Title | Affective Equality and Social Justice
---|---
Authors(s) | Lynch, Kathleen
Publication date | 2020-10-29
Publisher | Routledge
Item record/more information | http://hdl.handle.net/10197/11276
Publisher's statement | This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Paradigms of Justice: Redistribution, Recognition, and Beyond on 29 October 2020, available online: http://www.routledge.com/978138594272.

The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa)

© Some rights reserved. For more information
Introduction

The affective domain of life, arising from human dependencies and interdependencies, constitutes a distinct sphere of social relations. Consequently, affective relations of love, care and solidarity comprise a relatively autonomous field of social practices, within and through which inequalities and exploitations can occur, just as they can occur in the economic, political or cultural sphere (Baker et al. 2004; Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Crean 2018).

Affective relations are not social derivatives therefore, subordinate to economic, political, or cultural relations in matters of social justice. Rather, they are productive, materialist human relations that constitute people mentally, emotionally, physically, and socially. The nurturing work that produces love, care, and solidarity operates under principles of other-centredness, even when it fails in this purpose. Furthermore, neither love nor care are purely personal or intimate matters; care exists as a public practice, be it in terms of health care, environmental care, community care, educational care or public welfare; solidarity can be regarded as the political expression of such public care (Boltanski and Porter 2012; Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018).

Because the relational realities of nurturing (and their counterpoint, neglect) operate as a distinct set of social practices, love, care and solidarity relations are sites of political import that need to be examined separately in social justice terms. The lack of appreciation of affective relations leads to a failure to recognise their pivotal role in generating injustices in the production of people in their humanness.

This paper outlines a framework for thinking about affective relations in structural social justice terms. In so doing, it hopes to contribute to the redistribution, recognition, representation debate about justice by making the case for a fourth dimension, relational justice. The framework is sociologically informed by theoretical work and empirical research undertaken on love, care and solidarity (Cantillon and Lynch 2017; Grummell, Devine and Lynch 2009; Ivancheva, Lynch and Keating 2019; Lynch 2007; Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Lynch, Grummell and Devine 2012; Lolich and Lynch, 2016; 2017: Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018). It takes a structural rather than individualist approach to social justice, arguing that equality of conditions matter as it is impossible to have anything but weak forms of equality of opportunity in economically and politically (structurally) unjust societies. In relational
terms, one does not just need access to love, care and solidarity, but the experience of love, care and solidarity in a deep nurturing sense.

The paper opens with a discussion of how the concept of affective equality is related to, but separate from, conceptions of social justice articulated by Honneth and Fraser. Arising from empirical studies on love, care and solidarity undertaken over the last 10 years, the paper attempts to advance on Honneth’s (1995, 2003) understanding of love and solidarity and Fraser’s (2008) three-dimensional theory of justice by proposing a fourth dimension, relational justice. The second section of the paper outlines a definition of affective equality and explains how affective injustices cannot be examined separately from structural economic, political and cultural inequalities. It presents an intersectional structural perspective on social justice that recognizes affective relations as a distinct system of nurturing social relations (albeit relations which may fail in their purpose). The paper concludes by making the case for grounding politics in the ethics of love, care and solidarity, rather than the ethics of competition and self-interest that underpin neoliberal capitalism.

Theories of Justice: Going beyond Honneth and Fraser

Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser have undertaken ground-breaking work in advancing the understanding of social justice within political theory. This paper attempts, albeit in a tentative manner, to advance on their very substantial bodies of work from a sociologically-informed perspective, particularly with respect to the salience of affective relations within theories of social justice. Given that Fraser gives attention to dimensions of justice beyond that of recognition, notably redistribution and representation, the discussion will focus more on how to advance on her analysis as it is more pertinent to core concerns in this paper.

Axel Honneth

Honneth has defined love and solidarity as issues of recognition in social justice terms; in so doing, he has placed issues that are of central concern to women, feminists, and to those who are inevitably dependent, such as young children, at the heart of his theory of justice. This is a welcome development in political theory as it recognises the salience of love and solidarity for the production and reproduction of humanity.

Honneth identifies, the ‘three recognition spheres of love, legal equality, and the achievement principle’ as the foundations stones for promoting social justice in modern liberal capitalist societies claiming they have contributed to an ‘increase in the social possibilities for individualization as well as a rise in social inclusion’ (Honneth, 2003: 185).

