



Title	MEC-enabled 5G Use Cases: A Survey on Security Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures
Authors(s)	Ranaweera, Pasika, Jurcut, Anca Delia, Liyanage, Madhusanka
Publication date	2022-12
Publication information	Ranaweera, Pasika, Anca Delia Jurcut, and Madhusanka Liyanage. "MEC-Enabled 5G Use Cases: A Survey on Security Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures." ACM, December 2022. https://doi.org/10.1145/3474552 .
Publisher	ACM
Item record/more information	http://hdl.handle.net/10197/25912
Publisher's statement	© ACM, 2022. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Computing Surveys, Volume 54, Issue 9, (December 2022) Article No.: 186 https://doi.org/10.1145/3474552
Publisher's version (DOI)	10.1145/3474552

Downloaded 2026-05-25 16:58:03

The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa)



© Some rights reserved. For more information

MEC Enabled 5G Use Cases: A Survey on Security Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures

PASIKA RANAWEERA, University College Dublin, Ireland

ANCA JURCUT, University College Dublin, Ireland

MADHUSANKA LIYANAGE, University College Dublin, Ireland and University of Oulu, Finland

The future of mobile and internet technologies are manifesting advancements beyond the existing scope of science. The concepts of automated driving, augmented-reality, and machine-type-communication are quite sophisticated; and requires an elevation of the current mobile infrastructure for launching. The 5G mobile technology serves as the solution; though lacks a proximate networking infrastructure to satisfy the service guarantees. Multi-Access Edge Computing envisage such an edge computing platform. In this survey, we are revealing security vulnerabilities of key 5G based use cases deployed in the MEC context. Probable security flows of each case are specified, while countermeasures are proposed for mitigating them.

CCS Concepts: • **Human-centered computing** → *Ubiquitous and mobile computing*; • **Security and privacy**; • **General and reference** → **Surveys and overviews**; • **Computer systems organization** → **Cloud computing**;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: 5G, use cases, MEC, Security, ITS, V2E, AR, VR, UAV, mMTC, eMBB

ACM Reference Format:

Pasika Ranaweera, Anca Jurcut, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. MEC Enabled 5G Use Cases: A Survey on Security Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures. 1, 1 (March 2021), 35 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnnn.nnnnnnnn>

1 INTRODUCTION

Moore's Law suggests the processor speed is exponentially incrementing over time [12, 87]. Hence, the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices employed at industries serving Big Data applications are thriving with the possibility of proliferated processing capability in miniaturized devices. Moreover, improved smart device usage literacy of general public in modern era are enabling the social internet platforms to launch cumbersome bandwidth consuming applications for elevating their subscriptions with immersive Quality of Service (QoS). It is estimated that the number of mobile terminals are reaching 2.8 billion by 2019 and monthly mobile data traffic is reaching beyond 49 exabytes by 2021 according to Cisco [117]. Thus, deployments of billions of smart devices demand access capacity and bandwidth requirement from the access interfaces of mobile base stations.

The fifth-generation (5G) mobile technology is the seminal advancement explored by the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to reach beyond the constrictions of the prevailing network architecture. To achieve the novel requirements of enhanced performance, portability, interoperability, elasticity, reliability, spectral and energy efficiency; a network softwarization approach should be followed by the evolving mobile networks [63]. Virtualization, service migration,

Authors' addresses: Pasika Ranaweera, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, pasika.ranaweera@ucdconnect.ie; Anca Jurcut, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, anca.jurcut@ucd.ie; Madhusanka Liyanage, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, madhusanka@ucd.ie, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland, madhusanka.liyanage@oulu.fi.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.

© 2021 Association for Computing Machinery.

Manuscript submitted to ACM

Manuscript submitted to ACM

53 orchestration, and service automation (as in service function chaining [48]) are the main phases of paving the path
54 towards 5G and beyond 5G mobile paradigms[24]. As the core and backhaul portions of the emerging mobile networks
55 are softwarized; techniques of ultra-dense networks, massive Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO), and high-
56 frequency communication are prominent methods for improving the wireless access network [117]. Due to these
57 technological improvements, 5G guarantees a 1000 times enhancement of the capacity than its predecessor.

59 Even with the softwarized 5G core network, facilitating the diverse requirements demanded by the IoT based devices
60 is still a predicament due to the drawbacks of existing service provisioning infrastructure[25]. Conventional cloud
61 computing architecture fails to provision emerging myriads of services [80]. The geographically distant placement of
62 data centres and limited access capacity contrives unintended delays and jitters that compromise the entire service
63 infrastructure. Moreover, cloud servers are incapable of servicing billions of IoT devices ubiquitously. These limitations
64 in cloud computing paradigm enforce vulnerabilities that can be exploitable by adversaries [130]. Moreover, privacy is
65 a major concern with the outsourcing based cloud computing service models [41]. Most cloud service providers are
66 violating the locational and data privacy of their consumers.
67

69 In order to overcome these constrictions in storage and processing service models, Edge Computing (EC) as a
70 paradigm was introduced in 1990s with Content Delivery Networks (CDN) that decentralized the data centre functions
71 [140]. Main objective of EC was to extend the functions offered from cloud computing to the edge of the mobile network
72 [103]. With in-proximity dispensing of cloud functions at the edge, drawbacks of the cloud paradigm could be mitigated.
73 In fact, this architectural paradigm shift is the *raison d'être* for 5G and beyond 5G based concepts to achieve the
74 guaranteed performance metrics. There are various flavours of edge concepts introduced for expanding this notion.
75 Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC), Fog computing, Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC), Cloudlets, and Transparent
76 Computing (TC) are such directives followed by research communities [103, 117]. Out of these concepts however, MEC
77 and fog computing are leading to be adopted pragmatically and in terms of standardization. In this survey, we are
78 investigating the MEC paradigm as its standardization is much more convincing than the other concepts.
79

82 1.1 Related Surveys

84 There are several research studies that focus on MEC, 5G, and various approaches related to the deployment of these
85 aspects, including security. Ren et al. in [117] explores the orchestration mechanisms within end-edge-cloud context for
86 fog, MEC, TC, and cloudlets. Different edge flavours are contrasted with an evaluation criteria; that sets the criterion
87 indices based on heterogeneity support, QoS requirements, elastic scalability, mobility, and interoperability. Moreover,
88 computational offloading, caching, security, privacy, and future research directions are discussed further. In [115],
89 a comprehensive survey is conducted on service migration scenarios for edge computing paradigms. The diversity
90 among the existing migration schemes are highlighted while architectures, platforms, and implementations related to
91 migration are presented further. Moreover, future research directions are presented considering the gaps identified in the
92 literature. Li et al. in [77] reviews the edge oriented computing systems focusing on their architectural features, resource
93 management approaches, and design objectives. Though, the investigation is more concentrated on fog computing
94 than other EC paradigms. The adaptation of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) on IoT based applications have
95 been studied in [157]. IoT use cases of smart home, smart transport, supply chain, smart healthcare, and smart energy
96 are described in the applicable DLT platform context. Offloading is a vital consideration for EC scenarios. Thus, a
97 survey is conducted on offloading algorithms in [139] for edge and cloud deployments. The surveys in [37] and [142]
98 discuss Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Software Defined Networks (SDN), Service Function Chaining (SFC),
99 and Network Slicing (NS) as MEC enablers; where focus on security is not comprehensive.
100
101
102
103

Ferrer et al. in [36] presents a concise comparison between MCC, Mobile Ad hoc Computing, and EC to emphasize the novel aspects of decentralized cloud approaches. Reliable resource provisioning problem with edge-cloud computing environments is addressed in [28]. More emphasis is drawn to the machine learning as a solution for workload characterization, workload prediction, component placement, system consolidation, and application elasticity aspects of prevailing resource provisioning approaches. Knowledge on IoT based communication protocols such as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), Data Distribution Service (DDS), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) are imperative for realizing the formation of 5G based use cases. A comprehensive survey is conducted in [26] on such IoT protocols emphasizing their characteristics, and performance issues in the context of fog and cloud computing integration.

Khan et al. in [63] addresses security and privacy advancements of 5G in the viewpoint of novel technologies of SDN, NFV, NS, and MEC. This survey has investigated the Physical Layer Security (PLS), security monitoring and management, privacy, and security standardization aspects of 5G to a comprehensive extent. Though, 5G based use cases are not considered in their scope. Ranaweera et al. in [109, 110] present a comprehensive inductive research on MEC security and privacy aspects, considering real-world MEC deployment scenarios accustoming to the ETSI standardization. Despite their holistic nature, their work does not focus on the 5G use cases that this article is introducing. The use cases of industrial automation, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITSs), Virtual Reality (VR), smart grids, e-health, and education are considered in [99] on the latency requirement perspective. Though this survey states the latency requirements of each use case, their security issues and prospects on edge computing has not been addressed.

1.2 Scope and Contribution

In this survey, we are exploring the security vulnerabilities of 5G use cases deployed in accordance to MEC based scenarios. The use cases of critical infrastructure based services, enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC), Autonomous driving/ Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) connections, Augmented Reality (AR)/ Virtual Reality (VR)/ Mixed Reality (MR), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are investigated for security vulnerabilities. Further, prevailing security solutions are mapped as solutions and countermeasures for each use case. This is the main contribution of this research as current literature lacks the discussion of security in 5G enabled edge computing based deployments. Understanding the progress of state-of-the-art industrial and academic projects in 5G and MEC are vital to realize the adaptation of the scoped use cases. Thus, this paper presents a holistic overview of leading projects.

1.3 Paper Organization

The rest of the paper is organized into 5 sections. Section 2 presents the background on 5G, MEC, and role of MEC in 5G. Core contribution of this research is contained in Section 3, where use cases are investigated for their security issues and usable solutions. Section 4 summarizes the details on current research groups and institutions proceeding in MEC and 5G focused security developments. Insights gained from this survey are discussed in Section 5, while probable novel applications and challenges for wide adoption of 5G are presented briefly. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 BACKGROUND

Despite that 5G and MEC can be operable independently, the integration of them would enable applications and use cases with requirements of Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communication (URLLC) capabilities in addition to improved security and privacy aspects [37]. Thus, assimilation of 5G and MEC standardization is imperative to realize the context of this paper. The following section describes the key information on 5G, MEC, and the role of MEC in 5G.

2.1 5G

The data rates of 1 ~ 10 Gbps, 1 ms round trip latency, enhanced capacity for plethora of connecting devices through high bandwidth channels, perceived availability of 99.999%, 100% ubiquitous connectivity, improving battery life through 90% energy reduction are major requirements for 5G in the performance perspective [2]. The softwarization of the 5G core enables the segmentation of functions to a layered architecture with its featured flexibility. The Fifth Generation Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP) project proposes the five layers of infrastructure, network/ control, orchestration, business, and services for forming the 5G functional architecture [40]. The orchestration layer however, is a dispersed function among other layers while services layer can be represented as an extension of the business layer [63]. The infrastructure layer represents the RAN connectivity portion of the mobile network. The Radio Access Technologies (RATs) employed in the 5G infrastructure layer are supporting Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA), massive Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO), Coordinated Multi-Point (CoMP) transmission, and millimeter Wave (mmWave) technologies [13, 31]. Control layer inhibits the network management function while network and business services are assigned to the business layer.

Security measures targeted for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authentication and authorization aspects were implemented with predecessor mobile networks ranging from 2G to Long Term Evolution (LTE). Though, Information Assurance (IA) policies has become most profound for 5G and beyond networks with the requisite to assure the content in processing, usage, and transmission in the cyber space [121]. Encryption is the key security mechanism to ensure security in mobile networks. Encryption schemes of A3, A5/2, A5/3, A8, Kasumi, SNOW-3G, and Evolved Packet System (EPS) Encryption Algorithm (EEA) along with EPS Integrity Algorithm (EIA) were such methods employed for confidentiality and integrity protection [63, 80]. Moreover, TS 23.122 and TS 33.210 specifications are defining the Access Stratum (AS) and Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security functions of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) based mobile deployments [72]. AS and NAS are functional layers of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and LTE protocol stack. Though, novel mobile network deployments require the allowance to be dynamically customized in accordance to the specifications of impending use cases and applications [3]. Thus, architectural amendments in 5G do not permit the utilization of security measures employed for pre-5G networks [59]. In addition, flash crowd network traffic demand, radio interface security, user plane integrity, roaming, Denial of Service (DoS) or saturation attacks, and signalling storms are identified as novel challenges for 5G mobile networks [4]. The heterogeneous nature of 5G enabled devices empowered with IoT technologies are envisaging massive scalability with cross-platform issues. Introducing novel services and applications are imminent to attract enormous amount of subscribers; hence contriving a flash crowd demand (unintended surge in subscribers) situation in the mobile network. Such situations are exploitable by capable adversaries to overload both application and radio interfaces that mimic a DoS effect [82]. Further, DoS or Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks pose a service interruption risk for latency sensitive 5G applications via impeding the service with continuous malicious accessing attempts. Similar effect is expected from signalling storms, by generating massive amount of signalling traffic in the control plane; access granted by the intruder from a signalling attack perpetrated at the 5G interfaces. As 5G core network components such as User Plane Function (UPF) are deployed in line with the edge/ user level, such signalling storms could sabotage the entire mobile domain [65]. The heightened mobility with 5G devices incur roaming, handover, and migration situations more frequent. Thus, timing based interposing attacks are imminent on such control channels, channel assignments, and migration sessions [134]. In addition, malicious User Equipment (UE) and fake BSs launching masquerading attempts resulting in wormhole, or sinkhole effects are imminent in the user plane [11, 61, 110]. Thus,

integrity and authenticity of the user plane is paramount for 5G. Solutions such as Host Identity Protocol (HIP) schemes, mandating global visibility for security policies, Cloud RAN (C-RAN) and EC, isolation of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) are adaptable for meeting the security requirements [3, 81, 135]. More details on 5G security can be assimilated from [35, 38, 49, 80, 144].

2.2 Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC)

In contrast to other edge computing paradigms, MEC edge infrastructure is proposed to be deployed at the Radio Network Controller (RNC), or the Base Station (BS), or gNodeB (gNB) in 5G terms [103]. Thus, its reliance on MNOs service quality is higher than the other paradigms. The ETSI defined MEC architecture is formed with two levels that are deployed along with the BS and the mobile core network entities referred as the edge/ host level and the system level respectively [33]. These two levels are segmenting the functions of service registration and service provisioning for improved access and security. Isolating the orchestration function of the entire system from the edge infrastructure, mitigates the possibilities of holistic system compromise through intrusions. Moreover, an edge infrastructure operating unburdened by the service registration processes would serve with improved mobility, scalability, availability, and context awareness [119]. In addition, an edge infrastructure capable of operating standalone or with cloud connectivity, envisages a very low latency and jitter for enhanced service access [152]. These features of MEC enable the compatibility and adaptability for IoT based services facilitated with the edge domain [118]. However, these novel structures and virtualization technologies employed for deploying a dynamic service environment are creating unprecedented issues in security and privacy context.




Fig. 1. MEC Operation and Structure

The MEC operational structure depicted in Fig. 1 represents the various entities defined by the ETSI for accomplishing classified tasks at the edge and the core [109]. The functions approving, rejecting, and managing service requests are handled by the entities of User Application Life-Cycle Management Proxy (UALCMP), Customer Facing Service Portal (CFSP), and Operations Support System (OSS) at the core. Mobile Edge Orchestrator (MEO) is orchestrating the entire MEC system under its domain. The edge system is governed by Mobile Edge Platform Manager (MEPM) while Virtualization Infrastructure Manager (VIM) is acting as the hypervisor for the edge environment. Mobile Edge Hosts (MEHs) are virtual entities that are configured for the subscriber service requirements; which perpetrates the actual storage and processing operations in the MEC system. Service instances instigated by the User Equipment Applications

(UE Apps) are interacting with its counterpart at a particular MEH called Mobile Edge Application (ME App). Mobile Edge Platform (MEP) is managing the resources and networking within a MEH.

MEC is built on top of the driving technologies SDN, NFV, Information Centric Networking (ICN), NS, and IoT [83, 103]. Thus, implementing security for heterogeneous services overlaid on top of the diverse driving technologies of the MEC is an intricate task. Moreover, extended access capacity at the edge with wireless channels and mobile offloading/ delegation schemes are elevating the probable penetrative and vulnerable vectors in the edge network that would be subjected for exploitation by the adversaries [50]. Thus, revealing vulnerabilities and threats in 5G based MEC deployments should be handled case-by-case for each probable use case of 5G.

