁷ est obiectum] sunt obiecta FV

²⁰⁸ maioris] maiorum V

²⁰⁹ unitas] veritas F

²¹⁰ subiectum] bibro(!) F

²¹¹ deest in F et V

²¹² esse] se V

²¹³ et om. F

²¹⁴ speciebus per essentiam] per essentiam speciebus F

²¹⁵ assimilare] individuum add. V, add. sed exp. F

²¹⁶ individuo] individua F

²¹⁷ genere add. V

²¹⁸ suas] sua V

²¹⁹ et hoc modo... differentias om. hom. V

²²⁰ diversos] diverso V

²²¹ per hoc... quesitorum om. F

Appendix 2

[MS Venezia, Marc., lat. VI.1, 17ra]

Circa quartam queritur questio dubitabilis valde, quam querit Averroys in commento super III *De anima*^{xxix} videlicet de quidditate anime, scilicet utrum sit ponere omnes animas rationales easdem numero vel differre secundum quidditates numerabiles et distinctas. Et ostenditur quod eedem sunt numero et eiusdem essentie non individuate secundum individuationem corporum humanorum.

Prima ratio: omne receptum in aliquo est in eo secundum quod exigit recipiens et *non res recepta*, sicut scribitur super XI *<Libri de causis>*^{xxx}. Ergo si intellectus esset vere individuatum secundum individuationem corporum humanorum, omne receptum in eo esset in ipso per modum individuati. Ergo intentiones universales non reciperentur in anima per modum universalis. Ergo universale, quod est unum preter multa, non esset quiescens in anima.

Secunda est: quoniam omnis forma individuata secundum individuationem corporum et materie est materialis forma. Sed intellectus non est forma materialis. Ergo non individuatur secundum individuationem corporum.

Tertia est: nulla substantia que non addit materiam supra speciem, individuatur per materiam, quia tunc²⁷¹ haberet materiam si individuaretur per eam. Sed nulla substantia stans per essentiam suam addit materiam supra formam, quia quod est in potentia materiali possibile est ut sit non-ens, sicut scribitur in XI *<Metaphysice>*^{xxx}ⁱ; sed substantia stans per essentiam suam composita est sub suo toto actu et non est possibile ut sit non-ens; sed intelligentie *stant per essentiam suam*, sicut ex XXV *<Libri de causis>*^{xxxii} penditur. Ergo non addit materiam supra speciem; ergo non individuatur per individuationem²⁷² materie corporum humanorum.

Quarta est: motor primus celi, quia non unitur orbibus celi per modum actus, sed per modum motoris, ideo non oportet ipsum multiplicari secundum multiplicationem orbium, sed movet omnes orbis saltem motu diurno manens unus; ergo cum intellectus anime rationalis non uniatur corporibus sicut actus, sed sicut motor, sicut dicitur in II *De anima*^{xxxiii}, intellectus *nullius corporis actus* est, quia tunc non oportet ipsum multiplicari nec individuari secundum individuationem corporum.

Ad oppositum, in I *De anima*^{xxxiv}: anima utitur corpore sicut ars instrumentis. Sed eadem ars numero in eodem tempore non utitur instrumentis diversis eiusdem speciei, quoniam alterum eorum esset ociosum sibi. Ergo nec eadem anima numero diversis corporibus eiusdem speciei interesset, quoniam natura nichil facit frustra. Ergo secundum individuationem et multitudinem ipsorum hominum numeratur et multiplicatur intellectus.

Secunda ratio est Augustinus in libro *LXXXIII questionum*^{xxxv}, et est: quoniam si non individuaretur intellectus secundum individuationem corporum, sed esset unus et idem omnibus hominibus, tunc simul et semel esset sciens et ignorans, bonus et malus, et etiam una anima intellectiva non salvaretur et alia dampnaretur; quod est hereticum.

²⁷¹ tunc] nunc *V*

²⁷² individuationem] individuatum *V*

Tertia ostendit: quod intellectus individuatus²⁷³ individuatur corpora hominum, ad inopinabile deducendo, quoniam si homines non individuarentur per intellectivam individuarentur per sensitivam. Sed principium individuationis est ultimum complementum individuationis. Ergo sensitiva esset ultima completio in hominibus; quod est impossibile.