Because we live in a social order in which individuals owe the possibility of an intact identity to affective care, legal equality, and social esteem, it seems to me appropriate, in the name of individual autonomy, to make the three corresponding recognition principles the normative core of a conception of social justice (Honneth, 2003: 181-2)

While he does address affective care in terms of love, the latter is the only type of affective relation that is recognized as such. He also defines love relations in a way that strongly associates them with the family, and treats them as private and, implicitly, apolitical matters. Yet love relations, as with all human relations, have a power dimension; they are public and political issues not private family matters in this respect (Connolly 2010). If the power, and related material conflicts within love relations are not recognised as such, there is a danger of romanticizing love in a way that ignores its embeddedness in wider structural relations (McNay, 2008). There is related danger of romanticizing family love without looking at its dark side, especially in patriarchal and/or capitalist societies, wherein authoritarianism and abuse can operate in the name of love, thereby creating dispositions that are far from loving in any meaningful nurturing sense of that term. When love relations are psychologised, the potential for political activism for emancipatory social change that lurks deep within the family system can be largely ignored (Connolly 2010). This leads to the situation where there is no political economy language to name the materiality and power dimensions of affective relations, which, in turn, undermines any movement for care-related politics; care consciousness is denied a political voice (Crean 2018).

Honneth defines solidarity as a form of merit or achievement-based recognition. While this is an established way of defining solidarity, it is also a strongly contested view (Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018). An achievement-based recognition interpretation seems to hollow out the affective concept of caring, which is morally led, and is at the heart of solidarity. Defining solidarity in achievement terms is also at variance with much philosophical thought where solidarity is regarded as a disposition of mutual recognition of shared needs and concerns (Rorty, 1989: 189), a form of ‘benevolent motivation’ because ‘to feel solidarity is to be morally motivated’ (Halldenius, 1998: 346).

Finally, Honneth’s theory of recognition, as it applies to love and solidarity, does not engage with the materiality of social life and of power itself. The world of recognition is defined in intersubjective terms, detached from an analysis of the social and political relations that mediate and frame recognition (Thompson, 2014:780-81). Lacking a structural analysis, it also underestimates the power of market-led state institutions in framing relations of recognition and care (Garrett, 2010). The ways in which capitalist economic systems not only condition power, but also frame consciousness and commitment to social (in)justice, through advertising, social media, and living in and through a market-led society (Sennett 1998; Leyva 2018), is not addressed thereby presenting a very idealized and structurally detached form of recognition and subjectification.

While Honneth’s work is rightly respected in terms of providing a profound understanding recognition, it does not fully recognize the importance of love, care and solidarity as interconnected affective relational systems that intersect deeply with economic, political and cultural relations, especially as these are framed within legal and political institutions.

Nancy Fraser
Nancy Fraser has recognized the salience of dependency and care as political issues, both historically and contemporarily (Fraser 1997, 2016). Given this, it is important to examine how she analyses care and dependency in terms of social justice and how her understanding of social justice relates to affective justice.

In a 1997 paper Fraser and Gordon mapped out the genealogy of conceptions of dependency. They noted that there is no longer any self-evidently valued or approved adult dependency in postindustrial society; independence is ‘enjoined upon everyone’ but achievable only through paid employment. Fraser and Gordon recognise the problems that this idealization of independence poses: they claim that there is a need to challenge the negative valuations of dependence to enable a more emancipatory vision of society to emerge. However, they do not offer a resolution to the dependency dilemma.

What Fraser (1997) does address, in a separate paper, is the gender equality problem that arises in doing (unpaid) dependency work within family care settings; she recognises gender-based affective inequality, in the contributive justice sense, although not using this nomenclature. In her ‘post-industrial thought experiment’ she values caring, outlining an ideal type Universal Caregiver model as a potential resolution of the care/gender equality problem in capitalist societies (Fraser 1997: 59-62). While Fraser (2016: 99-100) does recognise that care is indispensable to the functioning of the economy, politics and culture of society, care relations are defined as *reproducers rather* than producers of social life. The care crisis is (rightly) defined as a social-reproductive crisis within capitalism, most recently a crisis tendency within contemporary financialized capitalism; however, the role that caring plays relatively independently of capitalism is not explored.

In *Scales of Justice* Fraser moved beyond the perspectival dualism of *redistribution* and *recognition*, that was a defining feature of her earlier work (Fraser 1995). She endorsed a three-dimensional theory of social justice, incorporating issues of political *representation* as social justice matters. She recognised the ‘relative autonomy of inequities rooted in the political constitution of society, as opposed to the economic structure or the status order’ (Fraser 2008: 6). One of the benefits of this revised framework is that it enables scholars to re-conceive *scale* and *scope* as questions of justice and thereby to move beyond a Keynesian-Westphalian framework that takes the who of social justice as being ‘the domestic political citizenry’ (2008:30).