2.3 Role of MEC in 5G




Fig. 2. MEC enabled 5G based use cases

MEC plays a key role in realizing the envisaged use cases of 5G. Six use cases, as depicted in Fig. 2, are elaborated in section 3 for stating the investigated security vulnerabilities in MEC enabled scenarios. As these use cases are offered as services to the 5G consumers, service quality in terms of QoS and Quality of Experience (QoE) are key factors for service continuity that eventually decides the pricing /charge of the particular service [21]. Thus, 5G core network deployment itself cannot ensure the required service quality from these impending applications due to limitations of access network. As discussed above, MEC and other edge computing paradigms facilitate the infrastructure for

Manuscript submitted to ACM

enhancing the access interfaces to cater ultra-low latency, real-time ubiquity, security, and privacy aspects of the mobile network[82]. Though, managing the diverse services that demand various requirements (i.e. low latency is critical for UAV and V2V applications while reliability, QoS, and QoE are required for eMBB and AR use cases) is a challenge for MNOs. Network Slicing is a concept identified for achieving this purpose maintaining the QoS and QoE levels specified by each service [151]. MEC supports the multi-domain globally dispersed services through sliced network deployments for heterogeneous applications and services [56]. ETSI defined MEC edge platform allows dynamic launching of service instances configurable for required specifications. Thus, network slice instances can be launched as ME Apps at MEC host level to enable multi-slice deployments.

3 SECURITY OF MEC USE CASES

In this section, use cases and applications of MEC are considered. For different MEC applications, security vulnerabilities are investigated while possible countermeasures are presented from the existing literature.

3.1 Critical Infrastructure




Fig. 3. Critical Infrastructure Connectivity to MEC Platform

Critical Infrastructure based services such as energy, water and sewage, offshore oil drilling rigs, financial, and emergency applications have expanded their scope through digitizing their controlling systems with IoT technology. Even industrial sectors are revolutionizing their deployments with novel technologies to cope with the rapid development[133]. Though global expansion of these services to dispersed global clusters constricts the usability of a centralized data centre for storage and processing. Thus, integrating MEC platforms for critical infrastructure services are probable and would improve the interfacing of the general public towards the services as critical customer status updating of billing, consumer usage, and service interruption notifications.

365 The energy sector holds the profound significance out of infrastructure services as it energizes all the other sectors and
366 envisages a sophisticated deployment options with the evolution of smart grid technology. The integration of IoT based
367 technologies enables the formation of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) / smart metering / net metering that
368 overlay a monitoring framework for the smart energy solution [61]. In addition, the incorporation of renewable energy
369 sources demands a decentralized deployment of power coordinating entities (smart grids) that enforce bi-directional
370 energy flow through the transmission grids [8]. Thus, employing an effective power utilization scheme is an intrinsic
371 requirement and achievable through system status analytics on consumer consumption, consistency of the generation,
372 grid utilization and performance of the operating devices. The consumers are granted the opportunity to utilize their
373 household utility spending by monitoring the IoT interfacing tools which facilitate the visualization of any incoherent
374 consumption patterns. The coordinated group of European Committee for Standardization - European Committee for
375 Electrotechnical Standardization - European Telecommunications Standards Institute (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI) proposed
376 a Smart Grid Architectural Model (SGAM) for realizing smart energy use cases [75]. Proposed architecture formulates
377 three dimensions that concatenate five functional interoperability layers with energy sector domains and zones which
378 accounts for power system management. Thus, the amalgamation of IoT technologies with electro technical devices is
379 reinforced from this proposal for achieving the ultimate integration of IoT and energy solutions. Moreover, decentralized
380 nature of smart grids in the energy network and the requirement for minimizing the latency for critical parameter
381 transmission demands the deployment of MEC. Subscribing MEC services for SCADA based smart grids enable the
382 connectivity among them across the network for establishing a monitoring and awareness channel to maintain a
383 balanced energy flow [1]. This approach is capable of alleviating the cost to improve the grid utilization. The consumer
384 interfacing and remote activation/ deactivation of household electrical apparatus is probable from MEC based ME Apps
385 that interconnect the smart grids to the Smart Energy Meters (SEMs).
386
387
388
389
390

391 In an era of urbanization, water and sewage treatment is a paramount necessity for achieving sustainable development
392 facilitated through improved urban sanitation and quality of human life [147]. MEC plays a key role in optimizing
393 the existing water governance techniques that are attributing complexities due to diversified cost structures formed
394 by origin of water sources and environmental externalities [90]. One of the most obvious use case for MEC is the
395 deployment of smart metering infrastructure embedded with Smart Water Meters (SWMs) resembling the AMI setup as
396 indicated in Fig. 3. MEC edge servers or MEHs are responsible for facilitating a low latency communication platform
397 between consumer end, water treatment plant and the central monitoring station. Moreover, sensory inclusions in an
398 automated treatment plant act as a MTC application that is capable of calibrating the control mechanisms to achieve
399 utilized water governance. However, current water treatment plants employ SCADA systems for controlling the fluid
400 flow through processes such as debris removal, filtration, recombination, flocculation, coagulation and chlorination.
401 Enhanced MTC (eMTC) solutions to establishing communication channels are guaranteed through LTE PHY layer for
402 SCADA deployments such as in Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) that operate at different controlling structures [23].
403
404
405

406 Petroleum extraction is a vital industry that caters the fossil fuels which generate combustible energy for energizing
407 vehicular engines and electricity generating plants throughout the globe. The continuous extraction has led to the
408 scarcity of natural resources that forced the petroleum industry to shift the drilling process to the offshore reservoirs
409 where the aquatic resources are still intact [57]. Thus, offshore plants are intrinsic requisites for petroleum industry
410 despite the precarious conditions granted to the employees. Automation is an approach to be considered for entrusting
411 the safety of employees at offshore plants. Magnitude of the power dissipation at the heavy machinery demands
412 the employment of SCADA systems for controlling them. Deploying MEC for expanding the scope and alleviating
413 the latency for oil drilling services improves the probability of launching eMTC based operating infrastructure at
414
415
416

417 offshore plants. This enables the remote automated operation of drilling devices which are linked through satellite
418 communication for mitigating human casualties probable at a plant malfunctioning.

419 Any service infrastructure that utilizes a communication network at its formation is prone to significant security
420 threats. In 2015, the National Cyber-security and Communication Integration Centre – Industrial Control Systems
421 Cyber Emergency Response Team (NCCIC/ICS-CERT) witnessed that the attacks on critical infrastructure have steadily
422 increased over the years [69]. Thus, investigating threats applicable for these application scenarios are critical. Fig. 3
423 depicts the various critical infrastructure based services and their connections to the MEC serviceable platform.
424
425

426 *3.1.1 Security Vulnerabilities.* If we remain with the assumption of internal connectivity of these critical infrastructure
427 facilities are secured by design, their bi directional connectivity with the BS could be the only vector to be considered for
428 penetration by malicious adversaries. The threats to such connectivity would resemble any intrusion based, intervention,
429 DoS or Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks; which are capable of ceasing ME Apps launched in the edge from accessing the
430 relevant infrastructure services. Due to the higher scale of the applications, the MEC edge level entities should have to
431 subscribe more than one MEH and the geo-distributed nature would link more than one MEC edge levels or system
432 levels for a particular critical infrastructure based service. This fact improves the possibility of prone to be attacked or
433 infected by a malicious agent through the MEC server side.
434
435

436 The dispersed deployment of SEMs across households in an AMI based smart grid installation encourages the adver-
437 saries to launch interposing attacks such as eavesdropping, modifying and interrupting in the wireless communication
438 channels additionally to the physical damages effectuated in close proximity [93]. Moreover, Sleep Deprivation Torture
439 (SDT) and Battery Exhaustion Attacks (BEA) are probable in smart grid environments [42]. Similar affect is imposed on
440 SWM installations in a smart water governance scenario. However, the nature of attacks is dependent on the deployment
441 scenario of the critical infrastructure application.
442
443

444 As the core functions of the discussed critical infrastructure based applications are facilitated through the SCADA
445 systems, the internal security vulnerabilities are common for all cases. The isolated and disconnected nature of SCADA
446 based systems advocated resilience against cyber-attacks in the past [17]. However, threats and vulnerabilities were
447 detected with SCADA systems as in the case of the popular worm STUXNET that raised the probability of critical
448 infrastructure services being vulnerable [92]. Moreover, penetration on the sewage system in Maroochi (Australia),
449 BlackEnergy Trojan which targeted a Ukrainian power grid, HAVEX malware and command injection attack on
450 water treatment plant in Kemuri are exemplifying the compromised SCADA systems [71, 128]. The communication
451 of the SCADA installations is attained by Modbus, DNP3 and Profibus protocols [128]. Cyber-attacks probable on
452 Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are categorized into Reconnaissance, command injection, response injection
453 and DoS attacks [71]. In that scenario, MEC system would be infiltrated from the critical infrastructure direction. As an
454 example, the distributed nature of smart grids would allow an infiltrated smart grid to unbalance the energy load by
455 feeding misleading information to the edge entities that could lead to catastrophic circumstances.
456
457
458

459 The connectivity of the critical infrastructure nodes with the BS in the proximity should be secured with extensive
460 cryptographic means due to their criticality and inherent resources. The priority for communication protocol would be
461 the secureness in spite of latency and bandwidth usage. Though the security measures to be adopted internally are
462 different from one application to another.
463
464

465 *3.1.2 Existing Solutions.* Yang et al. in [147] proposed a model for a smart sewage plant operating on intelligent and
466 picturesque SCADA system where sensory devices are employed for conveying monitoring statistics to the intelligent
467 control systems. A high speed and reliable networking platform is formulated to maintain the connectivity between the
468

469 SCADA based control system and the sensing devices. Features such as Real time regulation for optimizing, intelligent
470 decision making, efficient security analysis, self-healing/ correction, superior effluent quality, humanized and visualized
471 inter-operable platform are the intended objectives of the proposed model. SWMs are used to measure the consumer
472 water consumption while updating the central monitoring stations as illustrated in Fig. 3. As malware are definite
473 threats to SCADA systems, the approach instated by Shirazi et al. in [128] for detecting anomalies in SCADA systems
474 employing machine learning techniques is a prominent solution. The K-Means and Naive Bayes are configured in their
475 supervised mode while Principle Component Analysis using Singular Value Decomposition (PCA-SVD) and Gaussian
476 Mixture Model (GMM) techniques are configured to their unsupervised mode. The precision values of the machine
477 learning techniques are evaluated against naive and complex response injections, malicious state/ parameter and
478 function command injections, DoS, and reconnaissance anomalies methods in a gas pipeline simulation model [102, 131].
479 In addition, as Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) are imminent to be deployed in edge infrastructure in line with
480 SCADA systems, cryptographic means to support VNF isolation and shielding for security critical function over less
481 critical functions are important in the context of MEC [11].

485 Hussain et al. in [57] introduced an edge computing based resource allocation model to utilize the existing cloud
486 data centre based latency prone systems which communicated through satellites. Task scheduling policies such as
487 First Come First Server (FCFS) and Shortest Job First (SJF) are considered for remote operations controlled at the edge
488 level through a VM based coordinator to minimize the reliance on onshore distant resources. Proposed heuristics are
489 analysed for various workload conditions.

491 Leligou et al. in [74] proposed a framework that comprised the four layers: energy layer, telecommunication layer,
492 VNF layer and the application layer. The framework is employing MEC as an expanded Multi Radio Access Technology
493 (RAT) xMEC deployment for enabling offloading where blockchain based VNF Descriptors (VNFD) are acting as
494 process tags to achieve traceability in the energy layer. However, the deployment scenario for xMEC offloading is not
495 convincingly explicated to validate the applicability of the framework for smart grids.

498 Saez et al. in [122] propose a framework called System-level Manufacturing and Automation Research Test-bed
499 (SMART) that is controlled through PLC over an IP network engaging the OPC UA protocol in diagnosing and detecting
500 anomalies in the data extracted from the data sourcing devices: CNCs, RFID sensors, cameras, and conveyors. According
501 to the data processing framework; data transforming, analyzing, storing and image processing tasks are conducted at
502 the edge servers for enhancing the efficiency of the smart system. Thus, probable integrating scenarios with different
503 PLC based technologies validate the deployment as a critical infrastructure solution.

505 Experimental setup was orchestrated by Oyekanlu et al. in [96] for determining channel capacity in an edge computing
506 scenario to evaluate the performance of various IoT devices. The channel capacities in terms of SNR for edge computing
507 use cases: smart grids (for periodic, non-periodic, and synchronized phasor management units) and IIoT are formulated
508 assuming wired transmission channels. The results of this conduct are influential for manufacturers in spite of lesser
509 number of loads been considered.

511 The blockchain model proposed by Gai et al. in [42] were focusing on energy security in smart grid environments.
512 The intended objective of the system is to detect improper energy usage patterns to prevent probable energy related
513 attacks such as SDT and BEA. Blockchain technique is applied to form a network resembling a Smart Grid Network
514 (SGN) that is capable of achieving optimal resource management.




Fig. 4. AR and Video Streaming Applications with MEC

3.2 Enhanced mobile broadband channels/ Video Streaming and Analytics/ big events

Video stream analysis based applications such as vehicular license plate recognition, face recognition and domestic surveillance which require high computational complexity for their algorithms to be reliant on UHD transmissions [87][1]. Mobile gaming applications based on VR and AR integration are probable deployments for high level video streaming UHD channels that endanger the bandwidth provisioned for priority services. Cisco predicts that the share of mobile video streaming would be increased rapidly while the bandwidth saving approaches to Over the Top (OTT) streaming channels are identified as intrinsic preliminaries to form multimedia channels [86]. The crowd sourcing based media are uploaded into the servers through multimedia channels precipitately as in; 72 hours of video content uploaded to YouTube, 2.4 million pieces uploaded to Facebook, 347,000 and 216,000 images uploaded into WhatsApp and Instagram in a minute [15]. Moreover, consumer bandwidth has extended from single view to multi-view, 2D to 3D, and single source stream representation to adaptive multi-bit-rate multi-resolution representation. Thus, necessity to implement measures for utilizing the bandwidth from OTT streaming services is a manifesting predicament. There are two scenarios where the video streaming applications are deployed. Peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming traffic routed from an eNodeB serviced by a MEC edge level platform is conveyed to a UE directly that would save the backbone capacity and traffic of the network operator. In case of big event streaming, the streams are digested at a MEC host service subscribed by a local video production studio that would convey the streams to the UEs. This approach however, could be subjected to amendments by the video editors. Fig. 4 is representing various AR and video streaming based services that are capable of deploying under a MEC service infrastructure.

3.2.1 Security Vulnerabilities. A confiscated video stream is probable for embezzlement by the attackers for distilling counterfeited credentials that would violate the integrity of the content [69]. A news feed manipulations result in misleading circumstances for the viewers and would be critical depending on the entropy of the information. As most video streaming traffic are generated from crowd-sourcing applications, an infected UE poses the threat of multi-casting malicious content acting as an egress point through the video streaming channels. The majority of the social media and crowd-sourcing accounts are not equipped with strong password based credentials. Thus, phishing type attacks are capable of commandeering such accounts that violate integrity. Video streaming channels however, is encoded with an acceptable level of encryption. It makes the interposing attacks less probable. As streaming content are stored and processed in MEHs, malicious agents could be conveyed via UEs engaged in various applications mentioned above.

This type of attack results in compromising the edge infrastructure. Moreover, an infected ME App that processes the streaming content is capable of convincing the MEP and VIM to allocate unnecessary resources to exhaust the system.

3.2.2 Existing Solutions. Makinen in [86] proposed a business model for video streaming in events handling incorporating MEC service platforms. The business model is analysed in terms of service, technology, organization, and finance designs for P2P and big event streaming scenarios. Bilal et al. in [15] presented solutions for interactive multi-view streaming and gaming communities incorporating edge computing deployments. Interactive multi-view/ free-view video, video stream transcoding, and cloud gaming scenarios are considered for identifying edge technologies that involve techniques such as Multi-view Video Coding (MVC), Interactive Multi-view Video Streaming (IMVS), Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), and Adaptive Bitrate Streaming (ABR). Ren et al. in [116] investigated the latency minimization problem in a multi-user time-division multiple access Mobile Edge Computing Offloading (MECO) system. Three computation models: local compression, edge cloud compression, and partial compression offloading are formulated for optimizing video compression mechanisms analogous to video streaming deployments.