Quarta ex opposito huius impossibilis ad priorem conclusionem deducit, cum ypotesi [17rb] ad impossibile deducendo. Oppositum enim prioris conclusionis est: quoniam intellectiva sit ultima perfectio in hominibus. Ypotesis est: quoniam intellectus sit unus numero, non individuatus in omnibus hominibus secundum eorum diversitatem. Coniungatur ergo ypotesis opposito²⁷⁴ conclusionis; sequitur ex hiis quod ultima perfectio omnium hominum sit una numero, et ita quod omnes homines esset unus homo numero et non tantum participatione speciei. Sed hoc est impossibile quod accidat nisi ex opposito²⁷⁵ conclusionis, que vera erat. Ergo ypotesis erat impossibilis. Ergo impossibile est quod intellectus sit unus numero etc.

Quinta est, quoniam si intellectus sit unus in omnibus hominibus, tunc in aliquem Iohannem²⁷⁶ non esset separatus ipso mortuo, Girardo vivente et alio.

Sexta est, quoniam tunc esset aliquid unum numero aliud a Primo, quod secundum se totum simul et semel esset in diversis locis adinvicem separatis et distinctis²⁷⁷, quod est impossibile, si unus numero intellectus non individuatus esset in diversis.

Ultima est, quoniam omnes homines intelligerent idem penitus eodem modo, quoniam idem esset principium intellectus et eadem veritas intellectualis numero, que²⁷⁸ ubique se offerat intellectui. Hoc²⁷⁹ igitur impossibili dato, hec et alia exigunt consimilia, sicut patet subtilitati.

<Solutio>

Ad hanc questionem solvit Averroys Commentator super III *De anima*^{xxxvi}; et videtur esse in ista opinione quod intellectus est unus indivisus²⁸⁰ secundum individuationem corporum hominum. Unde sicut plures sensus copulantur ad unam originem in eodem homine, sic²⁸¹ in diversis hominibus – sicut dicunt sic opinantes – ymagines plures ad unam originem et in materiale principium copulantur, scilicet intellectum unum numero etc.

Opinio vero Phederici quondam Imperatoris^{xxxvii}, sicut ex relatione nobis constat, circa dictam questionem est: quoniam ex eadem procedant origine intellectus individuati sola applicatione et copulatione ad corpora diversa, sicut multi radii ex sole, et in eandem refluunt originem. Et illam originem ipsorum intelligentium posuit intelligentiam decimam, que continet globum quatuor elementorum. Ex qua opinione multos inducit errores, quia error qui paucus est in principio, multus est in fine, in II *Celi et mundi*^{xxxviii}; et traxit istam opinionem ex errore Algazelis in tractatu quinto, quem nominavit *Flores divinatorum*, ubi²⁸² exponatur sicut dictum

²⁷³ individuatus] individuati V

²⁷⁴ oppositum] opposito V

²⁷⁵ nisi ex opposito] *coni.* non exposita V

²⁷⁶ Iohannem] Iohannis FV

²⁷⁷ distinctis] destructis V

²⁷⁸ que]quelibet V

²⁷⁹ hoc] hec V

²⁸⁰ indivisus] individuationis V

²⁸¹ sic] sicut V

²⁸² ubi] nisi V

est supra. Istos errores caveatis et contradicatis ipsis per processum rationum septem ad oppositum²⁸³.

Tertia vero opinio, in qua sumus, est: quoniam duplex est individuatio intellectus: quedam secundum substantiam, et fit a suo creatore; alia vero est individuatio eius secundum operationem suam, et hanc contrahit ex applicatione et copulatione eius ad corpus cui unitur et in quo exercet illam operationem, secundum quam operationem corpori compatitur, sicut est operatio intelligendi per fantasmata, que communis est habentis et habiti, scilicet anime et corporis, quoniam fantasma non est sine sensu. Sensus vero non est sine organo corporeo. Intelligere vero non est *sine fantasmate*, et hoc declaratum est in I *De Anima*^{xxxix}. Et in eodem: anime passiones non sunt separate a phisica materialium; et ibi^{xl}: rationabilis²⁸⁴ autem etc. siquis dicat *animam gaudere et*²⁸⁵ *tristari* etc.