Grounded in the view that equality and social justice are principally problems of parity of participation, Fraser claims that social arrangements are just when they ‘permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers’ (Fraser 2008: 36). For participatory parity to be upheld, she outlines three key conditions that must be met. These are grounded sociologically in having equality in economic relations, political relations and cultural relations. ‘All three conditions are necessary for participatory parity. None alone is sufficient.’ (Fraser 2010: 365)
Fraser offers an invaluable three-dimensional theoretical framework for mapping problems of equality and social justice, yet the framework follows a traditional egalitarian theory perspective in relation to care forms of labour. The who of social justice is still defined in very particular adult terms (how, if, and when children, and those who are highly dependent on others, experience injustices seems to be outside this frame, as indeed it is in Rawls’ theory). The adult experiencing social injustice is the adult of the economy, culture and politics (the adult of the Marxist/Weberian trilogy of class, status and power). The framework does not recognise the affective domain of life as a discrete and relatively autonomous site of social relations. Nor does it address the ways in which the affective relations of the care world operate both independently of, and intersectionally with, economic, political and cultural relations in promoting injustice. Given that Fraser defines participatory parity as central to her theory of justice this is surprising for two reasons. First, because parity of participation in economic, cultural and political life is itself dependent on parity of participation in doing unavoidable and inevitable care work, work which women are morally and culturally impelled to do in most societies (Bubeck 1995; Folbre 1994). Second, to become and remain a resourced and enabled adult who can participate fully in society one needs to experience love and care, personally, professionally and politically, and such needs must be protected and enabled by the State in welfare capitalist societies (Garrett 2010). Without the nurturing resources invested in them, not only as children but also as adults, people would be unable to participate on equal terms with others in social life (Gilbert 2010). They would lack the extensive emotional, ethical, and the intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences and capacities (see Gardner 1983 on the latter) to do economic, political and cultural work. They would also lack a sense of care and love security, in whatever cultural form that takes. While family, community and state (welfare and related) caring does reproduce people for the capitalist economy, it does much more than this; it also produces people in their relationality, both in its presence and absence.

The primary purpose of love labouring (the nurturing work that is undertaken in the intimate relations of life) is not to serve capitalism (Cantillon and Lynch 2017; Lynch, 2007); to reduce love and care work to its indirect market capitalist purposes is to dismiss life outside of the market and economy in terms of relational value. It is to implicitly endorse the very capitalist values one seeks to undermine. Love labour matters because it produces people in their relational humanity: it is the primary element of people’s ‘humane co-affective relations’ through which they make and remake each other (Matheis 2014: 12). The affective relations involved in nurturing people through love, care and solidarity produce people in their humanness, as sociable beings in-and-of themselves (Oksala 2016: 297); its absence produces neglect, harm and loss. Love, for its part, enhances the capacity of human lives (Cantillon and Lynch 2017), and it enables moral transformation, in so far as it enables people to think and act other-wise (hooks 2000).

Moreover, given the centrality of affective relations in social life, care consciousness is an empirically observable sociological phenomenon. It is driven by a lay normativity (Sayer 2009).

2005) that finds expression in people’s ‘care relational identities’ (Crean 2018: 3), which are connected to but also separate from gendered identities (Lynch and Lyons 2009: 54-77). Ironically, there is ‘...no political economy discourse to articulate the materiality of affective relations and related inequalities’ (Crean 2018: 12) that undermine the development of people in their humanity. A political economy theory of capitalism that ignores the materiality of human production is incomplete because it fails to identify the intra-individual distinction between the self that serves the market and the self that serves others outside the market. It fails to recognise the work involved in creating each other through the inevitable interdependencies of life.

Affective Equality: Preliminary remarks:

An Equality of Condition perspective

In Equality colleagues and I distinguished between liberal concepts of equality and the concept of equality of condition (Baker et al. 2004: 21-46). We noted that, while the classical liberal ideal of equality of opportunity matters, there can never be substantive equality economically, politically, culturally or affectively without a change in the structures that underpin conditions for competitive advantage: the concept of competitive advantage is merely a way of legitimating pre-existing structural injustices. While there is an economically unequal society (especially a neoliberal capitalist one), there cannot be meaningful equality of participation in education (Lynch and Crean 2018) or in society more generally (Wright 2010).