3.3 Machine to Machine (M2M) and massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC) links in IoT




Fig. 5. MTC integration with MEC

Applications such as e-health wearables, IoT devices and entire range of machine controlled automated communication deployments are considered under this application [61]. The perception level of the majority of IoT applications is composed of sensory devices and actuators which rely on M2M communication for data transferring and conveying of control signals. The devices engaged in M2M communication are called Machine Type Communication Devices (MTCDs) by 3GPP. The access network facilitated for most MTCDs is non-cellular technologies which are Ultra Wideband (UWB), WLAN, ZigBee, Bluetooth, Low Power Wide Area (LPWA), Long Range (LoRa), Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) or Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) in case of e-health applications [20],[138],[78]. The realization of IoT based services covers the extent of communication types which are ranging from Human-to-Human (H2H), Human-to- Machine (H2M) or vice versa and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) [20]. Though a typical MTC architecture instigates two communication

Manuscript submitted to ACM

scenarios: between MTCs and MTC servers or inter-MTCD D2D type [27]. Healthcare applications such as health-assisting humanoid robots, remote surgeries and remote patient monitoring are plausible with MEC MTC deployments which uses WBANs for monitoring e-health statistics [103]. The types of MTCs employed in WBANs are Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICD), pacemakers, neuro-stimulators, gluco-meters, oximeters and vital sign monitors [138]. These heterogeneous bio-sensors, which are attached to different parts of the human body are communicating to the BS through a Machine Type Communication Gateways (MTCGs) using non-cellular network technologies. Fig. 5 illustrates various applications plausible for integrating into a MEC system.

3.3.1 Security Vulnerabilities. MTCs inherit three main vulnerabilities. They are: communication media (such as wireless radio which would be subjected to eavesdropping), resource scarcity regarding power and processing. Nano-networks are limiting the usage of powerful security schemes such as X.805 and translation sequences for security protocols between wired and wireless communication networks to preserve power consumption [20],[138]. Attacks such as DoS, jamming and data tampering targeted at nano-nodes in a WBAN are plausible. An exploited WBAN or a MTCG would penetrate the BS and misinform ME Apps operated under the e-health applications in MEHs by risking the health of patients. Moreover, DoS or jamming attacks targeting a WBAN would cause service disruption of the corresponding ME Apps. Moreover, industry based MTCs are prioritizing the longer operating time over the throughput [78]. Thus, the scarcity of computational resources in MTCs is preventing the employment of strong security mechanisms. All these facts and diversity of communication protocols employed by MTCs are improving the probability to penetrate the MEC system by malicious content.

3.3.2 Existing Solutions. The SMART framework proposed in [122] facilitates data extraction, transformation and load process for a plant floor data sourcing strategy. This deployment is capable of launching OPC-UA and MTConnect MTC protocols for extracting data from devices such as CNC, RFID, robots, sensors, gantry, conveyor, camera, Variable Frequency Drives (VFDs), and energy meters. Integration of edge computing utilize the storage, communication, control, configuration, measurement, and management processes while data analysis based on geometry, event, and signals are orchestrated for data reduction.

Li et al. in [78] proposed a novel framework that integrates M2M communication with MEC in a virtualized cellular network for offloading MTC computational tasks towards the edge to utilize the energy consumption. Connectivity among the four layers: physical resource layer, NFV layer, virtual network layer, controller layer, and the application layer are established from the conjunction of Wireless Network Virtualization (WNV) and SDN technologies. The random access process is formulated employing Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to optimize the cost in terms of energy consumption and computation execution time. Moreover, a new technology called embedded Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) is integrated into the MTCs that offers the switching ability among virtual networks considering their distinct features and QoS requirements. Zhang et al. in [154] proposed a statistical delay bounded QoS provisioning scheme for two types of mobile data offloading scenarios : WiFi offloading and D2D offloading. This offloading scheme intends to be deployed on edge computing mobile wireless networks. The D2D offloading scenario is applicable to MTC deployments that require off-site processing environment due to resource scarcity in MTCs. The effective capacity and the optimal probability of using D2D offloading scenario is modeled mathematically to forecast a QoS guarantee for D2D based edge deployments.

Dong et al. in [27] propose an ICN approach to support anycast services in the core network through the MTC engagement at the mobile edge network located at the eNodeBs. Network softwarization is established from slicing of different service layers managed from an orchestration entity and a slice controller. A cropland monitoring use case is

677 considered for formulating the solution where a protocol is proposed to indicate the intended message flows among
 678 the entities eNodeB, SGW, PGW, MTC server, and MTCDS. The results suggest that the bandwidth saving is higher
 679 at lower anycast update intervals times. Braeken et al. in [18] proposes an Edge Supportive Secure MAR (ESSMAR)
 680 architecture to assist doctors with additional information via MAR means to conclude the diagnosis. It is obvious that
 681 medical/healthcare information is extremely private, and should be protected against external parties. Thus, ESSMAR is
 682 included of a registration/ authentication key management scheme that was validated against MitM and replay attacks
 683 through AVISPA verification tool. The security analysis conducted among the mobile devices, edge server, cloud server,
 684 and underlying networks has given valid insights in formalizing the ESSMAR protocols.
 685
 686

3.4 Autonomous driving channels / connected vehicles and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) Connectivity




Fig. 6. ITS integration with MEC

713 The V2E adaptation is an initiative taken for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) [101]. Vehicular Networks
 714 (VNs) that form the ITS deployments have its distinct place in 5G context [136]. Employing MEC system or any
 715 other edge paradigm for launching V2E applications is a certain fact due to its requirement of ultra-low latency and
 716 reliability [103]. The 3GPP defined connected vehicles technology is focused on enhancing safety, reducing traffic
 717 congestions, sensing vehicle behavior and servicing other vehicular value added services by offloading computational
 718 and geo-distributed services to roadside BSs or Infrastructure to enable autonomous driving with data connectivity
 719 that attribute the alleviated latency [87]. Though, with envisaged drastic development, transportation industries are
 720 becoming conspicuous cyber-targets for adversaries due to their rapidly evolving mobility structure as concluded by
 721 the report from IBM X-Force and Transport Systems Catapult [43]. The smart sensors deployed in vehicles enable the
 722 Advanced Driver Assistant Systems (ADAS), which is introduced as the preliminary stage of self-driving applications
 723 [145]. The embedded features that attribute to 100 million lines of program code and processing ability of 25 GB data
 724 per hour improves the feasibility for deployment [73]. Vehicle automation approaches are entirely reliant on sensors.
 725
 726
 727
 728

729 As sensors being electronic devices prone to be penetrated by adversaries, any successful malicious penetration could
730 result in vehicle collisions, traffic congestions or damages to properties or human lives.

731 The connectivity between the vehicles is different from the connectivity from a vehicle to the BS. The protocols
732 and the communication technology employed for this connectivity depends highly on the manufacturer. Though, in
733 the United States the standard for V2V connectivity is Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) technology
734 which would transmit location, direction and speed of the vehicle to the nearby vehicle [137]. The intention of this
735 V2V deployment is to provide early warnings to imminent accidents detected through a smart system embedded in the
736 vehicles. Fig. 6 depicts the wide range of aspects in ITS deployments integrated with a MEC system. Further, possible
737 attack vectors are indicated in an illustrative context.
738
739

740
741 *3.4.1 Security Vulnerabilities.* vehicular entities are prone to attacks which could be launched in the proximity of the
742 targeted device as physical damage, hardware Trojans and side channel attacks. These attacks could grant access to the
743 communication devices of the smart vehicles which are in direct connection to the Engine Control Unit (ECU) of the
744 vehicle. The infiltration of the ECU could lead to circumvention of the safety critical systems in the vehicle [101]. Thus,
745 influencing the ECU with false statistics in case of an autonomous or semi-autonomous driving could endanger the
746 vehicle and the passengers travelling in it. Moreover, false information could be conveyed by an infected system to a
747 ME App operated under a MEH for causing vehicular accidents with malfunctioning automotive processes.
748

749 The threats plausible for vehicles are mainly targeted at the different systems in a vehicular entity; such as GPS
750 (spoofing and jamming), in-vehicle devices (malware, head unit attack), acoustic sensor (fake noises or interference),
751 radar (jamming, repeater, chaff and smart materials), LIDAR (jamming and smart materials), Odometric sensor (magnetic
752 or thermal), and electronic devices (EMP) [101]. Attacks such as dictionary, rainbow table and brute-force attacks to
753 extract the passwords or keys, DoS or DDoS attacks for service disruption, protocol based attacks targeting Controller
754 Area Network (CAN) or FlexRay and Rouge updates where the adversary targets the ECU firmware are plausible attacks
755 on software perspective [98]. Out of those, attacks focused on in-vehicle, GPS and electronic devices are significant
756 for MEC based connected vehicle deployments. Apart from service disruption of self-driving applications, latency
757 precipitated from these interposing or jamming attacks would still be crucial for connected vehicle applications.
758

759 "Uconnect" is a remote monitoring and controlling in-vehicle connectivity tool that maintains a link with the internet
760 from ECU for facilitating drivers the off-the-vehicle access. The same link with the internet is prone to exploitation for
761 compromising vehicular controlling (brakes, steering, and lighting) and peripheral ECU / Bluetooth based infotainment
762 systems that improve the plausibility of impregnating user mobile devices [43]. The traditional measures for protecting
763 the vehicular systems are inviable due to the evolving softwarize infrastructure of the connected vehicle concept.
764

765 The mobility of the connected vehicles would be a major concern as their speeds and direction are changing rapidly
766 with their movement. This mobility aspect of V2E applications are prone to threats of frequency hijacking of roamed
767 channel, masquerading during handshake, and VM migration attacks presented in [68]. The causes of this threats could
768 result in traffic congestions, accidents, property damages, or human casualties with the latency caused by mobility.
769

770 An infiltrated vehicular communication device is capable of injecting false information with the intention of causing
771 accidents. A threat originated at a vehicular sub system for propagating a malicious agent to the MEC system is
772 facilitated by the intrinsic circuitry of novel V2E deployments. As these embedded circuits are enriched with resources,
773 connectivity and coverage for infiltration could be achieved. But the threat origination could incur at a vehicle which is
774 not connected to the BS directly. The wireless links established between the vehicles in close proximity are vulnerable
775 to jamming or interference attacks which disrupt the V2V communication links entirely. However, the possibility of
776
777
778
779

781 a V2V link being subjected for intervention based attacks such as MitM and relay would be less probable due to the
782 speeds where the vehicles are travelling.
783

784 *3.4.2 Existing Solutions.* To counter the security threats on ITS deployments, security procedures and algorithms have
785 been defined in the IEEE Wireless Access for Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard which are followed in US and
786 Europe under ETSI [58]. This standard proposes an ECC based schema for certification and encryption where the
787 wireless technology IEEE 802.11p is used for secure communication. An adversary is capable of exploiting even the
788 smallest sensors inbuilt in a vehicle such as ultrasonic sensors which are used to detect the short range distances for
789 assisting parking. Xu et al. suggested two defense strategies for vehicular sensory systems. They are; single-sensor based
790 Physical Shift Authentication (PSA) scheme that verifies signals on the physical level and Multiple Sensor Consistency
791 Check (MSCC) that employs multiple sensors to verify signals on the system level to overcome the probable attacks on
792 ultrasonic sensors such as random spoofing, adaptive spoofing and jamming attacks [145].
793

794 As an initiative to achieve the efficiency guaranteed by Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (VDTNs), Kumar et al. in
795 [66] proposed a system architecture which integrates the smart grid environments with MEC based hosting platform
796 for various applications commandeered by mobile devices that are operating within the vicinity of Plug-in Hybrid
797 Electric Vehicles (PHEVs). The architecture consists of four layers where the edge data centers responsible for data
798 storage, file services and CA servers for legitimizing secure entities are included in the third layer. Smart charging
799 functionality is modeled for PHEVs using the Bayesian cooperative coalition game approach in which the throughput
800 increased by 10-15 % while 20% and 10% decrements are obtained for response time and incurred delay respectively.
801

802 Grewe et al. in [45] discussed MEC as a solution to alleviating the cost and latency associated with the resource
803 heavy algorithms executed at the cloud in Electronic Horizon (EH) ADAS systems. The strategy involves offloading the
804 EH instances to the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) or the Road-Side Unit (RSU). This enables mobility independent
805 data retrieval and virtualized services with Information Centric Networking (ICN) integration. Security and privacy
806 challenges in relation to the ICN integration are identified in the paper.
807

808 Cao et al. in [19] introduced a MEC based supporting architecture for Electrical Vehicle (EV) charging that employs
809 RSUs as edge elements to orchestrate the operations: disseminating Charging Station (CS) availability to EVs, information
810 mining and aggregation for EV charging reservations. A protocol for signaling is designed between the entities CS,
811 Global Controller (GC) located in the cloud and RSU, EV operating in the edge network. A process flow for charging
812 was introduced in use of 4 algorithms and a scenario was simulated considering an area of $4500 \times 3400 m^2$ in Helsinki.
813

814 Aissioui et al. in [6] conceptualized the Follow Me edge-Cloud (FMeC) directive amalgamating the MEC and Follow
815 Me Cloud (FMC) concepts that sustain the requirements of 5G automotive systems. The envisioned FMeC architecture
816 enrolls PMIPv6 domains that serve edge cloud services and links to the vehicular entities from eNodeBs covering the
817 domain area. Performance was evaluated from a simulation to model mobile network environment, vehicle traffic
818 environment, and network communication model that employed the tools MONeT++, INET, SimuLTE, and Veins.
819

820 **3.5 Augmented Reality (AR), Virtual Reality (VR), and Mixed Reality (MR)**

821 Out of encompassed 5G service categories: enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), massive Machine-Type Communication
822 (mMTC), and Ultra-Reliable and Low-Latency Communication (URLLC); mobile VR, MR and AR are use cases of eMBB
823 and URLLC which guarantees the ultra-reliability for the considered applications [30, 132]. As a 5G use case AR, VR,
824 and MR are facilitating the services of providing immersive and interactive experience for: 5G hotspots, in-vehicle
825 infotainment systems, and gaming for educating / instructing [88]; in addition to envisaged smart-health applications
826 of remote surgery and remote robotic controlling [111]. The VR refers to a 100% simulated visualization while AR and
827

MR are differing by the extent of virtualization overlaid with digitization on visual perception [30]. A typical VR Head Mounted Display (HMD) occludes the users' field of view and positions the virtualized elements through eye and head movement tracking. In the current market, VR services are delegated to the low cost mobile devices such as Samsung Gear VR and Google Cardboard while Oculus Rift, HTC Vive or PlayStation VR are high quality streaming products with latency sensitivity. The Motion-to-Photon (MTP) latency exceeding 15 - 20 ms for image rendering causes motion sickness for users through conflicted signals precipitated on Vestibulo-Ocular Reflex.

Latency < 10 ms, bandwidth > 1 Gbps and cell capacity > 500 connections are the requirements for ensuring the AR services with performance factors of screen response \approx 2 ms, sensory extractions \approx 1 ms, refresh rate at 120 fps \approx 8 ms, and network RTT processing \approx 2 ms for AR to be deployed as a 5G use case [88]. Basic function of an AR mechanism is to combine digital data generated through computed processing to the physical reality that intensifies the human experience. AR applications have adopted mobile technologies such as Layar, Junaio, Google goggles and Wikitude to enable its integration towards MEC [1]. Error diagnosing in industries and fixing, remote live supporting by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) functionality for machine operation and virtual training for operators are few plausible use cases of AR and VR applications in the industries [69]. Typical AR process requires five critical components operate: video source (mobile camera), tracker (position tracker of the user), mapper (modeling of the environment), object recognizer (known object identifier) and a renderer (processing of the frames) where the components other than the locally deployable video source and the renderer could be hosted in the MEC server for computer intensive offloading [87].