Ad primam rationem in contrarium solvendum, quoniam illa auctoritas^{xli}, omne quod recipitur in aliquo etc., intelligenda est de eo quod recipitur in aliquo prius composito; sed tunc quod recipitur in anima recipitur in aliquo prius incomposito²⁸⁶ suo modo, quoniam perfectio est anime in intelligendo et ita in intelligendo incomposita est prius, antequam universale prius recipitur in eadem.

Preterea: non recipitur universale in anima secundum suam substantiam, que singularis est, sed secundum suam potentiam, que universalis est; in recipiendo potentiam dico speculativam, secundum quam dixit Averrois^{xlii} individuari intellectum ex applicatione ad corpus, et hoc supplendum est quantum ad operationem.

Secunda et tertia ratio solvuntur per dictam distinctionem, quoniam scilicet intellectus²⁸⁷ non individuatur secundum suam substantiam per corpus, sed secundum operationem intelligendi per fantasmata, secundum quam operationem recipit additionem materie corporis sensibilis, cui unitur, supra speciem.

Quarta solvitur per expositionem duplicem huius verbi: intellectus nullius partium²⁸⁸ corporis est actus. Prima est, quoniam intellectus non est actus corporis quantum ad percipientem organorum, cum non sit forma organica, sicut sensitiva et vegetativa, sed actus eius quantum ad suam totalitatem. Unde supplendum est in illa litera truncata: nullius partium corporis actus est; sed intelligentia nec est actus totius corporis neque partium. Secunda expositio est, quoniam intellectus non est actus corporis ratione sue substantie, sed ratione potentie, quia vivit propria vita substantia eius preter vitam corporis, ad differentiam vegetative et sensitive; <iste> etiam sunt actus corporis ratione sue potentie et substantie, quoniam non vivunt propria vita preter vitam corporis. Intelligentia vero nec est actus corporis ratione sue substantie nec ratione sue potentie, ideo neutro modo erat simile de anima et intelligentia.

²⁸³ oppositum] oppositam *V*

²⁸⁴ rationabilis] rationalis *V*

²⁸⁵ et] ut *V*

²⁸⁶ in- *add. sup. lin. V*

²⁸⁷ intellectus *iter. V*

²⁸⁸ partium] partis *V*

Appendix 3

<p>pseudo-Roger Bacon, <i>Questiones altere supra libros Prime Philosophie Aristotelis</i>, Oxford, 1932, p. 88, l. 5 - 90, l.</p>	<p>pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld, <i>Super librum De causis</i>, MS Firenze, BCN, Conv. Sopp. G. 4, 355, 97ra-va; MS Venezia, Marc., lat. VI.1, 1va-vb</p>
<p>Queritur hic primo utrum de ente in sui communitate possit esse una scientia; dicit enim in litera quod sic. Videtur quod non;</p> <p>nihil quod est commune objectis diversarum virtutum, genere et specie differentium, nulli illarum virtutum in eo quod sic appropriabitur; set ens est huiusmodi, quia ens est commune substantie que est objectum intellectui, et quantitati que est objectum sensui communi, et qualitati que est objectum sensibus particularibus,</p> <p>ergo ens, in eo quod commune, nulli istarum virtutum appropriatur, set illud de quo est isti scilicet virtuti que est intellectus appropriatur, ergo de ente sic sumpto, scilicet communiter, non erit una scientia.</p> <p>Ad idem: de quantitate que est una species entis, et que solum de rebus ejusdem generis predicatur, non est una scientia set plures, scilicet 4 Mathematice; <u>ergo multo fortius de ente non erit una scientia set multo plures, cum sit latius et communius omni eo quod est.</u></p> <p>Ad idem: scribitur in II Physicorum quod triplex est negotium; quoddam est de ente mobili et corruptibili, et hoc est <u>naturale</u>; aliud de ente mobili incorruptibili, mathematicum; tertium de ente immobili incorruptibili, et hoc est <u>divinum</u>; non ergo est unum negotium vel scientia de ente</p>	<p>Primum est utrum de ente possit esse scientia in sua communitate. (...) Circa primum sic proceditur: videtur quod de ente in sua communitate non possit esse una scientia, nec mathematica nec alia, multiplici ratione.</p> <p>Prima est: nihil quod est commune obiectum virtutum genere et specie differentium ad aliquam appropriatur illarum. Sed ens commune est obiectum trium virtutum anime, scilicet substantie et ei quod quid est, quod est obiectum partis intellective, et quantitati, quod est obiectum sensu communis. Sed quinque differentie, que sunt numerus, motus, magnitudo, quies et figura, communes sunt etiam qualitati, quod est obiectum sensus particularis, precipue in tertia specie, scilicet passioni et passibili qualitati, que sensui inferunt passionem particulari, ut odor, color, sapor, calor, frigus et sonus et sic de aliis. Igitur ens non appropriatur ad intellectionem cause. Sed scientia tantum est de hiis, que sunt in intellectu, non in sensu. Ergo de ente in sua communitate non potest esse scientia, cum in sua communitate non sit in intellectu</p> <p>(...) Igitur quemadmodum ipsum in sua communitate sumptum non potest esse genus predicabile, unius ordinatoris <u>non poterit esse genus subiectum unius scientie in dicta communitate.</u></p> <p>Tertia ratio sumitur ex II Physicorum: triplex est negotium: primum est de ente mobili corruptibili, scilicet <u>phasicum</u>; secundum est de ente mobili incorruptibili, scilicet mathematicum, ut astrologum, ad quem alie finaliter tendunt; tertia est de ente immobili incorruptibili, scilicet</p>