When the principle of equality of condition is applied to affective equality, it implies that having an equal opportunity or chance to have love, care and solidarity is not enough. As our empirical research on love and care work showed, for people to thrive and not just survive, they need significant amounts of love, care and solidarity in their personal, professional, civil and political lives (Lynch and Baker 2009: 216-236). It is pointless to characterize equality in affective relations in terms of having the opportunity to have love and care; what people need is the experience of nurturing through love, care and solidarity, not just the right to have access to it.

To have equality of condition in affective relations, there must be structural changes in institutions that undermine the practices of love and care, and as argued elsewhere, that means challenging neoliberal capitalist, patriarchal, racist, disablist, ageist, disablist practices in the way governments and states organise the distribution of wealth, especially unearned financial wealth, employment relations, care relations, education and other social institutions (Lynch and Baker 2005; Lynch, Cantillon and Lyons 2007; Lynch and Baker 2009; Cantillon and Lynch 2017).

While the ways in which equality of condition would impact on affective relations cannot be analysed in-depth in this short paper, it is a core premise of the work\textsuperscript{v}.
The nature of affective relations means that affective equality is a micro and highly interpersonal matter, especially in terms of love and care. However, to define affective relations in micro-level terms alone is to miss the central role of wider social relations in determining the capacity of people to care and love each other in a nurturing way.

The nation state, and, increasingly, political institutions such as the EU, play a powerful role in enacting laws regulating political, economic and cultural relations, that impact on caring relations, be these in families, at work or in wider society. Achieving affective equality is therefore about generating, maintaining and regulating the social institutions of ownership and control of wealth, and places of employment to ensure that they are enabling and facilitative of loving and caring for all persons regardless of their occupation or employment status, their race, gender, disability or related statuses. It is about promoting education, housing, forms of transport, welfare, health care, and child care that are legally protected as pro-nurturing. And, it is about ensuring that formal political institutions, at local, national and global levels are solidaristic in character, so that they enable and facilitate nurturing relations, both in terms of how they operate internally as social institutions, but also how and if they exercise political power in the interest of promoting affective equality.

**Gender**

Whether affective relations are reciprocal or asymmetrical, whether they are structured by gender, social class, age, race, marital or family status, and/or other abilities, are also key questions of social and affective justice (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Federici, 2012; Oksala, 2016.). Most especially, securing equality in the doing of the emotional and material work involved in creating love and care relations is a major gender justice issue (Bubeck 1995; Fineman, 1995; Folbre 1994); it is a gendered dimension of affective equality in the contributive justice sense (Gomberg 2007; Sayer 2009). As recognised in previous studies (Ivancheva, Lynch and Keating 2019; Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Lynch, Grummell and Devine 2012) the gender division of labour in loving and caring is of pre-eminent importance socio-politically and central to the analysis affective equality in the contributive justice sense. Give the scale and depth of the gender dimensions of affective justice, they cannot be addressed in detail in this short paper. The focus will be on why love, care and solidarity
Affective Equality

As dependency and interdependency are endemic to the human condition (Held 2006; Kittay 1999: Tronto 1993), humans need certain basic forms of care and nurturing to survive and to flourish (Engster 2005). Being emotional as well as intellectual, social as well as individual (Nussbaum 1995), humans also have the capacity for intimacy, attachment and mutual caring arising from, and lived through, their inter/dependencies. They generally recognise and feel some sense of affiliation and concern for others, and value the various forms of social engagement that emanate from such relations. Bonds of intimacy, friendship and/or kinship are frequently what bring meaning, warmth and joy to life, while sustaining intimate relationships, friendships, and trusted community relations, all contribute to human well-being (Layard 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch 2014). Being deprived of the capacity to develop nurturing affective relations, or of the experience of engaging in them when one has the capacity, is therefore a serious human deprivation and an affective injustice.

Having an affectively egalitarian society means creating social systems and institutions where people receive as much love, care and solidarity as is humanly possible. And this means creating the political, economic, cultural and legal conditions to enable affective egalitarian relationships to happen in a way that the political, economic, cultural and affective needs of carers are fully respected, whether they are paid or not. Affective equality is therefore both an interpersonal and a structural matter.