An AR deployment on MEC test-bed has shown the latency and energy consumption reduction by 88% and 93% respectively through computational offloading [84]. This result is increasing the plausibility of integrating AR applications with MEC. Moreover, web-based AR (web AR) is an approach that overcomes the cross-platform and extensive provisioning limitations that are inherent with device-based and app-based AR applications. MEC is a pertinent deployment option for web AR that is envisioning to achieve 1 ms latency with 5G integration [104].

3.5.1 Security Vulnerabilities. The main threats plausible in AR applications are accessing and unauthorized manipulation of the video streams; where the attacker could easily distill the sensitive data of the users while manipulations of the video streams could lead to critical failures in machinery in industrial applications [69][87]. Thus, an exploited streaming channel between the MEC servers and the AR applications could confiscate the content in MEC hosts, which would infect the streaming traffic conveyed to other AR users in the proximity operated under the ME application. An infected ME App would manipulate the MEP and MEPM of the MEC servers to allocate more inessential resources for the particular application resulting service interruption of the MEC Hosts. Conversely, the privacy of both physical and virtual worlds of AR and VR users is a great concern [70]. Other than the private information such as credit card details, banking and personal passwords, virtual information composing the behavioral patterns (pulse and eye tracking enabling sensitive inferences [70]) would be a critical security concern. The interposing of any high bandwidth channel is conceivable for attacks such as MitM, impersonation, malicious node inspection, relay attacks and any attack plausible for intervening communication channels.

3.5.2 Existing Solutions. Langfinger et al. in [69] proposed a secure architecture for industrial AR applications to be compatible with Industry 4.0 standardization. In the deployment, an industrial automation device (as a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)) is securely connected to a mobile device which would convey the camera frames into the edge server through the AR pipeline. After pose estimation, 3D registration, and rendering processes, AR output is visualized at the mobile device transferred in the same secure channel. Measures such as prohibition of parallel connections that

885 links the UE and the edge, one directional information flow as in data diodes, using Transport Layer Security (TLS)
886 protocol, and dynamic assignment of permissions for UE are proposed to enhance the security in this solution.

887 Qiao et al. proposed a framework in [104] for integrating web AR with MEC. The framework is formed from
888 terminal, edge cloud, and remote cloud levels. The terminal level is pursuing the service scheduling and processing tasks
889 while image capturing, image matching and 3D rendering are performed under processing operation. The edge level
890 orchestrates the AR object deployment, destruction and support functions while the remote cloud level is provisioning
891 generalized services in terms of resource management. A performance evaluation conducted employing Samsung Note
892 4, Wi-Fi and Alibaba cloud for launching the MEC framework revealed the effectiveness of edge computing compared
893 with cloud computing.
894

895
896 The computational intensive and delay sensitive features of AR deployments prompt the issue of battery life time on
897 AR devices. In order to address this predicament, Al-Shuwaili et al. in [7] formulated a model for offloading AR tasks
898 to a cloudlet operating in the edge to alleviate the computational and communication overhead thereby utilizing the
899 energy consumption. Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) scheme is adapted to allocate the resources in the AR
900 process in an energy efficient manner.
901

902 Elbamby et al. in [30] investigated a use case for multiplayer immersive and interactive VR gaming scenario for
903 assessing the URLLC performance that employs edge computing and mmWave Access Points (mmAPs). In the gaming
904 environment, the location and orientation of VR Players (VRPs) are tracked and mapped into the virtual space
905 using the mmWave head-mounted displays (mmHMDs). MEC network is formed to perform the offloaded real-time
906 computing tasks that are conveyed through the mmAPs.
907

908 Eventhough the MEC paradigm improves the network responsiveness of the VR applications through alleviated
909 latency, saving the communication bandwidth is vital for the network to avoid congestions. Conversely, leveraging
910 computation and caching resources in mobile VR devices are an approach of sustaining the transmission efficiency.
911 Thus, Yang et al. in [148] proposed a communication constrained MEC framework that utilizes the consumption of
912 resources in the mobile VR devices through the exploitation of caching mechanisms in the edge servers. Lyapunov
913 theory was used to produce the offloading decision optimization algorithm which acts as an optimal task scheduling
914 policy, while the task requests are modeled as a Bernoulli process among other mathematical scenarios considered.
915
916

917 3.6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

918 UAVs play an increasingly important role in various scenarios such as photography, disaster response, inspection,
919 monitoring, precision agriculture, military, communication relaying, traffic control, and disaster relief services [87][50].
920 Tasks such as disaster relief efforts, detection of damaged reactors in the Fukushima nuclear power plant, real time
921 sensing of radiation levels, and status assessment of the neutralizing program was orchestrated by UAVs during
922 the Japans' East great earthquake [91]. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is predicting the amount of UAVs
923 to be sold annually to 4.3 million by 2020 as an indication on the extent of applicability for UAVs [39]. UAV based
924 communication deployments attribute: the Line-of-Sight (LoS) transmission attained by hovering to targeted locations,
925 dynamic deployment ability that features robustness to climatic effects and nullified costs for site installation in case of
926 an acting BS, and UAV-based swarm networks that facilitate ubiquitous connectivity to ground users with high flexibility
927 and various provisioning options [76]. UAV operations are categorized as Low Altitude Platforms (LAPs) and High
928 Altitude Platforms (HAPs) that are distinguished on altitude, computation, coverage, power, capacity and endurance
929 capabilities. Moreover, Size, Weight and Power (SWAP) of UAVs are constraints for attaining desired performance
930 metrics. The priority of the UAV is to conserve its battery life for flying while offloading the computational or storage
931
932
933
934
935
936

937 content to the MEC servers for processing [103]. Thus, employing strong cryptographic primitives or prolonged security
 938 protocols would be infeasible. The controlling link to UAVs could be maintained from a ground station or by a remote
 939 station controlled through a MEC system. Fig. 7 illustrates various UAV enabled applications in addition to embedded
 940 components of a UAV plausible for exploitation and attack vectors.
 941

942 **3.6.1 Security Vulnerabilities.** In this application, the usage of cryptographic primitives would be limited due to the
 943 requirement of preserving power (e.g. drones). Concisely, threats plausible for UAVs are categorized under Electronic /
 944 Electromagnetic, Cyber and Physical (ECP) spaces [39]. Most common type of attack plausible for drones or UAVs is the
 945 GPS spoofing attack, in which fake GPS locations are sent to the UAV for misleading or crashing the object. Approaches
 946 to bypass the cryptographic measures with electromagnetic, optical, or acoustic emanations called compromising
 947 emanations are mentioned in [39]. Apart from that attacks such as malware, key-loggers, blinding the sight of the
 948 remote pilot with laser, identity spoofing, cross-layer, multi-protocol and various DoS or DDoS attacks focused on
 949 exhausting the battery of the UAV is plausible [50, 107]. In the two methods where UAV maintains direct connectivity
 950 with the BS for controlling or computational offloading, the connectivity could be subjected to interposing attacks
 951 plausible on the air interface [109]. The threats towards the MEC system from UAV based attacks can exist with the
 952 computational offloading method where a malicious agent could be propagated to the MEH for manipulating ME Apps.
 953 Any successful attack could result in UAV crashing that cause damages to property or human lives.
 954
 955
 956
 957

958 **3.6.2 Existing Solutions.** Fouda et al. conducted a comprehensive assessment for plausible attacks on UAV Systems
 959 (UAS) focusing on Software Defined Radio (SDR) based UAS architectures [39]. Hooper et al. in [54] proposed a multi-
 960 layer security framework that integrates the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model layers with the Linux operating
 961 system kernel to secure the Parrot Bebop type UAVs from the exploits buffer overflow, DoS and Address Resolution
 962
 963
 964




Fig. 7. Applications and Security of MEC based UAV

989 Protocol (ARP) cache poison attacks. Penetration tests have been undergone in addition to introducing a watchdog
990 timer to utilize the CPU operations to the navigational processes and anti-spoofing mechanisms to the UAV access
991 point.
992

993 Motlagh et al. in [91] proposed a crowd surveillance method adopting UAVs and face recognition techniques for
994 detecting crimes, vandalism, and terrorist acts. In this case, MEC servers are deployed alongside a BS for offloading the
995 surveillance processing tasks to utilize the battery life of UAVs. In the experimental setup, a hexa-copter used as the
996 UAV is embedded with a camera, LTE modem, computing and sensory inclusions for flight controlling. The access to
997 the MEC server is facilitated from a LTE eNodeB while the face recognition process is operated at the ground control
998 station. Local Binary Pattern Histogram (LBPH) algorithm is employed for face detection while the results demonstrated
999 a significant reduction in energy consumption and processing time.
1000

1001 Garg et al. in [43] proposed a load balancing system for vehicular edge processes where UAVs are used as intermediary
1002 hubs for transmitting information for processing and surveillance activities. The system includes the entities: vehicular
1003 entity, UAV, dispatcher, edge devices, cryptographic entity, and the aggregator. The main steps of the model are
1004 authentication, balance load distribution, data processing, encryption, decryption, aggregation of data, and decision
1005 delivery to the vehicle through the UAV. A triple-Bloom-filter is used to launch a fast service processing platform
1006 between the vehicles and UAVs for distinguishing traffic, alleviating E2E delay, and enhancing authentication mechanism.
1007 The experiments conducted in a vulnerable environment with 100 possible attack vectors concluded the improved
1008 factors: computation time complexity, time complexity, delay, and precision.
1009

1010 Inspired by the Wireless Power Transmission (WPT) technologies and their usability on MEC use cases, Zhou et al. in
1011 [155] introduced a novel UAV-enabled wireless powered MEC system for prolonging the operational time of the energy
1012 limited mobile devices. UAVs are transmitting wireless energy to UEs that are located in the coverage area, where
1013 the UEs are granted the ability to leverage the harvested energy to perform computations or offloading tasks. A 3D
1014 Euclidean coordinate system and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol is adopted for formulating the model.
1015 Moreover, energy minimization, computation offloading, CPU frequency optimization, and trajectory optimization are
1016 studied employing Sequential Convex Approximation (SCA) technique and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The
1017 simulated results suggest a decremented total energy consumption of UAVs in the proposed scheme compared with
1018 two other schemes. The minimization however, is not significant. Security challenges for MEC based 5G use cases are
1019 specified in TABLE 1. Further, security countermeasures / best practices adoptable for MEC use cases are tabulated in
1020 TABLE 2.
1021

1022 4 MEC AND 5G RELATED PROJECTS

1023 The MEC initiative is evolving around Europe as most of the companies which collaborate to standardize the concept
1024 are European institutions including the ETSI. Thus, it is conspicuous that most of the MEC based projects are formed
1025 around Europe. The European 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5G PPP) with the initiative of Horizon 2020
1026 grants have funded a multitude of research groups in excelling their products and innovative insights on 5G related
1027 directives [103]. MEC is an underlying concept of most of such projects to achieve the guaranteed features. Therefore,
1028 in this section, MEC related projects and details of the research groups are addressed.
1029

1030 4.1 MEC AI (Jan 2018 - Dec 2019)

1031 MEC AI [95] is a directive pursued under the Edge Computing Enhanced by Artificial Intelligence (EDGE AI) project
1032 conducted by University of Oulu, Finland. The project is funded by the Technology Industries of Finland Centennial
1033 Foundation, Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation, and 'Future Makers' award. As a pioneer in cutting edge research on 5G
1034

Table 1. Summary of Security Challenges for MEC Integrated 5G Enabled Use Cases

Security Challenge	Description	Critical Infrastructure	eMBB Cases	M2M and mMTC	Auto Driving/ V2V	AR/VR/MR/XR	UAVs
DoS/ DDoS and Jamming Threats	Maliciously intended service requests targeting 5G (radio interfaces) and MEC (UALCMP and CFSP) are created in numbers and lead to service delays and disruption.	H	M	H	M	M	H
Flaws in PLC/ SCADA/ CPS	Design flaws in these hardware entities are exposing the industrial automation systems.	H	L	H	M	L	L
Phishing/ Masquerading/ Imposter Threats and Integrity Violations	Inability to verify/ validate the UEs, access points, and 5G/ MEC interfaces are allowing the adversaries to impersonate and extract information with gained access.	M	M	H	H	M	H
Energy & Resource Depletion Threats	Attackers are targeting the exhaustion of processing, storing, and memory resources, while ultimate objective is to deplete the standalone energy of IoT devices.	L	M	H	H	M	H
Scalability	Myriads of IoT devices are demanding rapid access to MEC services; cumbersome crypto primitives are unusable.	M	M	H	L	M	M
Compatibility/ Interoperability	Technological diversification inherent with 5G and IoT is restricting integration of standardized security measures.	L	H	H	M	M	M

 Low Risk

 Medium Risk

 High Risk

directive, researches in University of Oulu are focused on realizing the potential of employing edge computing as a means for processing data extracted from sensory and network devices to be utilized for applications such as hospitals, industry and vehicle steering. Prime objectives of this initiative are low latency and security. MEC based AI methods are developed to achieve those objectives in collaboration with the Finnish industries as Nokia. Especially, security aspects of MEC and AI integration is considered as a prime focus.

4.2 ANASTACIA [Advanced Networked Agents for Security and Trust Assessment in CPS / IoT Architectures] (Jan 2017 - December 2019)

ANASTACIA [14] is a EU H2020 funded project which integrates MEC and IoT for CPS based deployments to guarantee holistic trust and security by-design solutions. This is one of the highly functioning H2020 projects that investigate security from NFV and SDN applicability perspective. ANASTACIA achieved the goals of adaptation of security and privacy practices evident from the results of the projects that yield the technological integration of Low-Resource IoT, VNF image integrity, MEC resource geo-partitioning, NFV security best practices, anomaly based IDS, secure NFVI, network softwarization, 5G NB-IoT, Security-as-a-Service and many other novel concepts.

Table 2. Summary of Security Countermeasures/ Best Practices for MEC Use Cases / Applications

Ref. No.	Proposed Security Countermeasures / Best Practices	Critical Infrastructure	eMBB Cases	M2M and mMTC	Auto Driving/ V2V	AR/ VR/ MR/ XR	UAVs
[128]	Machine learning based anomaly detection technique for SCADA systems	✓		✓			
[74]	Utilizing blockchain based VNF descriptors for energy level tracking in RAT xMEC offloading deployment	✓		✓			
[122]	SMART framework for detecting anomalies in PLC based extracted data	✓		✓			
[42]	Blockchain model for SGNs to counter SDT and BEA, energy related attacks	✓	✓	✓			
[66]	Legitimization of PHEV entities from CA servers in the proposed architecture for MEC based smart grid vehicular charging process	✓			✓		
[45]	Security and privacy considerations in the ICN integrated MEC based offloading scenario for EH ADAS systems				✓		✓
[69]	Secure architecture for industrial AR applications that form a secure pipeline between UE and the edge servers	✓	✓			✓	
[54]	Multi-layer security framework for Parrot Bebop UAVs integrating OSI model						✓
[43]	Cryptographic means used in authentication mechanism considered for UAV based load balancing for edge processes				✓		✓
[108]	Security as a Service (SECaaS) approaches for the edge	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

4.3 SESAME [Small cEIS coordinAtion for Multi-tenancy and Edge services] (July 2015 - January 2020)

SESAME [47] is a EU H2020 project that targets the innovation of network intelligence, applications in the edge and NFV elements established through the extension of small cell concept for realizing highly dense 5G scenarios. MEC concept is studied for proposing the Cloud Enabled Small Cell (CESC) concept that forms a multi-operator configurable small cell to integrate virtualized execution platforms. SESAME targets to develop the orchestration strategy, NFV management, consumer virtualization management interfacing, self-x feature and radio access management techniques demonstrated through a prototype implementation.

4.4 SUPERFLUIDITY [A Super-Fluid, Cloud-Native, Converged Edge System] (July 2015 - March 2018)

SUPERFLUIDITY [123] project is intending to achieve super fluidity in the network by extending services to the core, aggregation, and edge partitions as in the case of zero viscosity fluids. This project is funded by the EU H2020 initiative. SUPERFLUIDITY answers the shortcoming of current networks such as impeding provisioning times, wasteful over-provisioning in variable demand, ineffective hardware, and ineffective heterogeneity support for multi-vendor components. The project developers are aiming to furnish the location, time, scale, and hardware independence benefits to the 5G networks guaranteeing telecom operators the capability to blend IT infrastructure effectively.