communiter sumpto, set triplex.

Ad idem: scribitur in *De Vegetabilibus* quod **genera dant se et sua nomina** suis speciebus, ergo **genera** et omnia superiora **nichil sunt preter suas species**, ergo **ens preter suas species et partes nichil est**, ergo **de ipso non potest esse scientia** alia a scientia que est de particularibus entibus, ergo **de ipso in sui communitate non erit una scientia.**

Contra: scientia ex unione intelligibilis vel ymaginabilis cum intellectu causatur, ergo ex unione **primi intelligibilis vel ymaginabilis** causabitur **scientia prima** et una; **set ens est primum** intelligibile vel **yimaginabile**, ut dicunt Averroes et **Avicenna**, ergo de ente, in quantum commune est, erit una scientia prima.

Ad idem, **de illo maxime debet esse scientia sub quo** substantia (*lege: subiecta*) omnium scientiarum comprehenditur (*lege: comprehenduntur*), et per quod omnia **principia** scientiarum verificantur; set ens est hujusmodi, quia **sub ente** comprehenduntur omnia, et etiam omnia principia scientiarum in eo quod entia verificantur, ergo etc.

Ad idem, quod non est non est (!) scire, ergo, ab oppositis, quod est erit scire, et ita **de ente erit scientia.**

Solutio: ad hoc dicendum **quod de ente duplex** est consideratio; uno **modo** consideratur **ens** in sui universalitate, **non**

methaphisicum. Ergo cum non possit una scientia integrari ex istis tribus, nec ens ad ista tria cedat in unam scientiam, et ita de ente in sua communitate non potest esse una scientia.

Quarta ratio sumpta est ex auctoritate Aristotelis in libro *De vegetabilibus* et Ysac in libro *De descriptionibus philosophie: genera et species dant se et sua nomina* hiis quorum sunt. Ex hoc sequitur id quod scribitur in Metaphysica Algazelis scilicet quod **genus nihil est preter suas species. Ergo ens nihil est preter suas species. Ergo de ente communiter sumpto non est scientia una**, sed contracto.

Contrarium duplici convincitur ratione. Prima est: **scientia fit per ymaginationem scibilis vel intelligibilis, ergo de primo ymaginabili** in sua communitate erit **scientia prima**, que omnibus communis est; **sed ens**, sicut dicit Algazel in sua Metaphysica, **est primum ymaginabile** ab natura; ergo dispositio in sua communitate debet esse philosophia prima, que omnibus est communis. Unde, Algazel et **Avicenna**: ens in sua communitate diffinitione non cognoscitur, sed sola ymaginatione.