Promoting affective equality politically involves securing the safety of nurturing structurally as a social good and ensuring equality in the capacity and resources to nurture. As affective relations operate as a relatively autonomous set of social relations across three major life-worlds, the primary, secondary and tertiary care spheres (Lynch 2007), affective equality is about maximizing the capacity of peoples and societal institutions to create, maintain and resource the affective relations that produce love, care and solidarity.
First, it is about protecting and enabling primary care relations at the intimate level to ensure they are as nurturing as possible, including enabling and resourcing the love labouring work that non-substitutable affective relations involve (Lynch, 2007; Cantillon and Lynch, 2017). Affective equality also involves ensuring that people have the capacity to create nurturing caring relations outside of family, friends and intimate others. Nurturing needs to be resourced and enabled in secondary sites of caring, including child care centres, homes for those in need of care, and in other social institutions where the work involved has a care dimension, including education, health care, and welfare particularly. Finally, affective equality is about promoting and sustaining care for strangers in the wider political domains, in one’s local community, and at regional, national and international levels.

Figure 1 below presents a visual representation of the three major life worlds where love, care and solidarity operate. First, there is the world of primary, intimate relations where there is strong attachment, deep engagement and intensity. These love relations involve high interdependency and are characterized by strong attachments, intimacy and responsibility over time. While they vary in form cross-culturally, they arise from inherited or contractual dependencies or interdependencies and are people’s primary care relations. The prototypical relationship in this circle is that between parents and children. Even if little love labour is invested in this intimate world, or if there is abuse or neglect, these relationships retain a high level of personal and social significance.

Secondary care relations are lower order interdependency relations. While they involve care responsibilities and attachments, they do not carry the same depth of moral obligation in terms of meeting dependency needs, especially long-term dependency needs. There is a degree of choice and contingency about secondary care relations that does not apply to primary relations. They characterize outer circles of relatives, friends, neighbours and work colleagues where there are lower order affective engagements in terms of time, responsibility and commitment.

Solidarity relations generally involve unknown others and do not involve intimacy. They are the political form or social form of love relations (Boltanski and Porter, 2012). Sometimes solidarity relations are chosen, such as when individuals or groups work collectively for the well-being of others whose welfare is only partially or not immediately related to their own,
Solidarity can be imposed through laws or moral prescriptions that are collectively binding. Solidarity is both a set of values and a set of public practices. It connotes the work involved in creating and maintaining local communities, neighbourhoods on the one hand, and the advocacy work in formal politics and civil society for social justice at national and global levels at the other. It finds its expression in people’s willingness to support vulnerable others within their own country or to support peoples in other countries who are denied basic rights and livelihoods to live a life of dignity. The levels of solidarity in each society are reflected in everything from the vibrancy of its community activities to the taxes people are willing to pay to fund and support vulnerable members of their own and other societies. It is where the moral, the affective and the political systems overlap in public life (for a fuller discussion see Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018).

Within each of these circles of care, people live in varying states of dependency and interdependency. And each care reality is intersectionally connected to the other, moving along a fluid continuum from deep and consistent love, care and solidarity to carelessness, neglect and abuse and violation (Figure 1). [Figure 1 here]
Within primary care relations, labours of abuse and neglect can replace love labouring, not only denying someone the benefits of love labour but damaging the person through abuse and violation (Feeley 2009). Equally in the secondary care relations fields, other-centred care labouring may or may not take place. Highly competitive work environments do not generate cultures of care and concern among colleagues (Ball 2003; Grummell, Devine and Lynch 2009). Neighbourhoods mired by poverty, war or violence are not likely to produce the kind of trust that underpins neighbourly care; exclusionary forms of social capital persist (Leonard, 2004). Higher levels of economic inequality within countries generate greater distrust and less willingness to show solidarity with vulnerable others, either within one’s own country or outside of it (Paskov and Dewilde 2012). There is, therefore, nothing inevitable in the love, care and solidarity (LCS) world; the relational sphere provides contexts where they can be either fostered or destroyed, not least because economic,
Why love, care and solidarity are related concepts

In framing the concept of affective equality, a question that arises is, why are relations of love, care and solidarity treated as a related family of sociological concepts. The primary reason for locating care and love within the same concept family is because the research literature, both theoretical and empirical, demonstrates that these two dimensions of affective relations are strongly overlapping (Badgett and Folbre 1999; Bubeck 1995; Ehrenreich and Hoschchild, 2003; Finch and Groves, 1983; Folbre, 2012; Held, 2006; Kittay, 1999; Mol 2008; Tronto 1987, 1993, 2013). This is not denying that love is distinct from other forms of caring as it is (Ferguson 2014), rather, it is to recognize that the boundaries between love and care cannot always be neatly drawn. Love labour and secondary care work can and do become closely intertwined, with love sometimes emanating from the activity of care (Traustadottir 2000; Folbre 2012; Tronto 2013), while love relations can change, losing their love dimensions.