1145 Developing a security framework to control the access of network processing functions is one of the project objectives
 1146 of SUPERFLUIDITY. Recent directives of the project have shifted towards SDN and NFV technologies.
 1147

1148 4.5 5G EVE [5G European Validation platform for Extensive trials] (July 2018 - July 2021)

1149 5G EVE [34] intend to implement and test, an advanced 5G infrastructure formed by interconnecting existing European
 1150 sites at Greece, Spain, France, and Italy. It is one of the three projects funded by the 5G PPP in 2018. The conceptual goal
 1151 of this project is to develop a 5G end-to-end facility in Europe to validate the network Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
 1152 of the 5G prototype scenarios through experimentation. The targeted experimental subjects include advanced spectrum
 1153 management, MEC, core/backhaul services, heterogeneous accessing methods, and site internetworking via multi-slice
 1154 orchestration. The telecommunication operators OTE, Telefonica, Orange, and TIM are facilitating the sites at European
 1155 vicinities that focus on diverse use cases as smart mobility, Industry 4.0, smart energy, smart environment, Immersive
 1156 media and entertainment. Services such as URLLC, eMBB, and mMTC are dominating the deployment options.
 1157
 1158

1159 4.6 6G FLAGSHIP (June 2018 - May 2026)

1160 Being a project initiated by University of Oulu, Finland [94]; envisions the wireless connectivity for 2030 with data-
 1161 driven and near-instant features. MEC and use cases specified in this paper are considered directives of 6g-Flagship in
 1162 addition to Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) approaches to automate the functions optimally. The
 1163 goals of this project reach from finalizing the 5G adoption, to the development of the 6G enabling technologies with
 1164 speeding up the digitization process. The domains of wireless connectivity, devices/circuits technology, distributed
 1165 computing, and services/ applications on 6G are covered in this project. A 5G test network is already deployed in the
 1166 project and deployed for developing easy to use tools for future advancements.
 1167
 1168

1169 TABLE 3 represents the summary of MEC based projects been discussed and their targeted aspects in terms of
 1170 security, privacy, trust, mobility, and interoperability.
 1171

1172
 1173 Table 3. Summary of 5G and MEC Projects and Research Groups
 1174

Project	Main Research Focus	Security	Privacy	Trust	Mobility	Interoperability
MEC AI [95]	Ensuring low latency and security in 5G networks via MEC and AI integration	✓	✓	✓		
ANASTACIA [14]	Investigating and demonstrating a holistic trust and security by design solution for CPSs with integrated MEC and IoT concepts that employ NFV/SDN based networking infrastructure	✓	✓	✓		✓
SESAME [47]	Extending the small cell concept to achieve CESC, with the integration of MEC and NFV technologies to realize 5G dense scenarios				✓	✓
SUPERFLUID [123]	Proposes a converged cloud based 5G concept that enable mobile edge use cases by extending the service functionality to the holistic network	✓			✓	✓
5G EVE [34]	Implementing and testing an advanced 5G infrastructure extended to European sites for validating 5G services including MEC				✓	✓
6G FLAGSHIP [94]	Developing the fundamental technologies for emerging 6G with an emphasis on wireless connectivity and intelligent distributed computing	✓	✓		✓	✓

5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK

This section comprises a concise explication of assimilated insights from the survey in terms of security and privacy of MEC systems. Presented insights are aligned with the future directives proposed from emerging researches for recognizing potential of the MEC deployments. Moreover, potential applications and probable technological solutions to be integrated with MEC to enhance the security are summarized.

5.1 MEC Applications

5.1.1 Critical Infrastructure.

Lessons Learned: It is evident that MEC capabilities forecast the potential to realize the smart city concept. Enabling the versatility of infrastructure based servicing is the key to achieving that goal. Though assuring security for diverse infrastructure based services is an arduous task due to their heterogeneous system architectures. Offloading storage and processing functions to the MEC edge network however, guarantees that these variant technologies are operating in a complied digitized environment in the data processing phases. SCADA and PLC based operators are common in these deployments. Threats originating internally in such environments are capable of exploiting the edge system once instilled through the communication channels. Eventhough mechanisms have been studied to detect malicious entities in SCADA based systems, the security of offloading channels are not addressed significantly.

Future Directions: In terms of smart grid security, various approaches such as key distribution based on Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol, ECC, PKI, Trusted Anchor (TA), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) as a third party, hybrid Diffie-Hellman, AES, RSA, Tsai-Lo identity based encryption scheme and ECC based ElGamal schemes are proposed for securing the connectivity extending from the SEM to the smart grid [89, 93, 126]. Blockchain is an approach to be considered in the future to ensure the privacy of subscriber consumption statistics traversing in SGNs [60]. Similar approaches are plausible for developing security solutions to terminal entities in other infrastructure services. Moreover, securing the offloading channels of the edge system is a critical directive for mitigating threats originated internally. In addition, outsourcing security to a trusted MEC based service as in Security as a Service (SECaaS) approaches are gaining popularity due to its optimum resource utilization in the context of critical infrastructure [108].

5.1.2 eMBB Channels/ Video Analytics/ Big Events.

Lessons Learned: Crowd-sourcing applications are one of the major contributors for proliferation of video streaming traffic. As these services are demanding UHD level quality in videos to facilitate ubiquitous reception at mobile devices, managing the bandwidth utilization is a conundrum for MNOs. This requisite is prominent in case of a big event coverage is undergoing. Thus, MEC in-proximity servers are capable of buffering the content prior to launching the streaming service, that enables the seamless video transmission. Advance video analytic capabilities are plausible with MEC servers that align with CCTV, face and vehicular name plate recognition techniques adapted by authorities. Most common type of security attack plausible for streaming channels is the interposing attacks conducted for altering the content for misleading the receiver which are influenced by politics, terrorist, or cyber marketing strategies. To secure the channel, an acceptable level of encryption should be employed. Though embedding security measures for video streaming channels in these scenarios are costing the bandwidth utilization. Thus, metrics should be established to retain the balance between security and bandwidth usage.

1249 **Future Directions:** As trending video streaming and crowd-sourcing applications are demanding their services to
1250 mobile devices, mobility is an aspect to be considered for proposing security measures. Thus, PLS based approaches as
1251 in [143] could be utilized to ensure security from the mobile device end. Joint network coding and re-transmission is an
1252 approach to secure the video streaming channels in IoT systems as proposed in [105]. Moreover, embedding security
1253 mechanisms in the video coding protocols at the design stage with minimum bandwidth adaptation is an interesting
1254 research directive for the future.
1255
1256

1257 5.1.3 mMTC links in IoT.

1259 **Lessons Learned:** The mMTC applications are ranging from the personally using e-health type WBAN wearables to
1260 massive industrial applications that employ MTCDs of different scales to create an autonomous environment. MEC
1261 plays a vital role for ensuring security for wearables with attributed location and context awareness. Moreover, edge
1262 infrastructure acts as a offloading serviceable platform to the industrial mMTC applications to improve their efficiency
1263 and global reach. As MTCDs are operating with various non-cellular communication technologies, employing security
1264 mechanisms should be applied to each technology separately in accordance with their protocols and specifications.
1265 Authentication mechanisms to be adapted should vary dependent on the authenticating entity as both human and
1266 machine entities are engaging in mMTC communications. Service impeding attacks such as DoS and DDoS are causing
1267 more damages to mMTC based industrial systems due to their reliance on scheduled operations. Privacy is a considerable
1268 factor for WBAN based services that is not addressed significantly.
1269
1270
1271

1272 **Future Directions:** For implementing security in WBAN based on nano-technological scale, biochemical cryptography
1273 could be adopted where biological molecules such as DNA or Ribonucleic Acid (RNA) are used as a source of encryption
1274 [138]. Though, this emerging field is creating new set of challenges, a cryptographic key based on molecular configuration
1275 or chemical reaction unique to a person would grant the level of inherence required from the bio-metrics in the nano-
1276 domain. Moreover, ECC based lightweight cryptographic protocols could be employed with WBAN sensory devices
1277 which are more resourceful than nano-level devices. In [153], a Lightweight and Robust Security Aware (LRSA) D2D
1278 assisting Certificate Less Generalized SignCryption scheme is proposed for WBAN based Mobile Health (M-Health)
1279 applications that resemble the requirement. As M2M based authentication schemes are prominent in this use case, PUF
1280 based approaches would be viable for deployment. Integrating security into D2D offloading schemes is a potential
1281 research area for the future under this application. Blockchain is becoming a solid resolution for privacy protection.
1282 Thus, blockchain based solutions such as [52] for tele-health wearable privacy preservation and certificate revocation
1283 approaches for M2M links as in [51] are promising directives for the future.
1284
1285
1286
1287

1288 5.1.4 Autonomous Driving / Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) Communication.

1290 **Lessons Learned:** This is one of the leading use cases of MEC that relies on processing capability of the edge for
1291 enabling autonomous driving to mitigate traffic congestions and accidents. Context awareness feature of the MEC is
1292 the key to deploying these services. In this use case, most probable attack vectors are emanating from the in-vehicle
1293 systems as they are prone to physical attacks. The radio based links that communicate with the MEC BSs directly are
1294 exploitable by attackers to cause accidents. In an ITS system, infrastructure based intermediary entities are located for
1295 expanding coverage. These entities are accessible for physical manipulations. Moreover, interfacing vehicular entities
1296 that engage in V2E adaptations are plausible scenarios for MEC. In that aspect, security in DSRC protocols that enable
1297 the V2V communication is a significant factor to be considered as explicated in [150].
1298
1299
1300

1301 **Future Directions:** Embedding adequate security measures to DSRC protocols as proposed in [79] should be considered
1302 to enhance V2E type communication channels. As vehicular offloading channels are requiring high responsiveness
1303 compared with other offloading mechanisms; an approach as Vehicular Edge Computing Network (VECN) proposed
1304 in [125] could be employed to secure the offloading channels specific to vehicular communications. According to ITS
1305 standard, vehicular entities are connecting with the edge under different scenarios of V2X. Thus, adaptive security
1306 mechanisms should be utilized as proposed in [113]. Moreover, adaptable measures to enhance the security in ECU
1307 of vehicles should be investigated to mitigate in-vehicle threats. Since all such security measures cannot be applied
1308 manually, autonomous approaches should be sought out employing AI or ML methods with novel algorithms to exploit
1309 the trade-off of security application, latency, and energy consumption [12].
1310
1311
1312

1313 5.1.5 AR/VR/MR.

1314
1315 **Lessons Learned:** AR and VR technologies are prominent for gaming and e-learning based applications that are
1316 extended from eMBB and URLLC adaptation. Latency, bandwidth, and cellular capacity are prime factors to achieve
1317 the required performance. Similar to video streaming applications, MEC facilitate a closer proximity video server for
1318 processing and storing AR scenarios. Alleviating the latency associated with image rendering and transmission is
1319 critical for the VR or AR users to avoid health issues as motion sickness. The remote surgeries, error diagnosis and
1320 maintenance in industries are viable AR deployments for the future. Thus, minimizing the delay is vital for realizing
1321 these deployments. In the perspective of security, service impeding attacks are jeopardizing such latency prone services.
1322 Attack vectors such as physical tampering, side channel attacks, malicious code injections, and hardware Trojans are
1323 applicable to AR/VR HMDs. Privacy is a key concern with AR systems, as they are extracting a higher range of sensory
1324 acquisition scope (visual strength, ocular orientation, location, and arm/leg motion tracking) that expose user sensitive
1325 credentials and behavioral statistics.
1326
1327
1328

1329 **Future Directions:** Developing security measures in the user devices as HMDs is imperative to ensure the privacy of
1330 users. As behavioral statistics could be gained from AR or VR based games played by the users without their awareness;
1331 legislation's should be put forward to extract user consent before enrolling with a particular game. Moreover, human
1332 health is a concerning factor for AR/VR based services that could result in ocular discomfort. Thus, proper methods
1333 should exist to notify the user regrading the timely visual quality that AR application is attributing to safeguard the user
1334 health. Though elevated number of sensory extracting apparatus embedded in AR devices are forming an opportunity
1335 to improve the existing authentication schemes and network security through visualization as patented in [124] and
1336 [10].
1337
1338
1339

1340 5.1.6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

1341
1342 **Lessons Learned:** As most UAV based services are operated with a direct connectivity maintained with the UAV
1343 from a ground station, mobility tackling and LoS control signal transmissions are factors that raise concerns over the
1344 communication aspects. The dispersed MEC servers are providing an extended coverage for UAVs to operate seamlessly.
1345 UAVs could enhance the performance by offloading the processing to MEC servers. Due to the higher mobility and
1346 eccentric reachability, UAV deployments are perceptible for surveillance activities in the future. Though battery life is
1347 the prime factor that decides their performance. Thus, UAV targeted attacks are focusing on exhausting the resources
1348 of it to terminate its life-cycle. In addition, eavesdropping scenarios are probable with intently placing of fake UAVs to
1349 induce spoofing attacks.
1350
1351

Future Directions: Proper measures should be explored to pursue the operation of the UAVs in instances that it fails to maintain the LOS connectivity to the operating ground station. Utilizing AI for developing an adaptive auto-pilot scheme is an approach to overcome that requirement[146]. PLS measures could be adapted as in [156] for maximizing the Intercept Probability Security Region (IPSR) to obscure the eavesdroppers through friendly jamming. Moreover, UAV enabled mobile relaying with an integrated MEC platform could be utilized for improving PLS in mobile communication environments [141]. UAVs should be embedded with self-activated security features at the manufacturing stage to counter intercepting attacks as isolation from the communication network is not an option. Similar to V2V applications, UAV requires the autonomous edge intelligence through means of AI/ML methods to improve decision making, and security management [46, 149].

5.2 Futuristic Applications

5.2.1 Rural Communication. The term ‘rural’ signifies an opposite meaning to an urbanized area that does not inherit adequate amount of resources to facilitate a seamless communication operation. As telecom operators are prioritizing their return on investment, developing telecommunication infrastructure extending to areas that occupy minor population is ineffective in their perspective. Moreover, pragmatic circumstances such as geological location, atmospheric conditions, LoS, and failure to acquire land to launch remote sites are plausible factors that enable rural communication. Thus, existing communication options are limited to satellite links that are accessible globally with attributed drawbacks of latency and high reliance on atmospheric conditions[22]. Rural communication is applicable for various instances where rural communities are restricted of accessing novel technologies that rely on mobile connectivity for operation [120]. Rural Smart Grids are one such instance in which an isolated facility or minor community are serviced by a low capacity grid deployment [62]. Moreover, health sector is a widely applicable rural circumstance that requires assistance from underlying communication infrastructure to handle emergency situations including ambulances [29][55]. Due to the improved capacity and coverage in mobile sites of MEC systems, servicing the rural areas are plausible with proper mobile propagation parametric adjustments. In addition, MEC enabled RAN access interfaces are capable of supporting non-3GPP communication services that are plausible for connecting the rural sites to the proximate BS. MEC based rural transmission of data endure an improved opportunity to ensure security and privacy compared with satellite communications.

5.2.2 Smart Agriculture / Farming. The rapid population growth demands excessive food production to cater humans and live stocks in farming industries. Resource depletion, pollution and scarcity for labor are elevating the arduousness of maintaining agriculture based services to cater the demand [100]. Thus, automation is an imminent option for improving the servicing of smart farms with IoT integration. IoT sensors are deployable for monitoring climatic and crop development status to automate the water and fertilizer dispersing mechanisms. These automation strategies draw insights from gathered data analytics to maximize the crop production. Adapting machine learning is such a strategy for crop selection and maximizing crop yielding rates [67]. M2M links are typically established between IoT devices that employ technologies such as BLE, NFC, or Wi-Fi. As these devices are located remotely to the main farm site, physical tampering due to intended or natural causes is plausible. Vehicular monitoring is another aspect of smart agriculture that enhances the efficiency of the outcome. UAVs are applicable to remote monitoring of crops while autonomous vehicles (tractors) are enabling precision farming [103].