Secunda ratio est complicata ex pluribus mediis et est: quia **de eo** contingit **esse scientiam sub quo subiecta aliarum continentur** et in quo **principia** radicanter et cuius cognitio rectificat omnem scientiam. Sed **sub ente** continentur subiecta aliarum scientiarum, que sunt de aliqua parte entis et in quo principia earum radicanter, et maxime veritas principii primi 'de quolibet esse vel non esse' radicator super ens. (...) Igitur **de ente** in illa communitate **erit scientia** omnibus communis, que rectificat omnes alias et dirigit eas in cognitione causarum, principiorum et subiectorum, et hec est philosophia prima, quod arbitror esse astruendum.

Ad intelligentiam huius questionis considerandum est **quod de ente convenit** esse scientia **dupliciter**. Primo **modo** est scientia **de ente non contracto secundum**

contractum secundum separationem vel rem, nec secundum acceptionem vel abstractionem, et hoc modo in sex primis libris *Metaphysice* consideratur;

alio modo consideratur ens in quantum contractum.

Et hoc **dupliciter**; uno modo **secundum separationem**, et hoc modo de ipso determinatur in undecimo; **secundo modo** consideratur secundum quod **contractum secundum abstractionem**, et hoc **tripliciter** quia triplex est **abstractio**. Quedam est **abstractio rei a re**, et hoc modo de ipso in **mathematicis** determinatur, <cum> abstrahantur **res mathematice a sensibilibus**, de quibus sunt scientie mathematice; alia est abstractio **intentionis a re**, et sic de ipso ente determinatur **in physicis**, unde hec **intentio**, ‘homo vel equus’, **ab particularibus abstrahitur**, de quibus in physicis determinatur; **tertia est abstractio intentionis ab intentione**, et hoc modo de ipso determinatur **in logyca**, unde dicitur quod **logyca est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis**.

Ad primam rationem dicendum, et ad minorem, **quod substantia, quantitas, qualitas, dupliciter considerantur**; uno modo quantum <ad> **essentias**, et sic **solo intellectu** apprehenduntur, et sic est de ipsis divina scientia; **alio modo** quantum **ad esse**, et **hoc modo substantia ab intellectu, quantitas a sensu communi, qualitas a particulari, comprehenditur**, et sic de hiis **non est scientia, sicut ratio procedit**. (...)

Ad quartam dicendum, quod quamvis **genera** et superiora quantum **ad essentiam participatam nihil sint preter ea quorum sunt**, tamen quantum ad essentiam absolutam aliquid sunt preter illa. Vel dicendum quod secundum unum modum considerationis non

rem vel secundum acceptionem, separationem vel abstractionem. Et hoc modo **Philosophia Prima** de ente in sua communitate speculatur quantum **ad primam sui partem usque ad sextum tractatum**, et quantum ad subiectum primum, quod est commune per participationem essentie formalis, sicut rationes due declarabant. **Alio modo** est scientia **de ente contracto** secundum rem vel secundum acceptionem. (...)

Sed de ente contracto **dupliciter** est scientia: aut enim est scientia de ente **contracto per separationem**, et hoc est philosophia prima quoad tertium subiectum et tertiam partem. **Secundo modo** est scientia de ente **per abstractionem**. Differentia vero separationis et abstractionis patuit superius. Hec vero **abstractio rei tripliciter** est: aut enim est **abstractio rei a re**, et hec est **in mathematicis** forme quantitatis a materia naturali, quorum utrumque est res. Secunda est **intentionis a re**, et hec est **in phisicis**: abstrahit enim phisicus universalem **intentionem a particulari**. **Tertia est intentionis ab intentione**, et hec est **in dialecticis**. (...) Sic igitur abstrahit **logicus intentionem ab intentione**; unde **logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis**, sicut dicit Boetius (...).

Ad rationem primam in oppositum **dicendum est quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas dupliciter possunt considerari**: aut **secundum essentiam**, et sic sunt obiecta **unius virtutis**, scilicet **intellective**, et hoc modo ens commune est obiectum unius virtutis et potest esse una scientia de ente. **Alio modo** considerantur **ista tria genera, sed ens est res illorum generum**, et sic est **obiectum trium virtutum, et hoc modo ens alicui non appropriatur illarum, ut ratio procedebat**. (...)