Solidarity is a moral disposition and commitment to nurture and support vulnerable (albeit generally unknown) others (Rorty 1989). While there are very real tensions between a normative understanding of solidarity as other-centred and inclusive on the one hand, and the self-interested, calculative interpretations of solidarity on the other (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Lynch and Kalaitzak, 2018; Stjernø 2004), when solidarity is framed in the positive, inclusive sense of that term, it is clearly aligned with love and care. Solidarity is a macro-level expression of collective caring, a politicized form of love. It is about other-centred work involving the regulation of desires in a way that is focused on the interest of the ‘other’ (Boltanski 2012 [1990]: 109–10). Love-as-solidarity can and does find political expression, even among those who are most oppressed (Hardt and Negri 2009: 179–80).

Solidarity can be and is expressed through publicly supported health, education and welfare programmes, and while this solidarity may be conditional at times, the core principles underpinning it is concern for the welfare of others. If it were solely based on achievements or merit, as Honneth (1995) suggests, it would cease to be solidarity in the sense that it would no longer be driven primarily by the moral motivation to alleviate or prevent the suffering of others (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003).

Mapping the Intersection between Relational Inequalities, Redistribution, Recognition and Representational Injustices

Affective injustices are real and have material costs and consequences. Moreover, they do not operate alone but are exacerbated by other structural injustices, notably the unequal re/distribution of resources and wealth, respect and recognition, and lack of parity of representation in the exercise of power. Affective inequality is especially exacerbated by
economic inequalities as highly unequal societies (lacking economic solidarity) produce ‘socially evaluative threats’\(^6\), leading to anxieties and insecurities that adversely impact on health, including mental health while undermining trust and solidarity (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, 2018). It is no accident, that those who are in prison are not only disproportionately from very poor households but are also very likely to have suffered severe care deprivations and to have lacked adequate education and other social goods (Feeley, 2009; O’Mahony, 1997; Wacquant, 2009).

Figure 2 below maps the relationship between affective relations and economic, political, cultural systems, and between each of these and the dimensions of equality/inequality to which they are connected. While affective relations play a key role in framing how people are loved and cared for, economic, cultural and power structures also impact on the affective domain. As all major are durable, being are institutionalised in laws, systems, customs and conventions to the benefit of the already privileged and powerful (Tilly 1998), it is not possible to address issues of social justice in one social system without addressing those in related systems and structures\(^6\). 

---

\(^6\) [Figure 2 here]

**Figure 2**

Four Structural Systems where in/equality is generated mapped with Four key Dimensions of in/equality and related processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structured Social Systems where In/equality is generated</th>
<th>Dimensions of In/Equality</th>
<th>Processes of acquiring social goods as sites of in/equality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re/Distribution (Resources)</td>
<td>Respect and Recognition (Status)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh (2004) *Equality*

The double XXs in Figure 1 illustrate that this is the site where a given social injustice is generated while a single X indicates an indirect inequality arising simultaneously from the impact of other systems.
While lack of love, care and solidarity (LCS) is generated in affective relations, it has repercussions in economic, cultural and political relations: those who are uncared for, neglected or abused do not just experience an affective loss, they also experience indirect costs in economic and political life, often through lack of social confidence or inability to compete and succeed in employment and education (Feeley 2009).

Not only is injustice generated by the ways in which relations operate within systems, it is also derived from injustices operating in the processes that give access to valuable social goods. This is illustrated clearly in how one acquires resources through employment. While paid work gives access to resources, the conditions in which one earns those resources differ considerably, not only in terms of income, but also in terms of the burdens and wider benefits of certain forms of work, and in terms of personal autonomy and respect at work (Sayer 2009).

Social injustice is not just about what social good one receives therefore, it is also about the processes that operate in determining how one receives them. In the case of economic relations, it is not just the issue of wages that matter, but whether one is always confined to undertaking difficult and/or boring, dirty or tiring work. As the burden of menial work is generally accompanied by the lowest possible wages and poor working conditions, and as the kind of work people do has a deep impact on the kind of person they can become, and on the quality of their lives, the processes of acquiring social goods is a significant issue of contributive justice (Sayer 2009: 102). In the case of unpaid family care work with vulnerable dependents, the issue is not only that one is without pay but that doing this kind of immanent, and frequently non-transferrable work, also curtails one’s ability to contribute to political, economic and cultural life. Most particularly, it seriously limits the opportunities for many women and carers to exercise their political voice. Primary carers’ lack of time and resources to participate and contribute to politics, combined with academic misrecognition of how care consciousness operates separate from but connected to class, gender and race, leads to silences about the interface between affective inequalities and other injustices in political and sociological discourses (Crean 2018: 13).