Nanotechnology based bio-sensors are a trending adoption for smart farming applications to conduct accurate analysis on soil humidity, water, pesticide usage, and plant pathogens in a nano-scale [9]. Dong et al. in [27] proposed an information centric approach to achieve the anycast service in MTC with ICN (Information Centric Networking)

1405 being enabled as a slice in the future network adaptable to smart farming. The mobile edge computing at the eNodeB
1406 facilitates the anycast service to the clients with significantly less experienced latency and reduced control message
1407 overhead generated in the core network. In the MEC perspective, similar to rural communication; MEC servers remotely
1408 situated or reached via enhanced coverage of MEC enabled BSs, contribute to smart agriculture services significantly.
1409 Though achieving security is a challenging task due to wide coverage.
1410
1411

1412 *5.2.3 Industrial IoT (IIoT) and Industry 4.0.* Industrial Internet, IIoT or “Industry 4.0” is a standard represented by
1413 the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) for integrating IoT services for industrial sectors [103]. Initial intention of the
1414 Industry 4.0 standard was to integrate Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), IoT and cloud computing based data analytics to
1415 facilitate automation for industries by assuring interoperability, information transparency, technical assistance, and
1416 decentralize decision making design principles [106]. Sensors in IIoT are optimizing the production from captured
1417 sensory data via Programmable Automation Controllers (PAC) that handle processing and communication [44, 127].
1418 The majority of current industrial automation plants are embedded with SCADA systems. Thus, security vulnerabilities
1419 explicated under critical infrastructure based applications are adoptable for this circumstance. Moreover, IIoT could be
1420 visualized as a way of amalgamating the machine based and human based workforces for achieving a maximal outcome
1421 that benefit industrial owners and human operators. Digitized data of every aspect in the manufacturing processes
1422 offer opportunities to optimize the practices revealed through proper mechanisms. As industrial factories are large
1423 vicinities, MEC enabled BSs could be launched inside the factories for enhanced service provisioning depending on the
1424 occupied human and non-human workforce. MEC edge level launched within a factory premises could be configured
1425 for servicing specialized industrial requisites to achieve low latency and high reliability. Several edge based approaches
1426 are proposed for enhancing IIoT operation in [16, 97]. As M2M based communications are imminent, security protocols
1427 should adopt proper D2D authentication mechanisms such as PUF and PLS for mitigating exploitations.
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432

1433 *5.2.4 Tactile Internet.* The Tactile internet is considered as the next evolutionary level of the Internet that deliver
1434 real-time control, touch, sensing/actuation information via a reliable, available, responsive, secure, and intelligent
1435 connectivity that envisions a broader internetworking context capable of handling unprecedented circumstances
1436 probable with impending applications [5]. This vision preemptively coined by G. P. Fettweis in 2014, creates a plethora
1437 of opportunities and applications that provision features required for expanding IT market base [85]. It is standardized
1438 by the IEEE Tactile Internet (TI) Standards Working Group (WG) that is designated by IEEE 1918.1 [53]. The 5G mobile
1439 network concept is the *raison d’etre* for Tactile internet that focuses on serving the industries expanding with the
1440 Industry 4.0 standard [129]. Functional representation of the end-to-end Tactile internet architecture includes master,
1441 slave, and network domains where master and slave domains are operating at Tactile edges[5]. These deployments
1442 are mainly focused on serving CPSs, MTC, M2M, D2D, and VR applications that require 1 ms of round-trip latency.
1443 Maier et al. in [85] investigates the deployment of Tactile internet concept with Fiber-Wireless (Fi-Wi) enhanced LTE-A
1444 heterogeneous networks to be adopted in MEC considering the latency and reliability performance aspects. MEC with
1445 its attributed ultra-low latency and high reliability processing infrastructure in the edge envisage the visions of Tactile
1446 internet that enable proper security mechanisms as a significant factor.
1447
1448
1449
1450

1451 *5.2.5 Disaster Management.* Environmental disasters were once believed as a means of balancing the human population
1452 from over-exhausting the resources on earth from devastation’s such as landslides, earthquakes, avalanches, tsunamis,
1453 volcanic eruptions, flooding, forest-fire, and lightning. Though current disasters are prone to be emanated by human
1454 intervention as in massive explosions resulted from industrial malfunctions that extend to nuclear level or extremist
1455

acts resulted from terrorism. In spite of the origination of disasters, the damage and casualties associated with them are unpredictable. Unprecedented nature of the affected scope by geographical and atmospheric means are exacerbating the circumstances for evacuation procedures conducted by the authorities. Thus, scientists are focusing on integrating IoT for disaster management and relieving scenarios that contribute to early warning, notification, data analytics, knowledge aggregation, remote monitoring, real-time analytics, and victim localization functions [114].

Deployment of IoT sensors for measuring the environmental statistics (such as atmospheric, seismic, volcanic, radiation, and ocean level) is paramount to forecasting disasters and their magnitude. Maintaining the communication links without been overloaded is a prime requisite for telecommunication service providers perspective in a disaster situation. MEC is a paradigm introduced to improve the standards of current telecommunication infrastructure in terms of service provisioning and access capacity. Thus, Disaster management services extended through WSNs could be operated by a MEC edge level in a certain geographical coverage area, enabling the disaster mitigation functions mentioned above. Proliferated responsiveness of the MEC RF based access interfaces, attribute the potential to improve the evacuation procedures and notification schemes with the integration of crowd-sourcing applications [112]. As Ray et al. in [114] presents various IoT based state-of-the-art solutions applicable to disaster management situations; proposed cloud based IoT systems as RESCUE by Khan et al. in [64] are extensible for MEC platforms. Leveraging UAVs for disaster relief missions specialized in crowd localization is an effective use case that MEC can contribute for enhancing the performance [32].

5.3 Challenges for Wide Adaptation of 5G

The wide adaptation of 5G for IoT realization is imminent. The networking infrastructure standardized for 5G is different from LTE based deployments in both access and core network formation. Thus, following aspects can be presented as major challenges for 5G realization.

URLLC capabilities are burdening the security engineers in applying appropriate level of security for communication protocols and payload overheads. Thus, novel cryptographic means should be investigated to minimize the overhead drastically. **Massive IoT applications** are creating issues for resource utilization at the edge in terms of processing, communication, and networking aspects with the proliferated IoT devices. Managing security is evidently arduous in such circumstances. **Energy efficiency** of both UEs and intermediary resource constrained edge nodes are quite vital for the service continuity. Thus, energy saving mechanisms (i.e. hibernation), energy harvesting techniques, and energy optimum processing are quite crucial for 5G deployments.

Service migration is becoming an imminent aspect of edge computing; and with local 5G operator based gNBs. Security concerns associated with migration process in terms of virtualization technologies, MNO domains, and handover handling should be investigated thoroughly. **Scalable security** requirements are vital for 5G based deployments where security and latency have a clear trade-off. Thus, security features/ mechanisms should be applied in accordance to the requisites from the application and its priority level. **Orchestration** is the most researched aspect in virtualization domain; which requires complete autonomous control embedded with intelligence in case of edge computing. Security is a vital function under orchestration, and should be standardized for autonomous operation.

6 CONCLUSION

Security and Privacy are vital requirements for upcoming digital services that holds similar significance to performance metrics. Therefore, robustness of a particular application against cyber-intrusions is a demanding factor for raising its selectivity among consumers. However, security flaws should be investigated according to a deployment scenario for accurate identification of vulnerabilities and mapping existing security solutions to mitigate them. In this paper,

we stated various vulnerabilities and attacks that range through cyber and physical space. The standardized MEC architecture has aided us to specify the flaws unique to each use case. Novel security solutions that are proposed for cyber-physical systems, ICN, NFV, and other impending technologies are mapped for each use case in the MEC context. The excessive discussion on assimilated facts and future directives are reinforcing our proposals with comprehension. As this survey focus on multiple use cases, it is our hope that, scientists working on these novel areas will find the presented insights valuable.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work is partly supported by the Academy of Finland under the 6Genesis (grant no. 318927) project.

REFERENCES

- [1] Nasir Abbas, Yan Zhang, Amir Taherkordi, and Tor Skeie. 2018. Mobile Edge Computing: A Survey. *IEEE Internet of Things Journal* 5, 1 (2018), 450–465.
- [2] Mamta Agiwal, Abhishek Roy, and Navrati Saxena. 2016. Next generation 5G wireless networks: A comprehensive survey. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* 18, 3 (2016), 1617–1655.
- [3] Ijaz Ahmad, Tanesh Kumar, Madhusanka Liyanage, Jude Okwuibe, Mika Ylianttila, and Andrei Gurtov. 2017. 5G security: Analysis of threats and solutions. In *2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking (CSCN)*. IEEE, 193–199.
- [4] Ijaz Ahmad, Tanesh Kumar, Madhusanka Liyanage, Jude Okwuibe, Mika Ylianttila, and Andrei Gurtov. 2018. Overview of 5G security challenges and solutions. *IEEE Communications Standards Magazine* 2, 1 (2018), 36–43.
- [5] Adnan Aijaz and Mahesh Sooriyabandara. 2019. The Tactile Internet for Industries: A Review. *Proc. IEEE* 107, 2 (2019), 414–435.
- [6] Abdelkader Aissioui, Adlen Ksentini, Abdelhak Mourad Gueroui, and Tarik Taleb. 2018. On Enabling 5G Automotive Systems Using Follow Me Edge-Cloud Concept. *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology* 67, 6 (2018), 5302–5316.
- [7] Ali Al-Shuwaili and Osvaldo Simeone. 2017. Energy-efficient Resource Allocation for Mobile Edge Computing-based Augmented Reality Applications. *IEEE Wireless Communications Letters* 6, 3 (2017), 398–401.
- [8] Fadele Ayotunde Alaba, Mazliza Othman, Ibrahim Abaker Targio Hashem, and Faiz Alotaibi. 2017. Internet of Things Security: A Survey. *Journal of Network and Computer Applications* 88 (2017), 10–28.
- [9] Amina Antonacci, Fabiana Arduini, Danila Moscone, Giuseppe Palleschi, and Viviana Scognamiglio. 2018. Nanostructured (Bio) Sensors for Smart Agriculture. *TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry* 98 (2018), 95–103.
- [10] Axelle Aprville. 2019. Augmented Reality Visualization Device for Network Security. US Patent App. 10/178,130.
- [11] Michael Bartock, Jeffrey Cichonski, and Murugiah Souppaya. 2020. *5G Cybersecurity: Preparing a Secure Evolution to 5G*. Technical Report. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- [12] Pete Beckman, Charlie Catlett, Moinuddin Ahmed, Mohammed Alawad, Linquan Bai, Prasanna Balaprakash, Kevin Barker, Pete Beckman, Randall Berry, Arup Bhuyan, et al. 2020. *5G Enabled Energy Innovation: Advanced Wireless Networks for Science, Workshop Report*. Technical Report. USDOE Office of Science (SC)(United States).
- [13] Vimal Bhatia, Pragma Swami, Sanjeev Sharma, and Rangeet Mitra. 2020. Non-orthogonal multiple access: an enabler for massive connectivity. *Journal of the Indian Institute of Science* 100, 2 (2020), 337–348.
- [14] Stefano bianchi. 2017. ANASTACIA Project - Advanced Networked Agents for Security and Trust Assessment in CPS / IoT Architectures. <http://www.anastacia-h2020.eu/> last accessed May 16, 2019.
- [15] Kashif Bilal and Aiman Erbad. 2017. Edge Computing for Interactive Media and Video Streaming. In *2017 Second International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC)*. IEEE, 68–73.
- [16] Bartosz Boguslawski, Matthieu Boujonnier, Loryne Bissuel-Beauvais, Fahd Saghir, Rajesh D Sharma, et al. 2018. IIoT Edge Analytics: Deploying Machine Learning at the Wellhead to Identify Rod Pump Failure. In *SPE Middle East Artificial Lift Conference and Exhibition*. Society of Petroleum Engineers.
- [17] Mohammad Borhani, Madhusanka Liyanage, Ali Hassan Sodhro, Pardeep Kumar, Anca Delia Jurcut, and Andrei Gurtov. 2020. Secure and resilient communications in the industrial internet. In *Guide to Disaster-Resilient Communication Networks*. Springer, 219–242.
- [18] An Braeken, Pawani Porambage, Amirthan Puvanewarane, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2020. ESSMAR: Edge Supportive Secure Mobile Augmented Reality Architecture for Healthcare. In *2020 5th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Artificial Intelligence: Technologies and Applications (CloudTech)*. IEEE, 1–7.
- [19] Yue Cao, Omprakash Kaiwartya, Yuan Zhuang, Naveed Ahmad, Yan Sun, and Jaime Lloret. 2018. A Decentralized Deadline-driven Electric Vehicle Charging Recommendation. *IEEE Systems Journal* 99 (2018), 1–12.
- [20] Shuyi Chen, Ruofei Ma, Hsiao-Hwa Chen, Hong Zhang, Weixiao Meng, and Jiamin Liu. 2017. Machine-to-Machine Communications in Ultra-Dense Networks—A Survey. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* 19, 3 (2017), 1478–1503.

- [21] Xi Chen, Zonghang Li, Yupeng Zhang, Ruiming Long, Hongfang Yu, Xiaojiang Du, and Mohsen Guizani. 2018. Reinforcement learning-based QoS/QoE-aware service function chaining in software-driven 5G slices. *Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies* 29, 11 (2018), e3477.
- [22] Edgar Lemos Cid, Manuel Garcia Sanchez, and Ana Vazquez Alejos. 2016. Wideband Analysis of the Satellite Communication Channel at KU and X-bands. *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology* 65, 4 (2016), 2787–2790.
- [23] Mirsad Cosovic, Achilleas Tsitsimelis, Dejan Vukobratovic, Javier Matamoros, and Carles Anton-Haro. 2017. 5G Mobile Cellular Networks: Enabling Distributed State Estimation for Smart Grids. *IEEE Communications Magazine* 55, 10 (2017), 62–69.
- [24] Jose Costa-Requena. 2014. SDN integration in LTE mobile backhaul networks. In *The International Conference on Information Networking 2014 (ICOIN2014)*. IEEE, 264–269.
- [25] Chamitha De Alwis, Anshuman Kalla, Quoc-Viet Pham, Pardeep Kumar, Kapal Dev, Won-Joo Hwang, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. Survey on 6G Frontiers: Trends, Applications, Requirements, Technologies and Future Research. *IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society* (2021).
- [26] Jasenka Dizdarević, Francisco Carpio, Admela Jukan, and Xavi Masip-Bruin. 2019. A survey of communication protocols for internet of things and related challenges of fog and cloud computing integration. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 51, 6 (2019), 116.
- [27] Lijun Dong and Guoqiang Wang. 2017. Information Centric Approach in Achieving Anycast Service in Machine Type Communications. In *2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking (CSCN)*. IEEE, 157–162.
- [28] Thang Le Duc, Rafael García Leiva, Paolo Casari, and Per-Olov Östberg. 2019. Machine learning methods for reliable resource provisioning in edge-cloud computing: A survey. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 52, 5 (2019), 94.
- [29] Leila Eadie, Alasdair Mort, Luke Regan, Ashish S MacAden, and Philip Wilson. 2016. Remotely Supported Prehospital Ultrasound: Real-time Communication for Diagnosis in Remote and Rural Communities. In *Proceedings of the 3rd European Workshop on Practical Aspects of Health Informatics*. CEUR-WS.
- [30] Mohammed S Elbambay, Cristina Perfecto, Mehdi Bennis, and Klaus Doppler. 2018. Toward Low-latency and Ultra-reliable Virtual Reality. *IEEE Network* 32, 2 (2018), 78–84.
- [31] Mohammed Elbayoumi, Mahmoud Kamel, Walaa Hamouda, and Amr Youssef. 2020. NOMA-assisted machine-type communications in UDN: State-of-the-art and challenges. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* 22, 2 (2020), 1276–1304.
- [32] Milan Erdelj, Enrico Natalizio, Kaushik R Chowdhury, and Ian F Akyildiz. 2017. Help from the Sky: Leveraging UAVs for Disaster Management. *IEEE Pervasive Computing* 16, 1 (2017), 24–32.
- [33] ETSI. 2016. Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) Framework and Reference Architecture. *ETSI White Paper #3* (2016). https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/MEC/001_099/003/01.01.01_60/gs_MEC003v010101p.pdf Last accessed 16 May 2019.
- [34] EU-H2020. 2018. 5G-EVE. <https://www.5g-eve.eu/> last accessed May 16, 2019.
- [35] Dongfeng Fang and Yi Qian. 2020. 5G wireless security and privacy: Architecture and flexible mechanisms. *IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine* 15, 2 (2020), 58–64.
- [36] Ana Juan Ferrer, Joan Manuel Marquès, and Josep Jorba. 2019. Towards the Decentralised Cloud: Survey on Approaches and Challenges for Mobile, Ad hoc, and Edge Computing. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 51, 6 (2019), 111.
- [37] Abderrahime Filali, Amine Abouaomar, Soumaya Cherkaoui, Abdellatif Kobbane, and Mohsen Guizani. 2020. Multi-access edge computing: A survey. *IEEE Access* 8 (2020), 197017–197046.
- [38] Shane Fonyi. 2020. Overview of 5G security and vulnerabilities. *The Cyber Defense Review* 5, 1 (2020), 117–134.
- [39] Reham M Fouda. 2018. Security Vulnerabilities of Cyberphysical Unmanned Aircraft Systems. *IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine* 33, 9 (2018), 4–17.
- [40] Xenofon Foukas, Georgios Patounas, Ahmed Elmokashfi, and Mahesh K Marina. 2017. Network slicing in 5G: Survey and challenges. *IEEE Communications Magazine* 55, 5 (2017), 94–100.
- [41] Keke Gai, Meikang Qiu, Hui Zhao, and Jian Xiong. 2016. Privacy-aware adaptive data encryption strategy of big data in cloud computing. In *2016 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)*. IEEE, 273–278.
- [42] Keke Gai, Yulu Wu, Liehuang Zhu, Lei Xu, and Yan Zhang. 2019. Permissioned Blockchain and Edge Computing Empowered Privacy-preserving Smart Grid Networks. *IEEE Internet of Things Journal* (2019).
- [43] Sahil Garg, Amritpal Singh, Shalini Batra, Neeraj Kumar, and Laurence T Yang. 2018. UAV-empowered Edge Computing Environment for Cyber-threat Detection in Smart Vehicles. *IEEE Network* 32, 3 (2018), 42–51.
- [44] Kuntal Gaur, Anshuman Kalla, Jyoti Grover, Mohammad Borhani, Andrei Gurtov, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. A survey of Virtual Private LAN Services (VPLS): Past, present and future. *Computer Networks* (2021), 108245.
- [45] Dennis Grewe, Marco Wagner, Mayutan Arumaithurai, Ioannis Psaras, and Dirk Kutscher. 2017. Information-Centric Mobile Edge Computing for Connected Vehicle Environments: Challenges and Research Directions. In *Proceedings of the Workshop on Mobile Edge Communications*. ACM, 7–12.
- [46] Rajesh Gupta, Dakshita Reebadiya, and Sudeep Tanwar. 2021. 6G-enabled Edge Intelligence for Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Applications: Vision and Mission. *Computer Standards & Interfaces* 77 (2021), 103521.
- [47] H2020. 2015. Small Cells Coordination for Multi-tenancy and Edge Services. <http://www.sesame-h2020-5g-ppp.eu/Home.aspx> last accessed May 16, 2019.