Ad quartum dicendum quod essentia **generis** dupliciter consideratur, ut abstracta vel ut **participata**. Unde licet genus **nihil sit preter suas species**, non debet esse genus et suum nomen suis speciebus per essentiam participatam, verumtamen aliquid est **genus**

<p>est possibile genera <esse> preter species, tamen secundum alium possibile est, et sic de ente hic determinatur, scilicet diversimode et in aliis scientiis.</p>	<p>preter species secundum intentionem nature abstracte (...) tamen secundum diversos modos considerationis, <u>aliquid est preter ens et cedunt in scientias disparatas</u>.</p>
<p>Ad tertiam dicendum, quod subjectum in <i>Methaphysica</i> tripliciter dicitur; uno modo est subjectum in ipsa per participationem essentie communis formalis, et hoc est hoc <u>quod est ens quod de omnibus predicatur, de quo determinatur in sex primis libris. (Ibid., lib. 3, p. 121)</u></p>	<p>Et hoc modo Philosophia Prima de ente in sua communitate speculatur quantum <u>ad primam sui partem usque ad sextum tractatum</u>, et quantum ad subiectum primum, quod est commune per participationem essentie formalis, sicut rationes due declarabant.</p>

Appendix 4

<p>pseudo-Adam of Bocfeld, <i>Super Librum de causis</i>, MS Firenze, BCN, Conv. Sopp. G. 4, 355, f. 102rb-va; MS Venezia, Marc., lat. VI.1, f. 1ra</p>	<p>Henry of Geysmaria, <i>Questio de quolibet</i>, in Calma/Székely, p. 213-214</p>
<p>Sequitur <i>causa</i>, a qua sumpsit exordium: est autem causa per quam aliquid habet esse, quod dicit causatum, ut dicitur in libro <i>De articulis fidei</i>; secundum Boetium: causa est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud. Ideoque necessitatem cause expressit quatenus tangat principium approximatum ad opus.</p>	<p>Ad declarandum tytulum questionis: primo est notandum quod causa, secundum Boetium est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud, id est causa est id a quo aliquid aliud habet esse.</p>
<p>Sequitur primaria. Et considerandum est quod causa prima et primaria diversantur in hoc quod causa prima est unica, sicut scribitur in XI <i>Metaphysice</i>: unica est causa prima et unicus est motor primus, sicut unum est celum primum tantum, ut in libro <i>Celi et mundi</i>: causa prima movet causatum primum; et in libro <i>De articulis fidei</i>: causam simplicissimam esse oportet. Unde manifestum est omnium causatorum esse unam causam supremam. Est igitur causa unica, primo et suprema. Causa vero primaria nec unica est, sed plures, nec prima est simpliciter, sed prima in genere. Quatenus ergo plures causas, quarum esse superius est, in dicto theoremate ad invicem posset comparare et conferre proposuit: omnis causa primaria etc.</p>	<p>Tunc ponitur in tytulo questionis primaria. Pro illo notandum quod, secundum commentatores <i>Libri de causis</i>, causa prima dicitur per superhabundantiam, igitur uni soli convenit. Illa consequentia tenet ex VIII <i>Ethicorum</i> et V <i>Topicorum</i>. Sed primaria non est unica nec est simpliciter suprema, sed prima in genere. Et ideo autor <i>Libri de causis</i> dicit <i>omnis causa primaria ad servandum pluralitatem</i>.</p>
<p>Sequitur plus influit etc. Sed tunc verisimilis videtur afferri instantia: quia calor solis est causa primaria, calor ignis secundaria; tamen plus influit calor ignis quam calor solis. Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quoniam plus vel minus influere dupliciter est: vel secundum completionem et incompletionem aut secundum intensionem et remissionem. Calor vero solis completius influit quia, sicut dixit Expositor super II <i>Physicorum</i>: generans particulare relinquit generatum antequam compleatur sua generatio; generans vero universale, sicut sol et relique stelle, complet, supplet et perficit generationem. Unde in II <i>Physicorum</i>: sol et homo generant</p>	<p>Tunc dicitur in tytulo questionis plus influit. Pro illo notandum quod influentia est diffusio cause super causatum.</p> <p>Ideo sciendum ulterius quod differentia est inter plus influere et magis influere, quia plus dicit completionem et minus dicit incompletionem, magis vero et minus ut opponuntur dicunt intensionem et remissionem. Unde calor solis est causa primaria respectu caloris ignis, quia causa universalis, sicut calor solis, dicit virtutem influxivam caloris. Et calor ignis intensius influit quam calor solis, calor vero solis completius, sicut dicit Commentator super II <i>Physicorum</i>: generans particulare</p>