**Affective Relations and Values**

Because human beings live in affective relational realities, they have emotional ties and bonds that can reinforce their motivation to act as moral agents, to be responsive to others’ vulnerabilities (Tronto 1993: 134-5). People are ethical, committed and caring, as well as economic, political and cultural: they can and do act other-wise rather than just self-wise. The sets of values that govern people’s actions in everyday life and the emotions that accompany them are central to how people live and define themselves (Sayer, 2005: 949-952). While interests play a role in framing choices and actions, people are evaluative: they make moral judgments about what matters to them in terms of money, power and status. Even in a neo-liberal capitalist society “people are ‘often moved by a quite different set of motives, arising directly out of consideration for the claims of others. They act from a sense
of justice, from friendship, loyalty, compassion, gratitude, generosity, sympathy, family affection and the like... (Midgley, 1991: 5). Though these latter motives are not necessarily dominant (Sayer, 2011: 172), morality exists within people ‘... as a set of standards of correct behavior that define, orient, and regulate their actions from within’ (Vanderberge, 2017: 410); this means that things matter outside of politics and the economy. Moreover, the moral acclaim that comes with being strongly solidaristic impacts on behaviour and directs social action (Stets and McCaffree 2014).

Human vulnerability grounds relationality (Fineman 2004) no matter how complex and conflict-laden these relations may be. Because people have relational nurturing identities (or in some cases unfulfilled nurtured identities), as carers and cared-for persons, their decisions are influenced by their love, care and solidarity priorities and values, albeit in complex and inconsistent ways (Lynch, et al. 2009). To say this is not to deny that people can and do disregard concerns for others; they can and do behave indifferently, neglectfully and abusively as economic, power and status concerns intersect with affective relations. One of the defining struggles in the normative world is the struggle over how to balance concerns and commitment to others with self-interests, tapping into and managing corresponding emotions. But, accounts of human motivation that presume that decisions are made simply in terms of rational self-interest in economic or political terms ‘...fail to do justice to the ... ties of sympathy and commitment that bind people to one another in defiance of self-interested calculation (Nussbaum, 1995: 380).

**Conclusion**

Neoliberal capitalism is the dominant political-economic ideology of the twenty first century. Premised on the primacy of the market in the organisation of economic, and political and social, life, while it has been contested, it has retained political (Harvey 2005) and cognitive hegemony (Leyva 2018). As it endorses a form of entrepreneurial individualism that is highly competitive and self-interested (Mau, 2015), and as it regards these traits as natural and desirable (Friedman 2002), neoliberalism is antithetical to care in deep and profound ways (Federici 2012; Fraser 2016; Oksala 2016). To challenge the values of neoliberal politics, a new language and narrative is required, one that recognises the sociological reality that humans are moral (as well as self-interested) agents for whom values matter. Affective ties ground this morality, even if the capacity to act on those values and concerns are delimited by economic, political and cultural institutions that override them in neoliberal times where self-interest, consumption and competition have moved from being a common feature of life to being celebrated as social virtues (Bauman 2007; Streeck 2016).

Focusing analytical attention on affective relations, and the salience of the normative within social scientific and political analysis, offers a different way of thinking about politics and
what matters to people in their everyday lives outside of the politics of class, status and power. It opens a political space for new normatively-led modes of political analysis and engagement in a way that challenges many of the core values of neoliberal capitalism. There is scope to intellectually direct political desire towards an admission of vulnerability and other-centredness, to help frame politics relationally and normatively.

Affective relations of love, care and solidarity matter not only for what they can produce personally (or what their absence of abuse can do negatively to persons, communities or societies) but for what they might generate politically in terms of heralding different ways of relating beyond separatedness, competition and aggrandizement. Grounding politics in the concerns about love, care and solidarity, rather than competition and self-interest, has the potential to help generate more egalitarian-driven thinking within public life. It would help restrain the principle of rational economic interest and the politics of fear, both of which are endemic to contemporary capitalism (Beck 1992). It could, over time, create a political discourse that would enable people to think other-wise rather than self-wise. This would help drive public-policy-thinking in a way that is focused on the care-of-the-other in the context of caring of the self, thus breaking the present binary of egoism vs. altruism. Recognising the ethical-political potential of love, care and solidarity as normative values therefore, could help change intellectual and public discourse about politics.