- [48] Hajar Hantouti, Nabil Benamar, Tarik Taleb, and Abdelquodous Laghrissi. 2018. Traffic Steering for Service Function Chaining. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* (2018).
- [49] Rémy Harel and Steve Babbage. 2016. 5G Security Recommendations Package 2: Network Slicing. https://www.ngmn.org/fileadmin/user_upload/160429_NGMN_5G_Security_Network_Slicing_v1_0.pdf Last accessed 16 May 2019.
- [50] Daojing He, Sammy Chan, and Mohsen Guizani. 2018. Security in the Internet of Things Supported by Mobile Edge Computing. *IEEE Communications Magazine* 56, 8 (2018), 56–61.
- [51] Tharaka Hewa, An Braeken, Mika Ylianttila, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2020. Blockchain-based Automated Certificate Revocation for 5G IoT. In *ICC 2020-2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)*. IEEE, 1–7.
- [52] Tharaka Hewa, An Braeken, Mika Ylianttila, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2020. Multi-Access Edge Computing and Blockchain-based Secure Telehealth System Connected with 5G and IoT. In *The 8th IEEE International Conference on Communications and Networking (IEEE ComNet'2020)*.
- [53] Oliver Holland, Eckehard Steinbach, R Venkatesha Prasad, Qian Liu, Zaher Dawy, Adnan Aijaz, Nikolaos Pappas, Kishor Chandra, Vijay S Rao, Sharief Oteafy, et al. 2019. The IEEE 1918.1 “Tactile Internet” Standards Working Group and its Standards. *Proc. IEEE* 107, 2 (2019), 256–279.
- [54] Michael Hooper, Yifan Tian, Runxuan Zhou, Bin Cao, Adrian P Lauf, Lanier Watkins, William H Robinson, and Wlajimir Alexis. 2016. Securing Commercial Wifi-based UAVs from Common Security Attacks. In *Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2016*. IEEE, 1213–1218.
- [55] Mohammad Hosseini, Yu Jiang, Ali Yekkehkhany, Richard R Berlin, and Lui Sha. 2017. A Mobile Geo-communication Dataset for Physiology-aware Dash in Rural Ambulance Transport. In *Proceedings of the 8th ACM on Multimedia Systems Conference*. ACM, 158–163.
- [56] Syed Husain, Andreas Kunz, Athul Prasad, Konstantinos Samdanis, and JaeSeung Song. 2018. Mobile edge computing with network resource slicing for internet-of-things. In *2018 IEEE 4th World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)*. IEEE, 1–6.
- [57] Razin Farhan Hussain, Mohsen Amini Salehi, Anna Kovalenko, Saeed Salehi, and Omid Semiari. 2018. Robust Resource Allocation Using Edge Computing for Smart Oil Fields. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing Techniques and Applications (PDPTA)*. The Steering Committee of The World Congress in Computer Science, Computer ..., 204–210.
- [58] Muhammad Javed, Elyes Ben Hamida, Ala Al-Fuqaha, and Bharat Bhargava. 2017. Adaptive Security for Intelligent Transport System Applications. *IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine* 10, 2 (2017), 110 – 120.
- [59] Dushantha Nalin K Jayakody, Kathiravan Srinivasan, and Vishal Sharma. 2019. *5G Enabled Secure Wireless Networks*. Springer.
- [60] Eranda Harshanath Jayatunga, Pasika Sashmal Ranaweera, and Indika Anuradha Mendis Balapuwaduge. 2021. Blockchain Advances and Security Practices in WSN, CRN, SDN, Opportunistic Mobile Networks, Delay Tolerant Networks. In *Revolutionary Applications of Blockchain-Enabled Privacy and Access Control*. IGI Global, 1–34.
- [61] Anca D Jurchut, Pasika Ranaweera, and Lina Xu. 2020. Introduction to IoT security. *IoT Security: Advances in Authentication* (2020), 27–64.
- [62] Fahad Khan, Atiq ur Rehman, Muhammad Arif, Muhammad Aftab, and Baber Khan Jadoon. 2016. A Survey of Communication Technologies for Smart Grid Connectivity. In *2016 International Conference on Computing, Electronic and Electrical Engineering (ICE Cube)*. IEEE, 256–261.
- [63] Rabia Khan, Pardeep Kumar, Dushantha Nalin K Jayakody, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2019. A Survey on Security and Privacy of 5G Technologies: Potential Solutions, Recent Advancements and Future Directions. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* (2019).
- [64] Taher Khan, Saptarshi Ghosh, Muddesar Iqbal, George Ubakanma, and Tasos Dagiuklas. 2018. RESCUE: A Resilient Cloud Based IoT System for Emergency and Disaster Recovery. In *2018 IEEE 20th International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications; IEEE 16th International Conference on Smart City; IEEE 4th International Conference on Data Science and Systems (HPCC/SmartCity/DSS)*. IEEE, 1043–1047.
- [65] Adlen Ksentini and Pantelis A Frangoudis. 2020. Toward slicing-enabled multi-access edge computing in 5g. *IEEE Network* 34, 2 (2020), 99–105.
- [66] Neeraj Kumar, Sherali Zeadally, and Joel JPC Rodrigues. 2016. Vehicular Delay-tolerant Networks for Smart Grid Data Management Using Mobile Edge Computing. *IEEE Communications Magazine* 54, 10 (2016), 60–66.
- [67] Rakesh Kumar, MP Singh, Prabhat Kumar, and JP Singh. 2015. Crop Selection Method to Maximize Crop Yield Rate Using Machine Learning Technique. In *2015 international conference on smart technologies and management for computing, communication, controls, energy and materials (ICSTM)*. IEEE, 138–145.
- [68] Shankar Lal, Tarik Taleb, and Ashutosh Dutta. 2017. NFV: Security Threats and Best Practices. *IEEE Communications Magazine* 55, 8 (2017), 211–217.
- [69] Michael Langfinger, Michael Schneider, Didier Stricker, and Hans D Schotten. 2017. Addressing Security Challenges in Industrial Augmented Reality Systems. In *Industrial Informatics (INDIN), 15th International Conference on*. IEEE, 299–304.
- [70] Kiron Lebeck, Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner. 2018. Towards Security and Privacy for Multi-User Augmented Reality: Foundations with End Users. In *2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE.
- [71] Chiking Lee. 2018. Discovering Cyber Vulnerabilities in SCADA Control System via Examination of Water Treatment Plant in Laboratory Environment. *The UNSW Canberra at ADFA Journal of Undergraduate Engineering Research* 9, 1 (2018).
- [72] Craig Lee and Andrea Fumagalli. 2019. Internet of Things Security-Multilayered Method For End to End Data Communications Over Cellular Networks. In *2019 IEEE 5th World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)*. IEEE, 24–28.
- [73] Jong-Hyok Lee and Hyoungshick Kim. 2017. Security and Privacy Challenges in the Internet of Things [Security and Privacy Matters]. *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine* 6, 3 (2017), 134–136.
- [74] Helen C Leligou, Theodore Zahariadis, Lambros Sarakis, Eleftherios Tsampasis, Artemis Voulkidis, and Terpsichori E Velivassaki. 2018. Smart Grid: A Demanding Use Case for 5G Technologies. In *2018 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops*

- 1665 [\(PerCom Workshops\)](#). IEEE, 215–220.
- 1666 [75] A Leonardi, K Mathioudakis, A Wiesmaier, and F Zeiger. 2014. Towards the Smart Grid: Substation Automation Architecture and Technologies. [Advances in Electrical Engineering 2014](#) (2014).
- 1667 [76] Bin Li, Zesong Fei, and Yan Zhang. 2018. UAV Communications for 5G and Beyond: Recent Advances and Future Trends. [IEEE Internet of Things Journal](#) (2018).
- 1668 [77] Chao Li, Yushu Xue, Jing Wang, Weigong Zhang, and Tao Li. 2018. Edge-oriented computing paradigms: A survey on architecture design and system management. [ACM Computing Surveys \(CSUR\)](#) 51, 2 (2018), 39.
- 1669 [78] Meng Li, Richard Yu, Pengbo Si, and Yanhua Zhang. 2018. Energy-efficient Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Communications in Virtualized Cellular Networks with Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). [IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing](#) (2018).
- 1670 [79] Chung-Wei Lin and Alberto Sangiovanni-Vincentelli. 2017. Security-Aware Design for V2V Communication. In [Security-Aware Design for Cyber-Physical Systems](#). Springer, 77–86.
- 1671 [80] Madhusanka Liyanage, Ijaz Ahmad, Ahmed Bux Abro, Andrei Gurtov, and Mika Ylianttila. 2018. [A comprehensive guide to 5G security](#). Wiley Online Library.
- 1672 [81] Madhusanka Liyanage, Ijaz Ahmed, Mika Ylianttila, Jesus Llorente Santos, Raimo Kantola, Oscar Lopez Perez, Mikel Uriarte Itzazelaia, Edgardo Montes De Oca, Asier Valtierra, and Carlos Jimenez. 2015. Security for future software defined mobile networks. In [2015 9th international conference on next generation mobile applications, services and technologies](#). IEEE, 256–264.
- 1673 [82] Madhusanka Liyanage, An Braeken, Pardeep Kumar, and Mika Ylianttila. 2020. IoT security: Advances in authentication. John Wiley & Sons.
- 1674 [83] Madhusanka Liyanage, Pawani Porambage, Aaron Yi Ding, and Anshuman Kalla. 2021. Driving Forces for Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC) IoT Integration in 5G. [ICT Express](#) (2021).
- 1675 [84] Pavel Mach and Zdenek Becvar. 2017. Mobile Edge Computing: A Survey on Architecture and Computation Offloading. [IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials](#) 19, 3 (2017), 1628–1656.
- 1676 [85] Martin Maier, Mahfuzulhoq Chowdhury, Bhaskar Prasad Rimal, and Dung Pham Van. 2016. The Tactile Internet: Vision, Recent Progress, and Open Challenges. [IEEE Communications Magazine](#) 54, 5 (2016), 138–145.
- 1677 [86] Olli Mäkinen. 2015. Streaming at the Edge: Local Service Concepts Utilizing Mobile Edge Computing. In [2015 9th International Conference on Next Generation Mobile Applications, Services and Technologies](#). IEEE, 1–6.
- 1678 [87] Yuyi Mao, Changsheng You, Jun Zhang, Kaibin Huang, and Khaled B Letaief. 2017. A Survey on Mobile Edge Computing: The Communication Perspective. [IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials](#) 19, 4 (2017), 2322–2358.
- 1679 [88] Jeremy Mitchell, David Soldani, and Malcolm Shore. 2018. The Path to 5G in Australia: Architecture Evolution from 4G to 5G. <http://huaweihub.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-path-to-5G-in-Australia-03-August-2018-2.pdf> Last accessed 16 May 2019.
- 1680 [89] Amin Mohammadali, Mohammad Sayad Haghighi, Mohammad Hesam Tadayon, and Alireza Mohammadi-Nodooshan. 2018. A Novel Identity-based Key Establishment Method for Advanced Metering Infrastructure in Smart Grid. [IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid](#) 9, 4 (2018), 2834–2842.
- 1681 [90] Andrés Molina. 2018. Water Governance in the Smart City. [WIT Transactions on The Built Environment](#) 179, 1 (2018), 13–22.
- 1682 [91] Naser Hossein Motlagh, Miloud Bagaa, and Tarik Taleb. 2017. UAV-based IoT Platform: A Crowd Surveillance Use Case. [IEEE Communications Magazine](#) 55, 2 (2017), 128–134.
- 1683 [92] Arash Nourian and Stuart Madnick. 2018. A Systems Theoretic Approach to the Security Threats in Cyber Physical Systems Applied to Stuxnet. [IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing](#) 15, 1 (2018), 2–13.
- 1684 [93] Vanga Odelu, Ashok Kumar Das, Mohammad Wazid, and Mauro Conti. 2018. Provably Secure Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme for Smart Grid. [IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid](#) 9, 3 (2018), 1900–1910.
- 1685 [94] University of Oulu. 2020. 6G-FLAGSHIP. <https://www.oulu.fi/6gflagship/> last accessed April 30, 2021.
- 1686 [95] Oulu. 2018. Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC) Artificial Intelligence (AI). <http://www.edgeai.info/project/mec-ai/> last accessed May 16, 2019.
- 1687 [96] Emmanuel Oyekanlu, Charles Nelatury, Alfred O Fatade, Olumuyiwa Alaba, and Ola Abass. 2017. Edge Computing for Industrial IoT and the Smart Grid: Channel Capacity for M2M Communication Over the Power Line. In [2017 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Electro-Technology for National Development \(NIGERCON\)](#). IEEE, 1–11.
- 1688 [97] Christoph Pallasch, Stephan Wein, Nicolai Hoffmann, Markus Obdenbusch, Tilman Buchner, Josef Waltl, and Christian Brecher. 2018. Edge Powered Industrial Control: Concept for Combining Cloud and Automation Technologies. In [2018 IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing \(EDGE\)](#). IEEE, 130–134.
- 1689 [98] Simon Parkinson, Paul Ward, Kyle Wilson, and Jonathan Miller. 2017. Cyber Threats Facing Autonomous and Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges. [IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems](#) 18, 11 (2017), 2898–2915.
- 1690 [99] Imtiaz Parvez, Ali Rahmati, Ismail Guvenc, Arif I Sarwat, and Huaiyu Dai. 2018. A Survey on Low Latency Towards 5G: RAN, Core Network and Caching Solutions. [IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials](#) 20, 4 (2018), 3098–3130.
- 1691 [100] Charith Perera, Chi Harold Liu, and Srimal Jayawardena. 2015. The Emerging Internet of Things Marketplace from an Industrial Perspective: A Survey. [IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing](#) 3, 4 (2015), 585–598.
- 1692 [101] Jonathan Petit and Steven E Shladover. 2015. Potential Cyberattacks on Automated Vehicles. [IEEE Trans. Intelligent Transportation Systems](#) 16, 2 (2015), 546–556.
- 1693 [102] Pawani Porambage, Gürkan Gür, Diana Pamela Moya Osorio, Madhusanka Liyanage, Andrei Gurtov, and Mika Ylianttila. 2021. The roadmap to 6G security and privacy. [IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society](#) 2 (2021), 1094–1122.