<p>hominem; et in <i>Libro vegetalium</i>: per virtutem stellarum fit forma in materia. Calor vero ignis intensius influit, sicut patet in combustione. Sed plus et minus dicunt completionem et incompletionem, magis vero et minus intensionem et remissionem. Unde dixit: plus influit etc. nec expressit magis.</p> <p>Preterea, calor solis non tantum ad esse naturale, sed etiam ad influentiam eius quod est vivere, esse disponit; calor vero ignis ad esse naturale tantum, et ideo causa primaria, que est calor solis, plus influit sive completius, et sic ‘plus’ significavit.</p>	<p>relinquit generatum antequam compleatur sua generatio; generans vero universale complet, supplet et perficit. Calor enim ignis tantum influit ad esse naturale. Calor vero solis disponit etiam ad esse quod est vivere, igitur completius influit; ideo dicitur in <i>Libro vegetabilium</i>: per virtutem stellarum fit forma in materia, scilicet dispositive, quia profundius agit inducendo ultimam dispositionem pro forma generanda, sicut etiam dicitur II <i>Physicorum</i>: homo generat hominem et sol. Causa secundaria dicitur respectu primarie cause a qua recipit virtutem et operationem. Sic enim autor <i>Libri de causis</i> exprimit causam primariam et secundariam.</p>
--	---

ⁱ ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, I, 1, 184a (*Aristoteles latinus* VII, 1.2, ed. F. BOSSIER et J. BRAMS, Leiden / New York, Brill, 1990, p. 7, l. 3-6).

ⁱⁱ ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 2, 71b (*Aristoteles latinus* IV, 1-4, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO et B.G. DOD, Bruges / Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968, p. 7, l. 4-6).

ⁱⁱⁱ ARISTOTELES, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 9, 76a (*Aristoteles latinus* IV, 1-4, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO et B.G. DOD, Bruges / Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968, p. 22, l. 19-20). Cf. PSEUDO-ROGERUS BACON, *Questiones altere supra libros Prime philosophie Aristotelis (Metaphysica I-IV)*, ed. R. STEELE, *Opera hactenus inedita* vol. XI, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1932, lib. I, ed. p. 22, l. 25.

^{iv} *Liber de causis*, II, 19, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 50.

^v *Liber de causis*, VI(VII), 64, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 61.

^{vi} *Liber de causis*, II, 19, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 50.

^{vii} *Liber de causis*, I, 1, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 46.

^{viii} NICOLAUS AMBIANENSIS, *De arte seu articulis catholicae fidei*, I, 1, ed. M. DREYER, Münster, Aschendorf, 1993, p. 79.

^{ix} *Non invenitur ibi sed vide* PETRUS HISPANUS, *Summule logicales*, ed. L.M. DE RIJK, Van Gorcum, Assen 1972, tr. 5, n. 19, 67, 6.

^x Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, XII, 1072b 5-15.

^{xi} Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De caelo et mundo*, II, 6, 288a 33 – 288b 6.

^{xii} NICOLAUS AMBIANENSIS, *De arte seu articulis catholicae fidei*, I, 12, ed. M. DREYER, Münster, Aschendorf, 1993, p. 80.

^{xiii} *Locus non inventus, sed vide* PSEUDO-ROGERUS BACON, *Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum, Opera hactenus inedita fasc. VIII*, ed. F.M. DELORME, coll. R. STEELE, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928, p. 66, l. 34 – 67, l. 3. Cf. AVERROES, *In Physicam Aristotelis*, II, apud Iunctam, f. 80E. Cf. *supra*, p. 000.

^{xiv} ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, II, 194b (*Aristoteles latinus* VII, 1.2, ed. F. BOSSIER et J. BRAMS, Leiden / New York, E.J. Brill, 1990, p. 55, l. 8-9).