To recognise the salience of affective relationality for human choices and actions is not to suggest that relationality is disinterested or driven by simple altruism. Relational beings are simultaneously living in an autonomous space; they are both self-interested and relational simultaneously. People are individuals-in-relation, not separate and soluble persons (England, 2005). And being self-interested in the classical economic sense may indeed be what enables people to be other-centred in other spheres of life; autonomy is not the enemy of relationality. Neither is relationality the enemy of autonomy; people who are engaged with the interests of others are more sensitive to their needs and desires and this knowledge of others gives one power to serve the other and to be rewarded in turn by reciprocal appreciation and action.

A global order that ignores the inevitability of care arising from human inter/dependencies cannot be just (Tronto 2013; Kittay 1993). Ignoring affective relations of nurturing also leads inevitably to a social system that ignores the way women are unable to exercise the kind of parity of participation in the economy, politics and culture, that Fraser (2008) claims is a benchmark of social justice. Affective equality and relational justice are therefore as central to the politics of justice as redistribution, recognition, and representation.

References


Fraser, N. 2016. ‘Contradictions of Capital and Care’, New Left Review. 100, July/August: 99-117.


Lolich, L. and Lynch, K. 2017 ‘No Choice without Care: Palliative Care as a Relational Matter, the Case of Ireland’, Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 100 (4) 353-374.


Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Vanderberghe, F. 2017. ‘Sociology as Moral Philosophy (and Vice Versa)’, Canadian Review of Sociology/ La Société Canadienne de Sociologie. 54 (4): 405-422.


The research for Affective Equality: Love, Care and Injustice (Lynch et al., 2009) involved a range of studies on primary and secondary caring for an EU-funded project on which I was the principal investigator. The main Care Conversations’ study involved twenty-one case studies of care in private households (ten involving care of children and eleven involving care of adults with high care needs). Thirty in-depth conversations were held with carers and care recipients (although some persons held both roles). The households were selected to represent participants from different social classes; they also included disabled people, lone carers, couples (heterosexual and same sex), single people, older and younger carers, people from different ethnic backgrounds, and women and men. Three other related studies are also undertaken for Affective Equality: Maeve O’Brien’s (2007, 2009) study of the emotional work of twenty five mothers with their school-going children- mothers in the study were drawn from a strategically sampled range of different social class, marital status, ethnic, racial and migrant backgrounds; Maggie Feeley’s (2009) study was based on extended interviews with adults aged of those of twenty eight people aged 40-65 years (15 women and 13 men) who had been in State care, focusing on the relationship between care/lack of care and literacy; Niall Hanlon’s (2009) study of eight leaders of men’s organisations exploring their views on care and masculinity. The second study investigated the impact of neoliberal policies in the appointment of senior managers in primary, second-level and higher education institutions, New Managerialism: Commercialisation, Carelessness and Gender (Lynch, Grummell and Devine, 2012). Fifty people (gender balanced group) were interviewed: 23 senior appointees and 27 chairs and/or key member of the boards of assessors for these appointees. The ways in which care relations interfaced with management in the context of neoliberal reforms was the focus of the study. Finally, a study of solidarity actions during the financial crisis in Ireland was undertaken as part of the SOLIDUS project (EU Horizons 2020 SOLIDUS project). In total, 42 interviews were undertaken with solidarity actors; 25 of these were with leaders of five major national organisations involved in organising solidarity actions against austerity. A further 10 individual interviews with leaders of other solidarity movements, and seven more with leaders of women’s movements were also undertaken. Data from a focus groups with key national solidarity actors was also collected. This data is currently being analysed.

Whether modern capitalism has contributed to social inclusion is an open question, one that is dependent on empirical verification. It cannot be taken as a given. Data from the OECD (2011, 2015) and work by economists such as Piketty (2014) suggests that while capitalism may have enabled certain social and economic advances, the benefits of these are by no means equally distributed, particularly in an era of neoliberal capitalism.

For a critique of the Rawls’ position see Kittay, 1999: 75-113)

The concept of equality of condition differs from equality of opportunity is discussed in some detail in Equality: From Theory to Action (Baker et al. pp. 21-72)

‘When inequalities are deep and extensive this provokes anxiety and fear about how one is valued. ‘Inequality increases the tendency to regard people at the top of society as hugely important and those near the bottom as almost worthless. The result is that we judge each other more by status and become more anxious about where other people think we fit in’ (Wilkinson and Pickett 2018: 28)

Inequalities are also intersectional (Crenshaw 1991) because people have multi-dimensional, structurally framed group-related identities. These must also be recognised in
framing theories of justice though it cannot be discussed in detail here (see discussion of this in Baker et al. 2004: 57-72)