- 1717 [103] Pawani Porambage, Jude Okwuibe, Madhusanka Liyanage, Mika Ylianttila, and Tarik Taleb. 2018. Survey on Multi-Access Edge Computing for
1718 Internet of Things Realization. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* 20, 4 (2018), 2961–2991.
- 1719 [104] Xiuquan Qiao, Pei Ren, Schahram Dustdar, and Junliang Chen. 2018. A New Era for Web AR with Mobile Edge Computing. *IEEE Internet*
1720 *Computing* 22, 4 (2018), 46–55.
- 1721 [105] Pengxiang Qin, Pinyi Ren, Qinghe Du, and Li Sun. 2018. Security Enhancement for IoT Video Streaming via Joint Network Coding and Retransmission
1722 Design. In *International Conference on Internet of Things as a Service*. Springer, 40–47.
- 1723 [106] Hamed Rahimi, Ali Zibaeenejad, and Ali Akbar Safavi. 2018. A Novel IoT Architecture based on 5G-IoT and Next Generation Technologies. In *2018*
1724 *IEEE 9th Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON)*. IEEE, 81–88.
- 1725 [107] Archana Rajakaruna, Ahsan Manzoor, Pawani Porambage, Madhusanka Liyanage, Mika Ylianttila, and Andrei Gurtov. 2019. Enabling end-to-
1726 end secure connectivity for low-power iot devices with uavs. In *2019 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference Workshop*
(WCNCW). IEEE, 1–6.
- 1727 [108] Pasika Ranaweera, Vashish N Imrith, Madhusanka Liyanag, and Anca Delia Jurcut. 2020. Security as a service platform leveraging multi-access
1728 edge computing infrastructure provisions. In *ICC 2020-2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)*. IEEE, 1–6.
- 1729 [109] Pasika Ranaweera, Anca Delia Jurcut, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2019. Realizing Multi-Access Edge Computing Feasibility: Security Perspective.
1730 In *2019 IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking (CSCN)*. IEEE, 1–7.
- 1731 [110] Pasika Ranaweera, Anca Delia Jurcut, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. Survey on multi-access edge computing security and privacy. *IEEE*
1732 *Communications Surveys & Tutorials* (2021).
- 1733 [111] Pasika Ranaweera, Madhusanka Liyanage, and Anca Delia Jurcut. 2020. Novel MEC based approaches for smart hospitals to combat COVID-19
1734 pandemic. *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine* 10, 2 (2020), 80–91.
- 1735 [112] Ashish Rauniyar, Paal Engelstad, Boning Feng, et al. 2016. Crowdsourcing-based Disaster Management using Fog Computing in Internet of Things
1736 Paradigm. In *2016 IEEE 2nd International Conference on Collaboration and Internet Computing (CIC)*. IEEE, 490–494.
- 1737 [113] Danda B Rawat and Chandra Bajracharya. 2016. *Vehicular Cyber Physical Systems: Adaptive Connectivity and Security*. Springer.
- 1738 [114] Partha Pratim Ray, Mithun Mukherjee, and Lei Shu. 2017. Internet of Things for Disaster Management: State-of-the-art and Prospects. *IEEE Access*
1739 5 (2017), 18818–18835.
- 1740 [115] Zeineb Rejiba, Xavier Masip-Bruin, and Eva Marin-Tordera. 2019. A survey on mobility-induced service migration in the fog, edge, and related
1741 computing paradigms. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 52, 5 (2019), 90.
- 1742 [116] Jinke Ren, Guanding Yu, Yunlong Cai, and Yinghui He. 2018. Latency Optimization for Resource Allocation in Mobile-Edge Computation Offloading.
1743 *IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications* 17, 8 (2018), 5506–5519.
- 1744 [117] Ju Ren, Deyu Zhang, Shiwen He, Yaoxue Zhang, and Tao Li. 2019. A Survey on End-Edge-Cloud Orchestrated Network Computing Paradigms:
1745 Transparent Computing, Mobile Edge Computing, Fog Computing, and Cloudlet. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 52, 6 (2019), 125.
- 1746 [118] Alex Reznik, Yonggang Fang, and Saad Ullah. 2018. MEC in an Enterprise Setting : A Solution Outline. *ETSI White Paper #30 2*, 30 (2018).
1747 https://www.etsi.org/images/files/ETSIWhitePapers/etsi_wp30_MEC_Enterprise_FINAL.pdf Last accessed 16 May 2019.
- 1748 [119] Rodrigo Roman, Javier Lopez, and Masahiro Mambo. 2018. Mobile Edge Computing, Fog et al.: A Survey and Analysis of Security Threats and
1749 Challenges. *Future Generation Computer Systems* 78 (2018), 680–698.
- 1750 [120] Harri Saarnisaari, Sudhir Dixit, Mohamed-Slim Alouini, Abdelaali Chaoub, Marco Giordani, Adrian Kliks, Marja Matinmikko-Blue, Nan Zhang,
1751 Anuj Agrawal, Mats Andersson, et al. 2020. A 6G white paper on connectivity for remote areas. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.14699* (2020).
- 1752 [121] Matthew NO Sadiku, Shumon Alam, and Sarhan M Musa. 2017. Information assurance benefits and challenges: An introduction. *Information &*
1753 *Security* 36, 1 (2017), 1–5.
- 1754 [122] Miguel Saez, Steven Lengieza, Francisco Maturana, Kira Barton, and Dawn Tilbury. 2018. A Data Transformation Adapter for Smart Manufacturing
1755 Systems with Edge and Cloud Computing Capabilities. In *2018 IEEE International Conference on Electro/Information Technology (EIT)*. IEEE,
1756 0519–0524.
- 1757 [123] S Salsano. 2015. Superfluidity: A Super-fluid, Cloud-native, Converged Edge System. <http://superfluidity.eu/> last accessed May 16, 2019.
- 1758 [124] Mike Scavozze, Jason Scott, Jonathan Steed, Ian McIntyre, Aaron Krauss, Daniel McCulloch, Stephen Latta, Kevin Geisner, and Brian Mount. 2015.
1759 User Authentication on Augmented Reality Display Device. US Patent 9,092,600.
- 1760 [125] Hichem Sedjelmaci, Ines Ben Jemaa, Makhlof Hadji, and Arnaud Kaiser. 2018. Security Framework for Vehicular Edge Computing Network Based
1761 on Behavioral Game. In *2018 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)*. IEEE, 1–6.
- 1762 [126] Vahe Seferian, Rouwaida Kanj, Ali Chehab, and Ayman Kayssi. 2018. Identity based Key Distribution Framework for Link Layer Security of AMI
1763 Networks. *IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid* 9, 4 (2018), 3166–3179.
- 1764 [127] Syed Noorulhassan Shirazi, Antonios Gouglidis, Arsham Farshad, and David Hutchison. 2017. The Extended Cloud: Review and Analysis of
1765 Mobile Edge Computing and Fog From a Security and Resilience Perspective. *IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications* 35, 11 (2017),
1766 2586–2595.
- 1767 [128] Syed Noorulhassan Shirazi, Antonios Gouglidis, Kanza Noor Syeda, Steven Simpson, Andreas Mauthe, Ioannis M Stephanakis, and David Hutchison.
1768 2016. Evaluation of Anomaly Detection Techniques for SCADA Communication Resilience. In *2016 Resilience Week (RWS)*. IEEE, 140–145.
- 1769 [129] Meryem Simsek, Adnan Aijaz, Mischa Dohler, Joachim Sachs, and Gerhard Fettweis. 2016. 5G-enabled Tactile Internet. *IEEE Journal on Selected*
1770 *Areas in Communications* 34, 3 (2016), 460–473.

- 1769 [130] Saurabh Singh, Young-Sik Jeong, and Jong Hyuk Park. 2016. A survey on cloud computing security: Issues, threats, and solutions. *Journal of*
1770 *Network and Computer Applications* 75 (2016), 200–222.
- 1771 [131] Yushan Siriwardhana, Pawani Porambage, Madhusanka Liyanage, and Mika Ylianttila. 2021. AI and 6G security: Opportunities and challenges. In
1772 *Proc. IEEE Joint Eur. Conf. Netw. Commun.(EuCNC) 6G Summit*, 1–6.
- 1773 [132] Yushan Siriwardhana, Pawani Porambage, Madhusanka Liyanage, and Mika Ylianttila. 2021. A survey on mobile augmented reality with 5G mobile
1774 edge computing: Architectures, applications and technical aspects. *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials* (2021).
- 1775 [133] Yushan Siriwardhana, Pawani Porambage, Mika Ylianttila, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2020. Performance Analysis of Local 5G Operator
1776 Architectures for Industrial Internet. *IEEE Internet of Things Journal* 7, 12 (2020), 11559–11575.
- 1777 [134] Prakash Suthar, Vivek Agarwal, Rajaneesh Sudhakar Shetty, and Anil Jangam. 2020. Migration and Interworking between 4G and 5G. In *2020 IEEE*
1778 *3rd 5G World Forum (5GWF)*. IEEE, 401–406.
- 1779 [135] Rahim Tafazolli, Chin-Liang Wang, Periklis Chatzimisios, and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. *The Wiley 5G REF: Security*. Wiley Online Library.
- 1780 [136] Irina Tal and Gabriel-Miro Muntean. 2018. Towards reasoning vehicles: A survey of fuzzy logic-based solutions in vehicular networks. *ACM*
1781 *Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 50, 6 (2018), 80.
- 1782 [137] Elisabeth Uhlemann. 2017. The US and Europe Advances V2V Deployment [Connected Vehicles]. *IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine* 12, 2
1783 (2017), 18–22.
- 1784 [138] Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, Imran Shafique Ansari, and Marwa Qaraq. 2018. Security in Wireless Body Area Networks:
1785 From In-Body to Off-Body Communications. *IEEE Access* 6 (2018), 58064–58074.
- 1786 [139] Jianyu Wang, Jianli Pan, Flavio Esposito, Prasad Calyam, Zhicheng Yang, and Prasant Mohapatra. 2019. Edge cloud offloading algorithms: Issues,
1787 methods, and perspectives. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 52, 1 (2019), 2.
- 1788 [140] Meisong Wang, Prem Prakash Jayaraman, Rajiv Ranjan, Karan Mitra, Miranda Zhang, Eddie Li, Samee Khan, Mukkaddim Pathan, and Dimitrios
1789 Georgeakopoulos. 2015. An Overview of Cloud based Content Delivery Networks: Research Dimensions and State-of-the-art. In *Transactions on*
1790 *Large-Scale Data-and Knowledge-Centered Systems XX*. Springer, 131–158.
- 1791 [141] Qian Wang, Zhi Chen, Weidong Mei, and Jun Fang. 2017. Improving Physical Layer Security Using UAV-enabled Mobile Relaying. *IEEE Wireless*
1792 *Communications Letters* 6, 3 (2017), 310–313.
- 1793 [142] Shalitha Wijethilaka and Madhusanka Liyanage. 2021. Survey on network slicing for internet of things realization in 5g networks. *IEEE*
1794 *Communications Surveys & Tutorials* (2021).
- 1795 [143] Lin Xiang, Derrick Wing Kwan Ng, Robert Schober, and Vincent WS Wong. 2018. Cache-enabled Physical Layer Security for Video Streaming in
1796 Backhaul-limited Cellular Networks. *IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications* 17, 2 (2018), 736–751.
- 1797 [144] L. Xu, A. D. Jurcut, and H. Ahmadi. 2019. Emerging Challenges and Requirements for Internet of Things in 5G. In *5G-Enabled Internet of Things*.
1798 CRC Press.
- 1799 [145] Wenyuan Xu, Chen Yan, Weibin Jia, Xiaoyu Ji, and Jianhao Liu. 2018. Analyzing and Enhancing the Security of Ultrasonic Sensors for Autonomous
1800 Vehicles. *IEEE Internet of Things Journal* 5, 6 (2018), 5015–5029.
- 1801 [146] Anil Kumar Yadav and Prerna Gaur. 2014. AI-based Adaptive Control and Design of Autopilot System for Nonlinear UAV. *Sadhana* 39, 4 (2014),
1802 765–783.
- 1803 [147] Shan-Shan Yang, Ji-Wei Pang, Xiao-Man Jin, Zhong-Yang Wu, Xiao-Yin Yang, Wan-Qian Guo, Zhi-Qing Zhao, and Nan-Qi Ren. 2018. Let a Sewage
1804 Plant Running Smart. In *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science*, Vol. 127. IOP Publishing, 012013.
- 1805 [148] Xiao Yang, Zhiyong Chen, Kuikui Li, Yaping Sun, Ning Liu, Weiliang Xie, and Yong Zhao. 2018. Communication-constrained Mobile Edge
1806 Computing Systems for Wireless Virtual Reality: Scheduling and Tradeoff. *IEEE Access* 6 (2018), 16665–16677.
- 1807 [149] Zhong Yang, Mingzhe Chen, Xiao Liu, Yuanwei Liu, Yue Chen, Shuguang Cui, and H Vincent Poor. 2021. Artificial Intelligence Driven UAV-NOMA-
1808 MEC in Next Generation Wireless Networks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.11681* (2021).
- 1809 [150] E Yeh, Junil Choi, N Prelicic, C Bhat, and R Heath. 2016. Security in Automotive Radar and Vehicular Networks. *Microwave Journal* (2016).
- 1810 [151] Faqir Zarrar Yousaf, Marco Gramaglia, Vasilis Friderikos, Borislava Gajic, Dirk von Hugo, Bessem Sayadi, Vincenzo Sciancalepore, and Mar-
1811 cos Rates Crippa. 2017. Network slicing with flexible mobility and QoS/QoE support for 5G Networks. In *2017 IEEE International Conference on*
1812 *Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops)*. IEEE, 1195–1201.
- 1813 [152] Ashkan Yousefpour, Caleb Fung, Tam Nguyen, Krishna Kadiyala, Fatemeh Jalali, Amirreza Niakanlahiji, Jian Kong, and Jason P Jue. 2019. All One
1814 Needs to Know About Fog Computing and Related Edge Computing Paradigms: A Complete Survey. *Journal of Systems Architecture* (2019).
- 1815 [153] Aiqing Zhang, Lei Wang, Xinrong Ye, and Xiaodong Lin. 2017. Light-weight and Robust Security-aware D2D-assist Data Transmission Protocol for
1816 Mobile-health Systems. *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security* 12, 3 (2017), 662–675.
- 1817 [154] Xi Zhang and Qixuan Zhu. 2017. Statistical Quality of Service Provisioning Over Edge Computing Mobile Wireless Networks. In *MILCOM*
1818 *2017-2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)*. IEEE, 412–417.
- 1819 [155] Fuhui Zhou, Yongpeng Wu, Haijian Sun, and Zheng Chu. 2018. UAV-enabled Mobile Edge Computing: Offloading Optimization and Trajectory
1820 Design. In *2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)*. IEEE, 1–6.
- [156] Yi Zhou, Phee Lep Yeoh, He Chen, Yonghui Li, Robert Schober, Li Zhuo, and Branka Vucetic. 2018. Improving Physical Layer Security via a UAV
Friendly Jammer for Unknown Eavesdropper Location. *IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology* 67, 11 (2018), 11280–11284.
- [157] Qingyi Zhu, Seng W Loke, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua, Frank Jiang, and Yong Xiang. 2019. Applications of Distributed Ledger Technologies to the
Internet of Things: A Survey. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)* 52, 6 (2019), 120.