^{xv} NICOLAUS DAMASCENUS, *De plantis*, II, 3, 171, ed. H.J. ed. H.J. DROSSAART LULOFS, E.L.J. POORTMAN, North-Holland, Amsterdam / Oxford / New York, 1989.

^{xvi} NICOLAUS AMBIANENSIS, *De arte seu articulis catholicae fidei*, I, 1, ed. M. DREYER, Münster, Aschendorf, 1993, p. 79.

^{xvii} Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica*, VII, 4, 248a 10 – 248b 20.

^{xviii} *Liber de causis*, XVII(XVIII), 143, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 85.

^{xix} *Liber de causis*, VIII(IX), 79, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 66.

^{xx} ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, II, 7, 198a (*Aristoteles latinus*, VII, 1.2, ed. F. BOSSIER et J. BRAMS, Leiden / New York, E.J. Brill, 1990, p. 80).

^{xxi} NICOLAUS DAMASCENUS, *De plantis*, I, 19, 1, ed. H.J. ed. H.J. DROSSAART LULOFS, E.L.J. POORTMAN, North-Holland, Amsterdam / Oxford / New York, 1989.

-
- ^{xxii} ISAAC ISRAELI, *Liber de definicionibus*, ed. J.T. MUCKLE, in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 12/13 (1937/1938), p. 307, l. 10-12.
- ^{xxiii} ALGAZEL, *Metaphysica*, in: *Algazels metaphysics : a medieval translation*, ed. J.T. Muckle, Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1933, p. 000. Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VII, 15, 1040a 20.
- ^{xxiv} ALGAZEL, *Metaphysica*, in: *Algazels metaphysics : a medieval translation*, ed. J.T. Muckle, Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1933, p. 000.
- ^{xxv} ALGAZEL, *Metaphysica*, in: *Algazels metaphysics : a medieval translation*, ed. J.T. Muckle, Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1933, p. 000.
- ^{xxvi} AVICENNA, *Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina*, tr. 1, c. 5, ed. S. Van Riet, (*Avicenna Latinus*, 1.3-4), 1977-1980, p. 22-27.
- ^{xxvii} Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II, 4, 415b 3, in: *Aristoteles Latinus Database*, ed. J. DECORTE, J. BRAMS.
- ^{xxviii} Cf. AVICENNA, *Liber de philosophia prima siue scientia diuina*, tr. 1, c. 2, ed. S. Van Riet, (*Avicenna Latinus*, 1.3-4), 1977-1980, p. 10, l. 73.
- ^{xxix} Cf. AVERROES, *In De anima*, III, c. 36, ed. F.S. CRAWFORD, Cambridge (Ma.), The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, p. 491sqq.; *ibid.*, c. 5, p. 392, l. 169 – 393, l. 175.
- ^{xxx} *Liber de causis*, IX(X), 99, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 77.
- ^{xxxi} Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, XII, 5, 1069b 15-20.
- ^{xxxii} *Liber de causis*, XXIV(XXV), 181, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 99.
- ^{xxxiii} ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II, 1, 413a 7 in: *Aristoteles Latinus Database*, ed. J. DECORTE, J. BRAMS.
- ^{xxxiv} Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II, 4, 415b 15-20.
- ^{xxxv} *Locus non inventus*.
- ^{xxxvi} Cf. AVERROES, *In De anima*, III, c. 30, ed. F.S. CRAWFORD, Cambridge (Ma.), The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, p. 468-470.
- ^{xxxvii} Cf. *supra*, p. 000.
- ^{xxxviii} ARISTOTELES, *De caelo et mundo*, I, 5, 271b, in: *Aristoteles latinus database*, ed. F. BOSSIER.
- ^{xxxix} ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, III, 7, 431a 15-17 in: *Aristoteles Latinus Database*, ed. J. DECORTE, J. BRAMS.
- ^{xl} ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, I, 4, 408b 5-8 in: *Aristoteles Latinus Database*, ed. J. DECORTE, J. BRAMS
- ^{xli} *Locus communis, vide et Liber de causis*, XXIV(XXV), 181, ed. A. PATTIN, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 99.
- ^{xlii} Cf. AVERROES, *In De anima*, III, c. 5, ed. F.S. CRAWFORD, Cambridge (Ma.), The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953, *ibid.*, c. 5, p. 392, l. 169 – 393, l. 175.